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1-22
An article that will sound reasonable to some, with a better setup for various scenarios than some other similar articles. But ultimately wrong, I believe, at the conceptual level.
My critique and alternative analysis below.
foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia…
An article that will sound reasonable to some, with a better setup for various scenarios than some other similar articles. But ultimately wrong, I believe, at the conceptual level.
My critique and alternative analysis below.
foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia…
2-22
The temptation of the analogy with the Korean War is obvious, thousands of people have thought about it, I did too. But there's a major difference: Western troops are not fighting in Ukraine. And so the analogy makes us project into Ukrainian decision making far too much.
The temptation of the analogy with the Korean War is obvious, thousands of people have thought about it, I did too. But there's a major difference: Western troops are not fighting in Ukraine. And so the analogy makes us project into Ukrainian decision making far too much.
3-22
The "as long as it takes" line from Western govts is the only one that survives scrutiny. Signalling that we desire an exit is not much better than betraying Ukraine at an earlier stage in the timeline.
The "as long as it takes" line from Western govts is the only one that survives scrutiny. Signalling that we desire an exit is not much better than betraying Ukraine at an earlier stage in the timeline.
4-22
Here's the thing: it isn't us fighting and bleeding. If it were our troops, looking for exits and tables would be fair game. Perhaps foolish. But fair. Our blood, our timeline, our impatience, our cry for our suffering to stop. But in this war, none of those are ours.
Here's the thing: it isn't us fighting and bleeding. If it were our troops, looking for exits and tables would be fair game. Perhaps foolish. But fair. Our blood, our timeline, our impatience, our cry for our suffering to stop. But in this war, none of those are ours.
5-22
Ukraine's territories are not ours to give. I will keep on saying this.
If it were one of our nations being invaded, it should rightly be only for us to decide whether or not to fight on or to settle.
Ukraine's territories are not ours to give. I will keep on saying this.
If it were one of our nations being invaded, it should rightly be only for us to decide whether or not to fight on or to settle.
6-22
For this reason of essential legitimacy, our official govt positions are that it's up to Kyiv, and Kyiv alone, to make the choice, at any point in time in future, to settle or to fight on. And we must stick to this and stop questioning it. It is the only correct position.
For this reason of essential legitimacy, our official govt positions are that it's up to Kyiv, and Kyiv alone, to make the choice, at any point in time in future, to settle or to fight on. And we must stick to this and stop questioning it. It is the only correct position.
7-22
Now, what is the Western interest here?
The supreme interest is the upholding of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of aggression.
The first-best outcome for our nations is a full Russian defeat in Ukraine.
It is also the first-best for Kyiv.
Now, what is the Western interest here?
The supreme interest is the upholding of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of aggression.
The first-best outcome for our nations is a full Russian defeat in Ukraine.
It is also the first-best for Kyiv.
8-22
This is the first-best not just because of common principles but also for mid- to long-term deterrence.
The crime of aggression cannot be seen to pay.
The aggressor must be seen to have failed in full - domestically and in the eyes of others.
Anything less is dangerous.
This is the first-best not just because of common principles but also for mid- to long-term deterrence.
The crime of aggression cannot be seen to pay.
The aggressor must be seen to have failed in full - domestically and in the eyes of others.
Anything less is dangerous.
9-22
There is, then, a pragmatic question. What if making the aggressor fail in full doesn't happen? The problem with some of these scenarios is that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies that affect our policies of support.
There is, then, a pragmatic question. What if making the aggressor fail in full doesn't happen? The problem with some of these scenarios is that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies that affect our policies of support.
10-22
While the authors do stress the need for more assistance to Ukraine, which is right, they also deploy the argument of saying that our resources are limited and may be needed elsewhere. They also express impatience. For a war that we're not fighting. That's a bit weak.
While the authors do stress the need for more assistance to Ukraine, which is right, they also deploy the argument of saying that our resources are limited and may be needed elsewhere. They also express impatience. For a war that we're not fighting. That's a bit weak.
11-22
This is just at one-remove from under-calibrating assistance because we wish to sell land that is not ours to sell.
We have no other choice but to boost our military means, and to do so immediately, for all the purposes we may need them for, including Ukraine.
This is just at one-remove from under-calibrating assistance because we wish to sell land that is not ours to sell.
We have no other choice but to boost our military means, and to do so immediately, for all the purposes we may need them for, including Ukraine.
12-22
Every scenario analysis that looks for an ideal moment to run to the proverbial negotiation table makes certain implicit assumptions that are problematic. Even those who concede openly that Moscow might not want to deal implicitly assume that it will.
Every scenario analysis that looks for an ideal moment to run to the proverbial negotiation table makes certain implicit assumptions that are problematic. Even those who concede openly that Moscow might not want to deal implicitly assume that it will.
13-22
It is more rational to assume that Russian state behaviour will be consistent with behaviour to date. First, that Russia will never truly settle, because for Moscow, a forever war is not a problem.
It is more rational to assume that Russian state behaviour will be consistent with behaviour to date. First, that Russia will never truly settle, because for Moscow, a forever war is not a problem.
14-22
Any line of contact is likely to be violated. Any truce to be exploited for future aggression. There is no end point to hope for as long as Putinism reigns. Putin's Russia has a near-infinite will for aggression and crime. It is not a Western country.
Any line of contact is likely to be violated. Any truce to be exploited for future aggression. There is no end point to hope for as long as Putinism reigns. Putin's Russia has a near-infinite will for aggression and crime. It is not a Western country.
15-22
Russia is not a society agitated by loud voices that denounce "forever wars". Putin loves forever wars.
But he can also be deterred by superior force.
And his troops can be demolished and he doesn't escalate.
Conversely, wherever he wins, horror ensues.
These are the facts.
Russia is not a society agitated by loud voices that denounce "forever wars". Putin loves forever wars.
But he can also be deterred by superior force.
And his troops can be demolished and he doesn't escalate.
Conversely, wherever he wins, horror ensues.
These are the facts.
16-22
So, what we need to solve the problem is to be much, much stronger than Russia, in the military dimension, and also in every other category of coercion.
The only future that works for Ukraine is to be militarily so strong that Russia will never again choose to attack it.
So, what we need to solve the problem is to be much, much stronger than Russia, in the military dimension, and also in every other category of coercion.
The only future that works for Ukraine is to be militarily so strong that Russia will never again choose to attack it.
17-22
That is also the only future that upholds the essential security needs of Europe and of NATO more broadly. Russia needs to experience high losses, weaken over time, and get to a point where it concludes by itself that it dare attack neither Ukraine nor NATO.
That is also the only future that upholds the essential security needs of Europe and of NATO more broadly. Russia needs to experience high losses, weaken over time, and get to a point where it concludes by itself that it dare attack neither Ukraine nor NATO.
18-22
That is the end state that ensures peace, and it needs to be permanent.
Now, all we need is think through the transition to that point. And it won't be achieved by cultivating ideas of self-exhaustion. We must exert ourselves and not look for exits. There is no escape.
That is the end state that ensures peace, and it needs to be permanent.
Now, all we need is think through the transition to that point. And it won't be achieved by cultivating ideas of self-exhaustion. We must exert ourselves and not look for exits. There is no escape.
19-22
So, the fixed points for policy are to build up our military strength, and build up Ukraine's military strength. Those are unconditional and clear. As for the war itself, it is best for us if Ukraine generates so much force that it wins everything this year.
So, the fixed points for policy are to build up our military strength, and build up Ukraine's military strength. Those are unconditional and clear. As for the war itself, it is best for us if Ukraine generates so much force that it wins everything this year.
20-22
But if that doesn't happen in 2023, and if Russia is still being aggressive in 2024, then, once again, Kyiv decides. Table or gun. Our job is not to moan about tables. But to give Ukraine more guns.
At any time, the bear may come back.
Only guns will keep it at bay.
But if that doesn't happen in 2023, and if Russia is still being aggressive in 2024, then, once again, Kyiv decides. Table or gun. Our job is not to moan about tables. But to give Ukraine more guns.
At any time, the bear may come back.
Only guns will keep it at bay.
21-22
This must be allowed to take as long as it takes. Because there's no other approach that is consistent with our interests.
This must be allowed to take as long as it takes. Because there's no other approach that is consistent with our interests.
22-22
We should appreciate how fortunate we are. Others are dying for us - and yet some of us are getting lazy. I say: stop being weak and #ArmUkraineNow
Or face much worse consequences down the road.
We should appreciate how fortunate we are. Others are dying for us - and yet some of us are getting lazy. I say: stop being weak and #ArmUkraineNow
Or face much worse consequences down the road.
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