North Korea promised a lot over the past years, but they keep delivering. Solid ICBMs were hinted at as early as April 2017. 1/
They also had included a solid ICBM in their current 5-Year-Plan, I think. Don’t nail me down on that one, though. I think @JosephHDempsey just mentioned an announcement of the solid ICBM in January 2021. /2
As always with North Korea, the speed of turning that idea into reality was breathtaking. They fired a big “140 tf” solid motor in December 2022, just 4 months ago. /3
And just yesterday, they successfully launched their three stage solid ICBM “Hwasong-18”. As a rocketeer, congratulations to that achievement. /4
There are nice photos and videos available from the launch. A treasure trove of information, but also looks cool 😎 Thanks to NK! /5
One thing to verify with that is, for example, first stage burn time, which should be around 65 seconds. And it is. /6
Why? Because a smart way to design a three stage solid ICBM of that size and performance would be that configuration we’re seeing, and the characteristics that follow from this choice. /7
As you can see, others had opted for similar choices in the past. Take the Soviets, or the USA. /8
Nonetheless, it’s still surprising how close so many details of the Hwasong-18 and its operations resemble those from the Topol family. Just look at this video (I only had a mobile Topol launch at hand, the successor Topol-M should look similar. /9
These parallels in technology are quite common in the North Korean program, having started with identical Scud copies in the 1980s, up to the engines that power their liquid ICBMs (which all were copied with almost no visible NK development and tests, and very few failures). /10
Therefore, the quick success of the Hwasong-18 can be seen as another proof of the NK genius at work. Where it took Soviets and China decades(!) to get solid ICBMs, NK just does it better, it seems. Also, none of those countries would dare to support NK missile development. /11
So much for now. On the road ahead: NK will probably declare the HS-18 operational and in serial production, and start fielding large numbers next month. Perhaps we’ll see another launch. Or not. You never know with North Korea. 12/12
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
UPDATE:
Risking to sound as if I'm talking about @PlayStation , I will refer to the Pukguksong-4 from October 2020 as the PS4 (left), and the Pukguksong-5 from the recent parade as the PS5 (right). 1/
A second look shows that PS4 and PS5 were both carried by the same trailers. Diameter looks quite the same. The PS5 looks a little longer - but it's not. This impression is made by the mock-up's position on the trailer, the shroud, and the paint job. 2/
The front brackets that support the mock-ups on the trailers have been moved forward for the PS5 (see red arrows). The cable raceway length seems similar for PS4 and PS5, but the PS5 seems to sit a little further back on the trailer. 3/
Some thoughts on the new NK Pukguksong-4A SLBM. First, dimensions. Always hard to figure that out, but I doubt the 2.15 m diameter I’ve seen floating around. That would put it in one league with the Russian Bulava, Chinese JL-2, and US Trident II D5. 1/x
While some analysts seem to expect such a leap from NK, I have my doubts. It took Russia a decade, and China longer than that, to get such a missile working. Also, the soldiers sitting in front of the PS-4A missile would all have to be basketball players if it was 2.15 m. 2/x
Nonetheless, the PS-4A is an interesting design. You can see a flat cable raceway running along the top, indicating a 2 stage configuration (cables are never run through the combustion chamber of a solid rocket motor, and you see the cables being mounted outside 2 times). 3/x
This guy either is a simple brat, or a paid troll, but I will use this argument to clarify some things about the North Korean KN-02 and its “improved version”. @RobotikaAutomat , at the next insult you’ll be the first one I ever blocked and reported. 1/18
The great @JamesMartinCNS NK Missile Test Database over at @NTI_WMD starts listing KN-02 launches from 2013 on. This may be due to their self-imposed restriction of only adding missiles beyond 500 kg payload and 300 km range. 2/18
But there were reports about the KN-02 (being an “upgraded”, “improved”, or “altered” version of the Soviet SS-21) a long time before that. First public appearance was at a 2007 parade, and tests have been reported since May 2005, even rumored since 2004. 3/18
The statement from a Seoul official that "North Korea is not capable of firing ICBMs from mobile launchers" should not be a surprise. It seems not everyone had a close look at the available Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 launch photos. (1/5)
There was some infrastructure hidden in a nearby trench at the Hwasong-14 maiden flight in July 2017. Cables were connecting the rocket with that trench. (2/5)
Again the same at the second Hwasong-14 launch: Cables and a trench, but also something hidden behind a fence. (3/5)
The following Thread is not to be seen as a full analysis, but more like some thoughts on things that should have been pointed out a while ago. Since they were not, I will do that now. So, here are some thoughts on the new #NorthKorea “ATACMS-lookalike” #missile. 1/19
According to open source knowledge, this missile type was first launched August 10, 2019 (2 launches 16 minutes apart), and again August 16 (2 launches 15 minutes apart). 2/19
The reported range and peak altitude at flight was 400 km with 48 km (Aug 10) and 230 km with 30 km (Aug 16). That raises the question why NK developed this system. They already have 7(!) different operational systems for that range: 3/19