Part two of @DFRLab's coverage on social media manipulation and violence in Sudan. A network of Twitter accounts is promoting #RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, by posting copied content and duplicate replies on Hemedti related content. 🧵👇 dfrlab.org/2023/04/19/sus…
The network’s content appears to fall into three categories:
• Tweets copied directly from the official Twitter accounts of the RSF or Hemedti
• Seemingly original content posts promoting Hemedti and the RSF
• Replies to tweets posted by the RSF and Hemedti.
Before the conflict between the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began, the accounts portrayed Hemedti as a reformist general and potential leader. After fighting started, as a hero. Often the accounts posted identical content, including replies, within seconds of one another.
.@DFRLab previously reported on suspicious tactics promoting the RSF. In October 2021, Meta deplatformed a network promoting the RSF and Hemedti for coordinated inauthentic behavior.
Many accounts copied content directly from the Hemedti and RSF's Facebook and Twitter accounts, sharing it as if it were original.
In multiple instances, several accounts would crop an original video and repost identical video content within minutes of each other
Due to the copy-paste nature of the network, where large groups of accounts shared the same content within minutes of one another, the accounts often had identical timelines. For example, the nine highest engagers often had almost identical timelines across days and even weeks.
On Tuesday, @DFRLab published an investigation into a network of 900+ potentially hijacked Twitter accounts that promoted content in a coordinated manner that was supportive of Hemedti and the RSF, making them appear more popular than they actually are. dfrlab.org/2023/04/18/pot…
As fighting continues in Khartoum, @DFRLab discovered 900+ Twitter accounts that appear to have been hijacked and refurbished to boost content supportive of #Hemedti and the #RSF, making the paramilitary force appear more popular than they may be. 🧵👇 dfrlab.org/2023/04/18/pot…
Our team reviewed 4,882 accounts and found that some very old accounts, most of which had been dormant for many years, suddenly began tweeting between December 2022 and February 2023 at what appeared to be a random combination of words and a date
After the random posts, accounts started liking content posted by Hemedti/RSF. However, almost none of the 900 accounts actually followed Hemedti or the RSF. Trying to appear authentic, accounts sometimes tweeted out Quran verses and inspirational quotes, often simultaneously.
This week, @DFRLab confirmed aerial strikes north of #Bakhmut, looked at the battle for #Vuhledar, examined a Russian amplified video of the Quran being desecrated, and recaps tank training received by Ukrainian forces.
.@DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of #Bakhmut. Analysis of the damage inflicted reveals that potential missiles struck buildings in two different industrial plants.
Red: Russia, Blue: Ukraine
Possibly driven by a desire to produce better results than the Wagner Group, Russian forces continue to advance on Vuhledar and Bakhmut. A UK report purports that the ongoing offensive operations are provoking a competition between the different units.
The @DFRLab confirmed Russia has intensified its air power in recent weeks. Satellite imagery indicated Russia’s air force have increased aerial activity in Crimea.
These findings are consistent with @bradyafr who identified seven different instances of aircraft located in southern Ukraine.
On the first anniversary of the war in Ukraine, #RussianWarReport🇷🇺 shares the top lines of @DFRLab's new reports on Russian narratives. Even a year later, Russia is pushing narratives meant to undermine Ukraine and foment further regional conflicts. 🧵👇atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…
The first of @DFRLab's two new reports, “Narrative Warfare” examines how the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression through employing false and misleading narratives for the weeks and months leading up to the invasion. atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-resea…
The narratives laid out in the report served as Putin’s cases belli and were referenced hundreds of times throughout his February 24, 2022 speech announcing Russia’s “special military operation."
In today’s second report, Russian information operations tried to undermine Ukrainian resistance and support among Ukraine’s allies. These operations are meant to shape public opinion against Ukraine and the West, including in Africa and Latin America. atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-resea…
One Russian tactic embraced was tried and true: bombarding the information space with so many fake theories and denials of the atrocities they'd committed in Ukraine via outlets like Sputnik and RT that it was that much more difficult for people to differentiate fact and fiction.
Newer strategies involved tactics like "false debunking," inventing fake claims to then debunk those very claims, and hacking foreign media to spread disinformation. Russia also famously created a deepfake of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy calling on Ukrainians to give up.
In our first new report, we examined the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media's false/misleading narratives in the lead up to the invasion of Ukraine. These were used to justify the attack, mask operational planning, and deny responsibility for the coming war. atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-resea…
Our team analyzed 10,000+ articles from 14 pro-Kremlin media outlets to identify false/misleading narratives over the weeks leading up to the invasion, including Putin’s February 24, 2022 speech announcing the “special military operation.”
Pro-Kremlin media framed Russia as wanting peace but most often cited Russian officials and leaders of the Donbas regions. Kremlin-controlled media also presented Western officials' perspectives too, usually that the West is ready for both dialogue and sanctions to deter Russia.