Ukraine has more mobilized manpower in formed units.
So it can rotate units out of the line, add replacements, train them up and then move them back in the line.
The use of the Ukrainian National Guard in the line is so heavier units can be placed into an offensive reserve
2/
Russia's 1st line army units at the start of the war have, in many cases, been destroyed multiple times.
Historical 20th century casualty data* shows a unit losing 1/3 of its at start manpower quickly becomes "combat ineffective" & needs to be rotated out of the line
*See⬇️ 3/
...to be rebuilt.
Russia has regularly had 1st line inf. units go better than 50% casualties in this war.
There is an additional problem in that troops in combat continually for 180 days or something larger than 180 days in a year are "fought out" as front line combat troops
4/
We are over 400 days into this war.
The Sept 2022 & Jan 2023 Russian 'mobilizations' were in many ways desperation moves to plug the front lines in Ukraine with bodies because the survivors of the 'at start' Russian infantry & Jun 2022 LPR/DPR Mobiks were 'clocking out.'
5/
Additionally, both Ukraine and Russia have been burning out heavy combat equipment at a huge rate.
Ukraine has been better able to recover damaged equipment with the 'farm tractor brigades' and using East European NATO facilities to help repair them.
6/
Russia has had to pull T-80, T-72, T-62's and now T-55's from 'reserves' to replace losses with a smaller total AFV repair capability.
Simply put, NATO tank & AFV repair shops have more money to fabricate spares, plus access to modern electronics, that Russia does not. 7/
Thus new Russian units with 'Mobiks' are getting lighter and less mechanized over time, with diminishing capability to repair what they have, because cadre to train Russian specialists were fed into the meatgrinder in April-May 2022.
8/
Ukraine's Army is getting not only new specialists trained in NATO army training facilities to operate new Western equipment.
It is getting INSTRUCTORS trained on this equipment to train more Ukrainians.
9/
The two different trajectories of force development in the face of attrition over time is leading to something called "Lanchester Square Law Collapse."
It means the quality of one side collapses versus it's opponents such that it take more & more effort for less military effect.
The collapse of Japanese airpower in late 1943 - early 1944 after more than a year of attritional South Pacific air battles is a classic example. 11/
So were the collapses of the German U-boat fleet on May 1943 Atlantic convoy battles and the German fighter air arm between Feb and May 1944.
12/
We all need to watch for signs of a similar collapse of Russian ground fighting power in the coming weeks.
The 7-to-1 KIA exchange rates Ukraine has claimed versus the Russians at Bakhmut & masses of destroyed AFV's at Avdiivka are promising developments in that regard.
Thanks to @svillsss and a correspondent of mine, we all have an answer to the mystery of a forklift in a 1988 Soviet logistical document, given the near total dearth of domestic Soviet production of them for the Red Army.
The side by side video by @uaweapons below shows the tell tale smoke cloud of a thermobaric explosive jetting out of a small space that no longer has enough oxygen to burn the available aluminum fuel.
The relative dearth of RuAF tactical trucks and the large number of semi-tractor trailers on this Mariupol and Melitopol supply route says Russia has pulled a lot of transport from the Russian economy to replace lost military trucks.
A Ukrainian counter-offensive that gets within GMLRS M30A1 (tungsten fragment variant) range of such a Russian traffic jam will turn it into a Kuwaiti style "Highway of Death."
And please note they are using civilian tractor-trailers to move fuel.