Sanctions were supposed to deny Russia's ability to finance the war. But sanctions were delayed and it didn't happen. Now sanctions are finally starting to bite. At the end of 2022 liquid reserves were slightly above 1 month of import. More facts: 1/
Before the invasion, Russia's reserves were $634B. Sanctions immobilize about $313B. This leaves Russia with $146B in gold and about $107B in FX assets (largely yuan). 2/
Russia’s economy faces an extended period of stagnation. There was essentially 0 productivity growth post-2014; now it will turn negative due to sanctions and war. Russian economy will further suffer due to emigration and brain drain. 3/
Russia reports a record deficit of 2.4T rubles in 2023Q1 - 82% of the full-year budget target. December had a record single-month deficit of more than 4T rubles. Key drivers are revenue underperformance, notably oil and gas, and elevated expenditures due to the war. 4/
Oil and gas revenues for January-March are 45% below their level the last year. Russia is increasing its tax on oil. However, this is estimated to bring about 600B - not even close to cover Ts in lost revenues. 5/
EU embargoes on crude oil (Dec. 5, 2022) and oil products (Feb. 5, 2023) were delayed. But now together with Europe’s exit from Russian gas, over 50% pre-invasion exports are sanctioned. The sanction gaps are East Asian democracies as well as China, India, and Turkey. 6/
Russia was able to redirect crude oil to China, India, and Turkey. The exclusion of shipping services from the EU embargo allowed to keep Russian oil on the market. But Russia has had to accept heavy discounts. 7/
Sanctions succeeded in maintaining oil market stability while reducing Russian export earnings. Global oil prices have returned to pre-full-scale invasion levels. Russia’s inability to find alternative buyers for its gas decreased gas production. 8/
High prices and redirection to alternative buyers supported Russian exports. But total exports have weakened since 2022Q4 as energy prices moderated and additional sanctions took effect. In imports, Russia has not been able to replace EU and US trade. 9/
KSE Institute expects significant declines in oil and gas export volumes (-12.9%, -27.9%) as well as prices (-32.6%, -49.4%) in 2023. 10/
KSE Institute projects that lower export volumes and prices will cut oil and gas earnings in half this year (41% for oil, 64% for gas). The current account surplus will narrow to $63 billion. This is a problem because Russian budget assumes $123 billion surplus. 11/
Sanctions are working. Slowly but surely. Let's add more. You can read the entire KSE Institute sanction chartbook and suggestions for further sanctions here kse.ua/wp-content/upl…
Kellogg: Last time I came [to Ukraine], I visited a military hospital and saw soldiers who lost limbs. One young man had no legs. I felt an incredible sense hearing the strength in their voices despite the wounds. It shows the soul of the army and of every soldier.
1/
Kellogg: My first question [to wounded soldiers] was: What will you do after the hospital
Over half said: Return to combat, go back to the army.
Napoleon said morale is the main strength. Talk to soldiers to know what is really happening.
2/
Kellogg: I truly hope that by the next Independence Day, Ukraine will celebrate as a free and peaceful nation.
[Russia really thinks it can decide whether Ukraine can exist or not]
Lavrov: Ukraine has the right to exist, provided it must let people go. The people who, during a [illegal and rigged] referendum, decided that they belong to the Russian culture.
1/
Q: Did Russia invade Ukraine? [Russia still evades answering this simple question]
Lavrov: Democracy is when people...
Q: Did Russia invade Ukraine?
Lavrov: We launched a special military operation to protect people the Ukrainian regime called enemies and bombed. 2/
Lavrov: The countries that prepared the anti-Russian coup in Ukraine, supplied modern weapons, and supported a regime violating human rights [everything a lie] shouldn’t expect us to accept security guarantees on their terms.
It must be decided by consensus, not unilaterally. 3/
Putin’s main fear is another 1991 — Moscow losing central power, says Peter Pomerantsev in The Telegraph.
Yet he feeds on Western timidity. He gains when Trump treats Russia as US's equal and makes Europe plead for approval. 1/
Russia runs war on two fronts: land and perception.
On the battlefield it counts miles. In the “psychosphere” it counts Western hesitation. Kremlin propaganda now shows US and Russian bayonets stabbing Ursula von der Leyen — Europe cast as the victim of a new axis. 2/
Russia’s leaders still carry the trauma of 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed overnight.
When they sense control slipping, they retreat. Reviving that fear is the way to stop Putin from eroding Western unity. 3/