Thread by @2econd_crossing

#OTD 18 April, 1813, Gneisenau urged Hardenberg to permit the Prussian army to engage in ‘Angriffskrieg,’ a dashing offensive against the French advancing towards the Saale.
At the Russian camp in Bunzlau, Kutuzov fell severely ill and became incapable of moving with his army.

Eugene’s army was stretched between the Lower Saale on his left and the Harz Mountains on his right. Ney and Marmont’s Rhine Observation Corps, commanded by Napoleon, advanced via the Hof-Leipzig route, with Bertrand’s Italian Observation Corps shielding the southern flank.

Upon receiving Eugene’s dispatch from the 16th, that the enemy was approaching the Harz, Napoleon sent the 4th Division Teste of Marmont’s VI Corps, composed of two French battalions and four Polish battalions detached from Dombrowski, to Marburg.

While Teste defends Eugene’s linkage to Westphalia, Marmont, just joined by Bessiere, occupied Eisenach and Gotha, and Ney marching with the rest of his III Corps towards Erfurt.
Bertrand’s IV Corps of 60,000 men, at the same time, moved from Bamberg to Cobourg.

Napoleon learned from Baron Moustier, the French minister in Württemberg, that 2nd Brigade of Württemberger Cavalry and the 3rd brigade of Infantry will reach Würzburg before the 25th. Professing his “desire to protect [his] states and Bavaria,” he wrote to King Frederick

to make the reinforcements join Bertrand as soon as possible. He admitted that “the Prussians have raised a lot of militia cavalry, whose men ride badly but are no less of a concern.”
(To Berthier, 18 April 1813, 19870; To Bertrand, 19871; To Jerome, 19872; To Frederick, 19873)

Eugene’s Elbe Observation Corps continued to skirmish with small detachments around Alsleben, where Rudolphi stood in front of the new bridge with two pieces of artillery and a company of infantry. Radianov, after fighting Latour-Maubourg’s scouts near Güften in the morning,

withdrew and united with Rudolphi at Alsleben. Latour-Maubourg reported that “the little skirmish,” resulting in five deaths from both sides, ended at noon, and suspected the enemy to be emerging from Rothenburg and Alsleben.

About 30 miles north of Alsleben, a unit commanded by Waffer was working on extending the dam across the Kluss, from Biederitz on the Ehle to Pechau. Diebitsch also suggested building a bridge across the Elbe to facilitate communication with Dornberg, operating around the Harz,

where Lanskoy was also roaming around with Wintzingerode’s vanguard.
At night, Eugene became informed of the minor offensives on both of his flanks, and reinforced Latour-Maubourg with a division of cavalry and infantry under Lauriston.

Tomorrow, the combined force would occupy Alsleben.
Although unaware of the enemy’s plan to access the Ehle, the viceroy sought to prevent the enemy around him from connecting with those on the Weser. From Bremen, Davout reported that “enemy posts had arrived as far as Werden.”

Meanwhile, a letter from Tettenborn indicated that a Swedish corps of 12,000 men were on the way,expected to headquarter in Ludwigslust on the 20th.
It is in this context that Gneisenau and Blucher insisted on an offensive on the Lower Saale, against a corps still isolated.

Gneisenau and Hardenberg resolved their differences over the right moment to rally the Saxons. To the Chancellor’s letter from the 10th, which explained the need for a top-down consultation with the supreme authorities before making any gesture to the locals, Gneisenau replied:

“It has made me unusually happy to find again the dispositions of goodwill that you have always bestowed on me…Also, I will write no more proclamations. The worst is that my old general [Blucher] has suffered a reprimand that I alone deserved.”

But in a subsequent letter, he disclosed another source of frustration with the Breslau court-that the Prussian army was being chained by the Russians’ slowness, when this war was supposed to be “‘Angriffskrieg…whose success depended on the destruction of the enemy’s power.”

Gneisenau argued that they had done everything to comply with Kutuzov’s endless insistence on patience:
“We advanced but not beyond this land so that we did not distance ourselves from the Hof–Dresden road and as a result perhaps give a bold opponent the opportunity to undertake

something against our few bridges before the Russian main army could arrive. We now have five bridges (not counting Wittgenstein's) and three bridgeheads.
… “All along we have adhered to three principles:

(a) the protection of our bridges;
(b) the reinforcement of our combat power from the interior;
(c) [getting] the Austrians [on our side]…The third remains a concern but we cannot postpone further operations on their account.”

Despite his previous discord with Blucher, Scharnhorst, also persuaded Knesebeck to let the King adopt “a firm resolution for the next operation,” for they “must now fight or evade Napoleon's main army without yielding all advantages for the future.”

In other words, they would either face Eugene while he was still far away from Napoleon’s army, or be cornered by the united French army.
The Russian headquarter still ordered Wittgenstein to “only think of uniting with Blücher and the reserves,” even at the cost of Berlin,

for they could maintain communication with the Duchy of Warsaw by remaining in Dresden. They emphasized that “the Prussian court itself recognizes this as an inevitable necessity.”
(Eugene to Napoleon, 18 April 1813; Scharnhorst to Hardenberg, 18 April 1813; Leggiere; Prittwitz)

But days were numbered for the architect of the grand strategy. On the 18th, Kutuzov was unable to rise from his bed and forced to remain in Bunzlau. Alexander, despite the history of his misgivings about the Field Marshal, is said to have remained at his bedside.

The cause was a bad cold he had gotten on one cold night. When his carriage became stuck in muddy sheets of ice, Kutuzov insisted on continuing the journey on horseback.
“The days are passing, my dear Auguste,” wrote Eugene to Augusta, late at night,

“and still no business, no lost ground…Today is the 18th of April, the anniversary for me of a lost battle; I frankly assure you that I am very happy not to have fought today, I had the idea that the outcome would not have been happy. I see you laughing at my superstitions.

I mounted my horse this morning to go and visit the Prince of Anhalt-Bernburg…He was very sensitive to my attention, all the more so as I promised him to place the least possible burden on him…”
(Parkinson; Eugene to Augusta, 18 April 1813)
-The End-

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