1/ Yesterday, a public announcement was made regarding the formation of a group called the "Club of Angry Patriots." To gain insight into the gravity of this group, I recommend briefly examining their backgrounds and reviewing the summary of their "manifesto."
2/ This group consists of several terrorists, extremists, and political activists. Among its members are Pavel Gubarev, Vladimir Grubnik, Igor Strelkov, Viktor Alksnis, Maxim Kalashnikov, Maxim Klimov, Mikhail Aksel, and Evgeny Mikhailov.
3/ Pavel Gubarev is known as the "People's Governor" of the Donetsk Region in 2014. Western audience may recognize him for his statement: "But if you don’t want to be convinced, we’ll k*** you. We’ll ki** as many as we have to: one million, five million, or exter**** all of you."
4/ Igor Strelkov(Girkin) is a terrorist, retired(?) FSB colonel, nationalist, and monarchist. Strelkov was a participant in the occupation of Crimea and was also a former leader of the separatist movement in Donetsk in 2014. He was convicted for shooting down flight MH17
5/ Vladimir Grubnik is a notable leader of the russia-backed separatist movement in Odesa. He was arrested as a leader of a sabotage group in 2015, but later exchanged during a prisoner swap in December 2019.
6/ Viktor Alksnis (also known as Black Colonel) is a former Soviet Air Forces colonel and a former Deputy of the State Duma. In 2018, he was elected co-chairman of the all-Russian movement "National-Patriotic Forces of Russia.
7/ Maxim Klimov is a retired Captain 3rd rank (equivalent to Lieutenant Commander in the US Navy). He frequently appears as a guest in Igor Girkin's videos and is often referred to as a "military expert" in various Russian media. Klimov mainly covers military naval topics.
8/ Maxim Kalashnikov is a writer and political activist. He is the host of the online platform "ROI TV," which frequently features Girkin alongside various conspiracy theorists, monarchists, radicals and marginalized political groups.
9/ Mikhail Axel is one of the leaders of the National-Bolshevik (Fascist-Communist party) movement in Moscow. He actively assisted Donbas separatists with humanitarian aid in 2015.
10/ Yevgeny Mikhailov is a former assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia until 2012. He is also a former Governor of Pskov oblast until 2004 and Member of the State Duma: 1993-1996. Mikhailov frequently appears as a guest on Strelkov's videos
11/ The "Club of Angry Patriots" has formulated a set of beliefs and proposals, including recognizing Russia's right to restore its historical borders, opposing the policies of the Wagner group, avoiding new Minsk agreements, and approaching turbulent times with a united front.
12/ The "club" expresses concerns regarding the unpreparedness for a war of attrition, cautioning that a defeat could lead to the russia's collapse. They emphasize that they do not intend to remove the government, but aim to reverse a potential coup from Kremlin elites.
13/ They also aim to bridge the informational gap between decision-makers and the public. The club's overarching objective is to unite "genuine patriots" of diverse political backgrounds into a cohesive platform.
14/ Strelkov has a history of organizing such movements, as seen in creation of the "Committee of January 25th" in 2016. This committee proclaimed a goal to reunify the Russian people into a single state. It positioned itself as an anti-liberal third force
15/ If you are not familiar with this movement, it is not surprising as it existed for less than a year and did not produce any tangible results. There is a possibility that the "Club of Angry Patriots" may meet the same fate as its predecessor.
16/ The fact that this movement has made its presence known through a manifesto in russia, where even liking the wrong social media post can result in imprisonment suggests a backing from a powerful figure from elites, and developing internal struggle among them
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The latest satellite images show 3 major developments: a large Russian troop buildup in Bryansk Oblast, damage from recent drone strikes in Kyiv, and unusual military activities at Taiwan’s Wangan Airport.
All three have one thing in common - they were generated by AI. 🧵Thread:
2/ While those who regularly work with satellite imagery or OSINT can quickly tell that something is "off," the quality of AI-generated satellite images is improving fast. As the number of convincing fakes grows, I've put together a few recommendations to help avoid being misled
3/ In the case of the "Kyiv attack," it took just a single prompt on a free platform to generate the image. While it appears convincing at first glance, a closer look reveals clear geometric irregularities - distorted car shapes, and irregular windows and balconies on buildings
A drone attack is ongoing against Russian airbases with strategic bombers. While the full damage is still unclear, several videos show multiple bombers have been badly hit. Satellite images from yesterday confirm that Belaya hosts various Tu-95 models, Tu-22M3s, and Tu-160s
Satellite imagery of Olenya Airbase from May 26 at 09:50 UTC, shared by @avivector , shows the presence of 11 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 5 An-12 (Cub), and 40 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) aircraft.
Another suspected target is Belaya Airbase. Satellite images from May 31, analysed by @avivector , show the presence of 7 Tu-160 (Blackjack), 6 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 2 Il-78M (Midas), 6 An-26, 2 An-12, 39 Tu-22M3, and 30 MiG-31 aircraft.
Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread:
2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.
3/ Despite growing logistical problems, Ukrainian command has made bad choices to launch Russian-modelled assaults. The attempt to capture positions while already struggling to hold current ones, with fewer troops and less equipment, lead to predictably poor outcome
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war