I obtained a russian document titled "Regulation on Storm Units Z of the 8th Combined Arms Army." This document outlines the objectives, organization, and logistical requirements of 'Storm Z' units. After analyzing its contents, I have distilled the main points.
2/ The document defines "Storm Z" Company as an independent, joint, tactical, combined-arms company temporarily created outside the regular army corps unit structure for immediate operational use in performing particularly complex combat missions.
3/ The document outlines a request to establish 'Storm Z' companies within the following units:
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades: 1st, 9th, 110th, 114th of the 1st Army Corps
Motorized Rifle Regiments(150th division): 102nd, 103rd
4/ Tank Regiments(150th division): 68th, 163rd
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades: 4th, 6th, 7th, 110th, 123rd, 132nd.
5/ The composition of the company (or detachment) has a flexible structure that varies depending on the received combat mission, the situational conditions, the terrain, and other factors, and is completed with the necessary number of personnel
6/ "Storm Company Z" (100 personnel) structure:
4x Capture Squad (10 personnel each)
4x Fire Support Squad (10 personnel each)
1x Company Command (2 personnel)
1x Combat Engineering Group (5 personnel)
1x Reconnaissance Group (8 personnel)
8/ The goals of the Storm 'Z' company are:
• To conduct combat operations in a city (settlement) or areas with difficult geographical conditions.
• To capture important objects such as strongholds, command posts, communication centers, buildings, structures
9/ • To carry out sabotage operations in territories controlled by the enemy.
• To search for and destroy sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
10/ • To block structures and eliminate enemy forces within them.
• To adjust artillery fire and air support
11/ It should be noted that the servicemen who join the Storm-Z unit are granted a status equivalent to that of "BARS" volunteers, and they receive a salary of 205,000 rubles per month for the duration of their contract.
12/ GROUP TRAINING
The training and coordination of Z Company typically requires 10 to 15 days and is conducted in three stages.
During the first stage, the focus is on restoring military personnel's proficiency in various skills, including weapons handling, first aid,
13/ camouflage, shelter preparation, reconnaissance, and communication. The training also includes specialized instruction for UAV operators and mine and booby trap deployment and removal.
14/ The second stage of training involves squad coordination, with a focus on joint actions of military personnel in combat pairs, trios, and squads. It includes self-help and mutual assistance, mutual fire cover, radio communication,
15/ and preparation for coordinated actions during marches, urban assault, capturing fortified points, and securing gains.
The third stage of training involves the coordination of platoons, with a main focus on preparing them for conducting assault operations
16/ and coordinated joint actions during marches, urban assaults, capturing fortified points, and securing gains.
It is noteworthy that Company Z includes inmates, and there are particular regulations concerning their participation, which I will cover in the Part II.
17/ Kindly ensure to like and follow, as Twitter algorithms tend to demote content related to war and Ukraine, so you do not miss the second part.
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1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
🧵Thread
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories