Sanctions were supposed to deny Russia's ability to finance the war. But sanctions were delayed and it didn't happen. Now sanctions are finally starting to bite. At the end of 2022 liquid reserves were slightly above 1 month of import. More facts: 1/
Before the invasion, Russia's reserves were $634B. Sanctions immobilize about $313B. This leaves Russia with $146B in gold and about $107B in FX assets (largely yuan). 2/
Russia’s economy faces an extended period of stagnation. There was essentially 0 productivity growth post-2014; now it will turn negative due to sanctions and war. Russian economy will further suffer due to emigration and brain drain. 3/
Russia reports a record deficit of 2.4T rubles in 2023Q1 - 82% of the full-year budget target. December had a record single-month deficit of more than 4T rubles. Key drivers are revenue underperformance, notably oil and gas, and elevated expenditures due to the war. 4/
Oil and gas revenues for January-March are 45% below their level the last year. Russia is increasing its tax on oil. However, this is estimated to bring about 600B - not even close to cover Ts in lost revenues. 5/
EU embargoes on crude oil (Dec. 5, 2022) and oil products (Feb. 5, 2023) were delayed. But now together with Europe’s exit from Russian gas, over 50% pre-invasion exports are sanctioned. The sanction gaps are East Asian democracies as well as China, India, and Turkey. 6/
Russia was able to redirect crude oil to China, India, and Turkey. The exclusion of shipping services from the EU embargo allowed to keep Russian oil on the market. But Russia has had to accept heavy discounts. 7/
Sanctions succeeded in maintaining oil market stability while reducing Russian export earnings. Global oil prices have returned to pre-full-scale invasion levels. Russia’s inability to find alternative buyers for its gas decreased gas production. 8/
High prices and redirection to alternative buyers supported Russian exports. But total exports have weakened since 2022Q4 as energy prices moderated and additional sanctions took effect. In imports, Russia has not been able to replace EU and US trade. 9/
KSE Institute expects significant declines in oil and gas export volumes (-12.9%, -27.9%) as well as prices (-32.6%, -49.4%) in 2023. 10/
KSE Institute projects that lower export volumes and prices will cut oil and gas earnings in half this year (41% for oil, 64% for gas). The current account surplus will narrow to $63 billion. This is a problem because Russian budget assumes $123 billion surplus. 11/
Sanctions are working. Slowly but surely. Let's add more. You can read the entire KSE Institute sanction chartbook and suggestions for further sanctions here kse.ua/wp-content/upl…
UK may move from sanctions to seizures — targeting Russia’s shadow fleet.
The Guardian: London is weighing the capture of a Russia-linked tanker, an escalatory step that could open a new front against Moscow as oil revenues fall. 1/
KSE Institute: Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell 24% in 2025, down to 22% of state income from 41% in 2022.
A maritime services ban plus tanker seizures would be very painful for the Kremlin. 2/
British defense sources confirm NATO discussions identified military options to seize “stateless” shadow fleet ships.
In Jan alone, 23 tankers using false flags transited the Channel or Baltic, many carrying Russian oil to China, India, Turkey. 3/
Jeffrey Epstein spent years trying to meet Putin, cultivated ties with Russian officials including an FSB academy grad.
Epstein once asked a Kremlin contact for help after claiming a Russian woman was blackmailing "powerful businessmen" in NYC — The WP. 1/
Putin’s name appears 1,000+ times in newly released DOJ files. He made repeated attempts from 2013-2018 to arrange a Putin meeting, often through former Norwegian PM Thorbjørn Jagland. No evidence shows it ever happened. 2/
Sergey Belyakov, a high-ranking FSB academy graduate and Russia's deputy economic development minister, maintained a close friendship with Epstein from 2014-2018. He invited Epstein to Russia's top investment forum multiple times. 3/
Brittney Shki-Giiziz, Canadian volunteer in Ukraine: My first day fighting was absolutely excellent. I destroyed a train station with a tank. Being at war was physically easier than the training the Canadian Army puts us through. It prepared me very well for war. 1/
Shki-Giiziz: The truth is that Russia is pushing. We are holding, but we are being pushed back constantly.
Our safe houses are pushed further back. We had positions in Myrnograd and Pokrovsk not so long ago. 2/
Shki-Giiziz: My first motivation for learning Ukrainian was to serve in a tank. Language was a requirement. I studied Ukrainian and the 25th Brigade gave me a chance. At first I just studied the commands. Now I’m conversational and can work freely in Ukrainian. 3/
A German wargame claims Russia could break NATO with just 15,000 troops — by exploiting hesitation.
Ben Hodges for Telegraph: A small Russian force could break NATO due to Western paralysis. The core fix is Ukraine. 1/
The scenario: Oct 2026. Russia stages a “humanitarian crisis” in Kaliningrad, moves into the Suwałki Corridor, seizes Marijampolė.
US stays out. Poland mobilises but hesitates. Germany dithers. Baltics get cut off. NATO credibility collapses — on paper. 2/
Hodges: Ukraine stopped a far stronger Russian army in 2022. Helping Ukraine defeat Russia is the strongest deterrent — it destroys the myth that Russia can win against NATO-level forces. 3/
Bloomberg: Russia is short nearly 10-11 mln workers and is now recruiting labor from India and Sri Lanka to keep its economy running as war and demographics drain the workforce. 1/
For decades, Russia relied on migrants from Central Asia. That model is breaking down as the Ukraine war, emigration, and aging push the country into its deepest labor crisis in years. 2/
Moscow estimates it will need 11 mln additional workers by 2030. Unemployment is about 2%, while one-quarter of the population is already retirement age. There is no domestic reserve left. 3/