Thread by @sambendett

1/ THREAD. Russian military's Armeijski Sbornik magazine recently published a review of military tactics that work for Ukrainian forces, don't work for and should be avoided by the Russian military, and advice on going forward. Few main points are below.

2/ "Ukrainian military has widespread use of ambushes, which are usually arranged in bushes near hollows, near forest glades, edges, near roads, clearings and paths passing through ravines, and around turns along the routes of Russian military advancement (ambush action time 5-10… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

3/ "Ukrainian use of artillery at long ranges (up to 30 km) with fire guidance and adjustment with the help of UAVs; constant rotation and regrouping of units to maintain mobile defense;"

4/ "Ukrainian units' active use of Electronic Warfare, video surveillance, sensors, high-precision measurement and aiming devices, camera traps for fire destruction; availability of computer tablets with software for exchanging information via the Internet and setting tasks;"

5/ "Short-term (up to 5 minutes) raids by mobile groups at night on off-road and pick up truck-type vehicles (composition: up to 10 people, 2–3 vehicles with mortars, MLRS); artillery fire 2-3 minutes after discovering our positions because of Russian soldiers' use of open… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

6/ "Ukrainian infantry actions are protected by snipers, artillery, air defense and electronic warfare; destruction of weakly guarded Russian convoys (fuel and ammunition) in populated areas by letting our reconnaissance, forward (raid) detachments through."

7/ Typical mistakes among Russian military forces still include: "Chaotic movement of military columns, single vehicles, including civilian ones, along the roads in our rear; congestion of personnel in combat formations;"

8/ "Inefficient organization of Russian anti-tank defense, lack of additional protection from enemy anti-tank weapons; Continued use of open communication channels and cell phones. Using phones with SIM cards is prohibited, since the enemy’s electronic intelligence is working,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

9/ "Admission of civilians with cell phones to places of Russian forces' accommodation (concentration), on the advance routes; lack of interaction with each other, with neighboring units, with departmental structures (Rosgvardia, FSB), other paramilitary formations);"

10/ "Russian military's firing positions, trenches, shelters for personnel are not equipped in a timely manner, if they are built at all."

11/ Other advice to the Russian forces: "When using a quadcopter, launch this UAV far away from active battle formation groups; pilot the drone from the launch point to a low altitude of 50–150m to the reconnaissance area at a distance of 300–500m; fly back this quadcopter in the… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

12/ "When moving to a new location, send a task force in advance to the new deployment area with a minimum number with radio and satellite communications equipment."

13/ None of this is new, and many of these points were discussed in detail last year by the Russian military commentators, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, and by Western and international expert community, especially the dangers of using civilian comms in a warzone."

14/ That this public magazine has to restate some of the more obvious points probably indicates that many typical opsec procedures are still not followed.