1/ Yesterday, a public announcement was made regarding the formation of a group called the "Club of Angry Patriots." To gain insight into the gravity of this group, I recommend briefly examining their backgrounds and reviewing the summary of their "manifesto."
2/ This group consists of several terrorists, extremists, and political activists. Among its members are Pavel Gubarev, Vladimir Grubnik, Igor Strelkov, Viktor Alksnis, Maxim Kalashnikov, Maxim Klimov, Mikhail Aksel, and Evgeny Mikhailov.
3/ Pavel Gubarev is known as the "People's Governor" of the Donetsk Region in 2014. Western audience may recognize him for his statement: "But if you don’t want to be convinced, we’ll k*** you. We’ll ki** as many as we have to: one million, five million, or exter**** all of you."
4/ Igor Strelkov(Girkin) is a terrorist, retired(?) FSB colonel, nationalist, and monarchist. Strelkov was a participant in the occupation of Crimea and was also a former leader of the separatist movement in Donetsk in 2014. He was convicted for shooting down flight MH17
5/ Vladimir Grubnik is a notable leader of the russia-backed separatist movement in Odesa. He was arrested as a leader of a sabotage group in 2015, but later exchanged during a prisoner swap in December 2019.
6/ Viktor Alksnis (also known as Black Colonel) is a former Soviet Air Forces colonel and a former Deputy of the State Duma. In 2018, he was elected co-chairman of the all-Russian movement "National-Patriotic Forces of Russia.
7/ Maxim Klimov is a retired Captain 3rd rank (equivalent to Lieutenant Commander in the US Navy). He frequently appears as a guest in Igor Girkin's videos and is often referred to as a "military expert" in various Russian media. Klimov mainly covers military naval topics.
8/ Maxim Kalashnikov is a writer and political activist. He is the host of the online platform "ROI TV," which frequently features Girkin alongside various conspiracy theorists, monarchists, radicals and marginalized political groups.
9/ Mikhail Axel is one of the leaders of the National-Bolshevik (Fascist-Communist party) movement in Moscow. He actively assisted Donbas separatists with humanitarian aid in 2015.
10/ Yevgeny Mikhailov is a former assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia until 2012. He is also a former Governor of Pskov oblast until 2004 and Member of the State Duma: 1993-1996. Mikhailov frequently appears as a guest on Strelkov's videos
11/ The "Club of Angry Patriots" has formulated a set of beliefs and proposals, including recognizing Russia's right to restore its historical borders, opposing the policies of the Wagner group, avoiding new Minsk agreements, and approaching turbulent times with a united front.
12/ The "club" expresses concerns regarding the unpreparedness for a war of attrition, cautioning that a defeat could lead to the russia's collapse. They emphasize that they do not intend to remove the government, but aim to reverse a potential coup from Kremlin elites.
13/ They also aim to bridge the informational gap between decision-makers and the public. The club's overarching objective is to unite "genuine patriots" of diverse political backgrounds into a cohesive platform.
14/ Strelkov has a history of organizing such movements, as seen in creation of the "Committee of January 25th" in 2016. This committee proclaimed a goal to reunify the Russian people into a single state. It positioned itself as an anti-liberal third force
15/ If you are not familiar with this movement, it is not surprising as it existed for less than a year and did not produce any tangible results. There is a possibility that the "Club of Angry Patriots" may meet the same fate as its predecessor.
16/ The fact that this movement has made its presence known through a manifesto in russia, where even liking the wrong social media post can result in imprisonment suggests a backing from a powerful figure from elites, and developing internal struggle among them
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How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.