I obtained a russian document titled "Regulation on Storm Units Z of the 8th Combined Arms Army." This document outlines the objectives, organization, and logistical requirements of 'Storm Z' units. After analyzing its contents, I have distilled the main points.
2/ The document defines "Storm Z" Company as an independent, joint, tactical, combined-arms company temporarily created outside the regular army corps unit structure for immediate operational use in performing particularly complex combat missions.
3/ The document outlines a request to establish 'Storm Z' companies within the following units:
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades: 1st, 9th, 110th, 114th of the 1st Army Corps
Motorized Rifle Regiments(150th division): 102nd, 103rd
4/ Tank Regiments(150th division): 68th, 163rd
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades: 4th, 6th, 7th, 110th, 123rd, 132nd.
5/ The composition of the company (or detachment) has a flexible structure that varies depending on the received combat mission, the situational conditions, the terrain, and other factors, and is completed with the necessary number of personnel
6/ "Storm Company Z" (100 personnel) structure:
4x Capture Squad (10 personnel each)
4x Fire Support Squad (10 personnel each)
1x Company Command (2 personnel)
1x Combat Engineering Group (5 personnel)
1x Reconnaissance Group (8 personnel)
8/ The goals of the Storm 'Z' company are:
• To conduct combat operations in a city (settlement) or areas with difficult geographical conditions.
• To capture important objects such as strongholds, command posts, communication centers, buildings, structures
9/ • To carry out sabotage operations in territories controlled by the enemy.
• To search for and destroy sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
10/ • To block structures and eliminate enemy forces within them.
• To adjust artillery fire and air support
11/ It should be noted that the servicemen who join the Storm-Z unit are granted a status equivalent to that of "BARS" volunteers, and they receive a salary of 205,000 rubles per month for the duration of their contract.
12/ GROUP TRAINING
The training and coordination of Z Company typically requires 10 to 15 days and is conducted in three stages.
During the first stage, the focus is on restoring military personnel's proficiency in various skills, including weapons handling, first aid,
13/ camouflage, shelter preparation, reconnaissance, and communication. The training also includes specialized instruction for UAV operators and mine and booby trap deployment and removal.
14/ The second stage of training involves squad coordination, with a focus on joint actions of military personnel in combat pairs, trios, and squads. It includes self-help and mutual assistance, mutual fire cover, radio communication,
15/ and preparation for coordinated actions during marches, urban assault, capturing fortified points, and securing gains.
The third stage of training involves the coordination of platoons, with a main focus on preparing them for conducting assault operations
16/ and coordinated joint actions during marches, urban assaults, capturing fortified points, and securing gains.
It is noteworthy that Company Z includes inmates, and there are particular regulations concerning their participation, which I will cover in the Part II.
17/ Kindly ensure to like and follow, as Twitter algorithms tend to demote content related to war and Ukraine, so you do not miss the second part.
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Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
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You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
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3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization
🧵Thread with key findings from Frontelligence Insight analysis on Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Groups: structure, tactics, training, equipment, battlefield performance, and the conditions that enabled them
2/ Though called “assault” groups, Motorcycle Assault Groups serve diverse roles beyond direct assaults - handling diversion, reconnaissance, behind-the-lines infiltration, logistics, and flanking support in larger operations.
3/ More importantly, motorcycles act mainly as rapid transport, ferrying troops to their objectives rather than acting as combat platforms. As analysts @KofmanMichael and B.A. Friedman note, a better analogy is “dragoons” - mounted infantry who rode into battle but fought on foot
Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), a respected investigative group that has tracked Russian military affairs for over a decade, has published a new report on the production of T-90 tanks. 🧵Thread about their key findings on Russia’s tank production and expansion efforts:
2/ By early 2022, just before the invasion, Uralvagonzavod had started mass production of the upgraded T-90M "Proryv." The army had received 66–85 tanks, plus 10 sent to the Kazan Tank School. In total, Russia had about 65–85 T-90Ms and 370–380 older T-90s around February 2022
3/ CIT estimates that Uralvagonzavod built 60–70 T-90Ms in 2022. Production reportedly rose to 140–180 tanks in 2023. In 2024, output may have reached 250–300 tanks. All current T-90Ms are newly built, and hull production does not appear to be a limiting factor.
Nearly every week, headlines, X threads, and opinion pieces tout drones as the new defining technology of modern and future warfare. While there is certainly truth to that, it’s worth stepping back and examining this "now-mainstream" idea. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine has become the first battleground where drones have fundamentally reshaped the battlefield. By estimates, over 70% of battlefield losses are from the drones. Even if the exact figure varies depending on the source or methodology, most assessments place it above 50%
3/ In many ways, Ukraine has done for drones what "Operation Desert Storm", and later the "Shock and Awe" campaign in Iraq did for modern warfare: reshaping assumptions and demonstrating the transformative role of air supremacy and advanced technology across all levels of combat