1/65 I mentioned earlier a 2017 pitch deck of the Global Virome Project co-authored by Daszak that puts zoonosis and lab-leak exactly on the same footing and refers to lab-enhanced pathogens.
Without further ado, here are the key slides:
Slide 2:
2/65 These are the very first words of the very first slide, ignoring the title slide.
The next slides repeat the message and explain why the GVP can help detect outbreaks caused by the very real risk of lab-escape of potentially enhanced viruses.
Let's read this again👇🏻
3/65 Slide 4:
Again the threat of a lab accident is very clearly outlined, including the elevated risk of lab-leaks from pathogens enhanced via Gain-of-Function.
Daszak (EHA) was one of the main authors behind that Sep 2017 slide deck, with Carroll & Mazet.
@Johnincarlisle
4/65 Slide 5:
The Global Virome Project will help develop countermeasures for both zoonosis and lab-enhanced viruses, and will help detect the lab-made ones by mapping most natural strains👀
Coronaviruses are especially important in this context.
6/65 Slide 9:
The Global Virome Project presents a path to identifying and characterizing those viruses that have the greatest potential to infect humans, and their laboratory enhanced variants..👀
The GVP infrastructure will help get a handle on "man-made" threats even after the end of the GVP program (10 years):
11/65 Slide 25:
On the zoonosis side, we see evidence of SARS like coronavirus infections in Yunnan and none in Wuhan.
Wuhan is actually a good control group for that:
[This was later released in a paper by Shi ZL & Daszak, sent for publication in Nov 2017]
12/65 Slide 34:
Let's talk 💰.
$1bln of grants over 10 years will allow us to tackle these dual threats.
Also we will do some modelling and lab-based work to assess the zoonotic potential of newly discovered viruses.
Note to self: Really make sure that you don't leak a 🦠
13/65 Slide 40:
We conclude with some usual names.
EcoHealth Alliance, USAID, NIH, Metabiota, Pasteur Institute, etc plus China Academy of Sciences, Chinese CDC, BGI for a China pitch.
14/65 Slide 40 (cont.):
Note the Star Trek Emblem between USAID and Columbia Uni on the slide above.
Likely an insider joke based on Season 1, Episode 4, "The Naked Time" (1966).
All while asking for $1bln of funding over 10 years. Yippee 🥳
15/65 That pitch deck has been online for years.
A simple Google image search ("laboratory-enhanced viruses") immediately returns it. I found it that way a year ago.
Before I give a bit of context about this deck, here is the Slideshare link:
https://t.co/wMeuuPl6wmslideshare.net/SirTemplar/201…
16/65 Notes:
I saved the Sep 2017 deck as a PDF here:
There is a very similar June 2017 deck (26 slides instead of 41) that was attached to a FOI by @USRightToKnow.
@garyruskin has authorised me to release an extract of that FOI:
https://t.co/UgfAvBF1f7 https://t.co/dN5bm61Tytdrive.google.com/file/d/1cztLeo… drive.google.com/file/d/1J2UE8O…
17/65 Context:
The USRTK FOI extract gives us some context for the GVP pitch deck.
👉🏻 The June 2017 deck was being reviewed by Peter Daszak (EHA), Dennis Carroll (USAID), Jonna Mazet (UC Davis), Nathan Wolfe and Eddy Rubin (Metabiota) for the coming GVP launch.
18/65 None of these people ever mentioned it.
And they have all kept telling us that lab-escapes and lab-enhanced pathogens were pure conspiracy theories.
Or that we were wasting time asking for better oversight of GoF.
19/65 More specifically, that GVP slide deck was being prepared for the launch of the Global Virome Project at the Prince Mahidol Award Conference in Bangkok in early 2018.
20/65 Slide 22 of the short June 2017 deck explains the situation at the time quite well.
The "first wave" country launches refer to Thailand (TVP) and China (CVP).
21/65 For Thailand, the DoD already had its entries.
Supaporn in particular had long been an asset there, working with DARPA and DTRA/CBEP.
DTRA was looking for funding more sampling work there at that exact time:
22/65 For China, George Gao announced the launch of the Chinese Virome Project during the first major GVP international planning meeting held in Beijing in Feb 2017.
23/65 Of importance: funding in China was already available in 2017 for the Chinese version of the GVP, for instance under program 973.
More money was likely to come under various Road and Belt initiatives (which implies sampling in other Asian countries).
24/65 At the time the idea of the GVP team was to offer a front seat to China so as to integrate its CVP.
EcoHealth Alliance seemed to be even toying with the idea of giving the driving seat to China, possibly to try to convince the US to step in with some massive grants.
25/65 There was certainly plenty of confusion in the GVP team as to what the best approach was:
- get the US to lead asap with substantial backing and funding, or
- hand the lead over to China, despite likely data sharing issues.
26/65 Other countries joined the US administration in questioning whether China could be trusted to share its collected viruses, especially if it was building the main database, which effectively would put it in a leadership position:
27/65 And some serious issues were also being raised by the US Consulate in Wuhan as to the reliability of China as a key scientific partner on such a project.
Its behaviour there in 2017 did not inspire confidence.
31/65 All this happened when the 10-year PREDICT grants were ending and EHA was feeling the pinch.
EHA first tried to secure $1bln of grants over 10 years for the GVP.
Here are Daszak, Carroll and Mazet exactly one week after that email between them with the GVP slides.
32/65 Then in early 2018 EHA would put a DEFUSE proposal for DARPA, which proposed the creation (chimera/FCS insert), fine-tuning (passaging) and testing of lab-enhanced SARS-like viruses with the WIV.
https://t.co/I2A04oTMfQvanityfair.com/news/2022/03/t…
33/65 Deeper context:
After 9/11 & the anthrax attacks, the US started looking very actively at countermeasures and detection/attribution mechanisms for pathogens outbreaks (see TMTI below).
In 2016, as Genome Editing was becoming easier and cheaper, more concerns were raised:
34/65 The concerns were not only with terrorist groups (main focus after 9/11), but also with state actors.
The concerns also included the possibility of accidental release of lab-enhanced pathogens during civilian research projects.
https://t.co/RVwREzjCltbit.ly/BiotechRiskAss…
35/65 Then in ~2017 more alarm bells started ringing in the US, as China was launching a very ambitious Synthetic Biology program and was readying two P4s: in Wuhan and in Kunming.
I wrote in detail about it here: and https://t.co/zqofqnAdLw. https://t.co/SqbA1V2gENbit.ly/3nhcK9Q bit.ly/3TKHyf6
36/65 Track II cooperation was the only card in US hands.
At the same time, US factions pushed back against regulations that would just hinder similar work in the US and not affect the 'bad guys'.
2017 is when the NIH quietly lifted the GoF moratorium.
38/65 So the DoD was naturally high on the list for likely funding.
The GVP pitch then played precisely on some previous DoD efforts for the detection of lab-enhanced pathogens as we shall soon see. 🎯
Which now brings us to the TMTI and the DoE.
39/65 The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative was a 10-year program started in 2007 to 'successfully counter future genetically engineered biological weapons' and 'develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures that will benefit the warfighter.'
https://t.co/De1x58TNGcbit.ly/TMTI_Intro
40/65 The main ideas behind the DTRA TMTI were
- to rely on sampling to fill gaps in knowledge and
- to use top US laboratories, especially the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to design ways of detecting lab-enhanced pathogens.
https://t.co/RqM7Oj1QNuosti.gov/biblio/1016982
41/65 Hence the Global Virome Project falls squarely within the need to get samples to fill the gaps and be able to detect lab work.
See this TMTI report written by scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (under the Dept. of Energy) for DTRA:
https://t.co/N3a776lm10osti.gov/biblio/971776
42/65 This other report from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for DTRA has a few interesting notes about early efforts at Generic Engineering identification:
https://t.co/Dx4di17Lynosti.gov/biblio/1016982
43/65 One key point here is that the Livermore lab was one of the main players tasked with the problem of identifying lab-enhanced pathogens
And they came up with a 'most likely' lab origin for SARS-CoV-2 (with 'low confidence').
https://t.co/xRFz2mLiConationalreview.com/the-morning-jo…
44/65 Effectively the GVP pitch of sampling for detection of lab-enhanced pathogens was an answer to a well known interest of the DoD. 🎯
48/65 This was in reaction to a Science article extolling the virtues of the GVP, naturally without mentioning its other dimension (i.e. the detection of lab-enhanced pathogens from just-as-likely lab-accidents).
49/65 In contrast to the cosy Science shoo-in, another piece sent over by Daszak, Mazet & Watson in Dec 2017 to the WHO Bulletin did raise some good questions.
See the short extract of the FOI included here (the rest will be released by @USRightToKnow).
https://t.co/Uv3augXvRKdrive.google.com/file/d/1XQRHKN…
After the Wuhan outbreak, the GVP was recycled in the DEEP VZN program, a $125 million 5-year USAID smaller scale alternative announced in May 2021, with some of the usual US partners.
It excludes China.
@RogerWicker @ChuckGrassley
52/65 The DEEP VZN program description oddly states that SARS-CoV-2 is clearly zoonotic due to its host plasticity (despite no host animal having ever been found)
55/65 Fast forward to April 2020, and Daszak will be telling Hongying Li, the EcoHealth Alliance employee that was the liaison with the WIV and did that short China-led GVP presentation, NOT to upload the latest WIV sequence data from PREDICT-2 into Genbank.
Subtle irony.
56/65 As it is, we are also still waiting for China to reopen access to its main viral database that became externally inaccessible in Sep 2019 (despite being funded in part by the US and Europe).
57/65 Now let's imagine that you have been worried about China's huge ambitions in Synthetic Biology since around 2017, just as it was readying two P4s (Wuhan, Kunming).
At the same time you were witnessing a hardening of China's position (Wuhan consulate, Kunming P4, etc)
58/65 The only cards that you then have in your hands are:
- a Track II effort
- some hope of building a viral atlas that can then be used for attribution (lab-leak vs. zoonosis), under the guise of various sampling programs that you may soon be able to expand with the GVP.
59/65 So you bank heavily on the first card (Trust) and start pushing the second (Verify).
You take Baric to China (53'35'' below) and share some great synthetic biology technologies and ideas, to try to ingratiate yourself and get access (Trust).
60/65 See for instance the Harbin conference of Jan 2019, with for the very first time a dedicated workshop on 'Responsible Conduct in the Use of Gene Editing in Pathogen Research'.
61/65 And you keep sampling under various programs (GVFI, PREDICT, NIH, DoD/NMRC, ), while making sure you get these samples back home to build your viral atlas (Verify).
Eg; 2014-19 NIH grant EHA, 'Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence"
64/65 If it all plays out well, you may even be able to get more support for the idea of sampling systematically left and right, starting with DEEP VZN.
Which by now is effectively the only card left in your hand to address the biosecurity risk.
https://t.co/Q8oCX9QfTqnzherald.co.nz/world/covid-19…
65/65
I hope that you enjoyed this deep dive on the GVP, its emphasis on the very real risk of lab-leaks of enhanced pathogens as already recognized back in 2017, and the biosecurity implications behind it.
Like/Retweet the first tweet if you can 👇🏻:
@natashaloder @dasher8090
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1/11 There is an interesting interview from Aug 2002, which I have already pointed to, that shows how Fauci went 100% with the Biodefense agenda of Bush and Cheney.
It adds context to Emily's thread.
2/11 Fauci explains how he was given the green light by Bush / Cheney for taking over a major Biodefense portfolio within the NIH.
For instance, one of his first tasks was to plan for a possible bioweapon strike by Saddam Hussein. He worked hard on that urgent threat:
3/11 Fauci was really thrilled of being plugged in directly into Bush and Cheney, to be able to protect the US and Israel against imaginary bioweapons from Saddam.
He had a 'whole new respect for people that work in the White House, including the President'.
2/8 Key questions are addressed in this research, such as:
👉🏻 Who was really behind the investigative initiative of Jeremy Farrar, of the Wellcome Trust, at the end of January 2020.
👉🏻 Why the tone and conclusions of the Proximal Origin draft changed so much within a week of the confidential investigative call that took place on 1 Feb, organised by Farrar at the suggestion of Anthony Fauci (head of NIAID).
👉🏻 Why the agreed plan to have the WHO onboard the origin question was dropped around the 9 Feb, and never heard of again, despite having the support of the US government.
👉🏻 Why Farrar organised both the publication of Peter Daszak’s Statement of Support and the release of Proximal Origin at a crucial time.
👉🏻 What the position and priorities of the US administration regarding the WHO, and getting access to data and isolates, were.
👉🏻 What the role of Fauci in all of this was, and what he did in support of Farrar but also for his own sake.
👉🏻 Who sent an anonymous letter to Jon Cohen at Science denouncing the Proximal Origin co-authors as impostors, in July 2020, and why.
@AshleyRindsberg @hfeldwisch @emilyakopp @Akselfrid @zeynep @StrackHaley @nicholsonbaker8
As China was started to steam ahead on its own in 2017-18, be it sampling, GoF or various synthetic biology experiments, EHA was starting to be left behind.
EHA tried to stay on the train with the GVP and DEFUSE. That failed, as the risk-reward equations looked bad.
But within the NIH grants framework, Daszak was able to obfuscate his difficulties just enough, while the NIH was clueless enough to keep the game going into new territories.
Then as the degrading picture became more clear, some on the Track II Biodefense side thought that this was basically the only chance left to keep a seat on that train.
So, just at the time when it was losing control, the NIH looked the other way.
The result is a screw-up that was predictable from day one (back in 2002/3).
Now the NIH finds itself with grant and policy breaches, with Fauci demonstrably trying to prevent an investigation.
But the fact is that this was a Track II Biodefense game, played within the NIH, with imperatives of its own.
It’s like trying to fit a square plug in a round hole.
1/8 The story of one of the worst policy failures in US history in a nutshell, as an introduction to my latest work on the USAID and EHA grants in South East Asia:
Left Behind:
@emilyakopp @natashaloder @zeynep @KatherineEban
How come that Daszak's R01 AI110964 lists San Pya clinic (Myanmar) and Institut Pasteur (Cambodia) as in-country partners, when in fact these confirmed that they were NEVER contacted by EHA and have no idea why they are showing up on the grant?
2/11 Not only that, but the April 2020 update by EHA positively states that San Pya Clinic and Institut Pasteur Cambodia performed their assigned tasks and sent their samples to the WIV.
@emilyakopp @KatherineEban
3/11 I am not sure how you call this, but mis-reporting and likely fraud come to mind..
Not exactly a typo:
These entities were listed over and over in the grant documents, and are even attested as having done their work by EHA, but were never contacted by EHA!
@R_H_Ebright
Daszak did 4 months of detention in 1986 for stealing a TV set, a hi-fi, a statue and some other items, so that he could indulge in his alcohol fuelled ‘fun’ at other people’s expense.
This fraud later managed to get hold of 100s millions of US taxpayers money.