Sanctions were supposed to deny Russia's ability to finance the war. But sanctions were delayed and it didn't happen. Now sanctions are finally starting to bite. At the end of 2022 liquid reserves were slightly above 1 month of import. More facts: 1/
Before the invasion, Russia's reserves were $634B. Sanctions immobilize about $313B. This leaves Russia with $146B in gold and about $107B in FX assets (largely yuan). 2/
Russia’s economy faces an extended period of stagnation. There was essentially 0 productivity growth post-2014; now it will turn negative due to sanctions and war. Russian economy will further suffer due to emigration and brain drain. 3/
Russia reports a record deficit of 2.4T rubles in 2023Q1 - 82% of the full-year budget target. December had a record single-month deficit of more than 4T rubles. Key drivers are revenue underperformance, notably oil and gas, and elevated expenditures due to the war. 4/
Oil and gas revenues for January-March are 45% below their level the last year. Russia is increasing its tax on oil. However, this is estimated to bring about 600B - not even close to cover Ts in lost revenues. 5/
EU embargoes on crude oil (Dec. 5, 2022) and oil products (Feb. 5, 2023) were delayed. But now together with Europe’s exit from Russian gas, over 50% pre-invasion exports are sanctioned. The sanction gaps are East Asian democracies as well as China, India, and Turkey. 6/
Russia was able to redirect crude oil to China, India, and Turkey. The exclusion of shipping services from the EU embargo allowed to keep Russian oil on the market. But Russia has had to accept heavy discounts. 7/
Sanctions succeeded in maintaining oil market stability while reducing Russian export earnings. Global oil prices have returned to pre-full-scale invasion levels. Russia’s inability to find alternative buyers for its gas decreased gas production. 8/
High prices and redirection to alternative buyers supported Russian exports. But total exports have weakened since 2022Q4 as energy prices moderated and additional sanctions took effect. In imports, Russia has not been able to replace EU and US trade. 9/
KSE Institute expects significant declines in oil and gas export volumes (-12.9%, -27.9%) as well as prices (-32.6%, -49.4%) in 2023. 10/
KSE Institute projects that lower export volumes and prices will cut oil and gas earnings in half this year (41% for oil, 64% for gas). The current account surplus will narrow to $63 billion. This is a problem because Russian budget assumes $123 billion surplus. 11/
Sanctions are working. Slowly but surely. Let's add more. You can read the entire KSE Institute sanction chartbook and suggestions for further sanctions here kse.ua/wp-content/upl…
A Ukrainian "Baba Yaga" mega drone killed Volodymyr Leontyev — Moscow’s puppet mayor of occupied Nova Kakhovka.
He's one of Kyiv’s most wanted collaborators for torture and abductions. The strike blew up his car near Zaporizhzhia. He died in hospital soon after — Times. 1/
A Kyiv court sentenced Leontyev in absentia to 15 years for ordering Russian troops to abduct and torture Oleksandr Shapovalov, mayor of nearby Beryslav, and journalist Oleh Baturin.
He helped occupation forces hunt pro-Ukrainian residents. 2/
Ukraine’s military intelligence vows to keep targeting collaborators.
After agents killed Mykhailo Hrytsai in June, a DIU officer told Kyiv Independent: There’re still plenty of such targets in the occupied territories. We will get to each and every one. 3/
Discussions around Tomahawks are quite similar to what happened with ATACMS. Will see.
White House is weighing sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine — a move Putin calls a new stage of escalation, FP. They can reach Moscow and mark a shift from Trump’s earlier stance. 1/
JD Vance confirmed Washington is looking at the sale of Tomahawks after Zelenskyy’s request.
The US will also share intelligence to guide strikes on Russia’s oil sector, already hit by drones that cut refining capacity by up to 40%. 2/
Tomahawks carry 450 kg warheads and would multiply Ukraine’s strike power.
The US has built nearly 9,000 since the 1980s and could send around 200 older missiles without touching core reserves. 3/
In Czech, pro-Russian right-wing ANO party of Andrej Babiš won parliamentary elections with 34.5% of vote, securing 80/200 seats.
Babiš on Czech ammunition initiative for Ukraine: It should be organized by NATO and transparent, if there's war, nobody should make money from it, — Suspilne. 1/
[The Czech Republic is a member of NATO, and is responsible for transparency, as it is the initiator of this mechanism.] 2/
Babiš on Ukraine's accession to the EU: You are not prepared for the EU.
We have to end the war first, and of course we can cooperate with Ukraine, but you are not ready for the EU. 3/
War against Ukraine has a very negative impact on Russia, and this is a harsh reality Putin should accept.
On Sept 28, Moldova gave Maia Sandu’s pro-EU party power despite Russian funding, FP. Armenia backed EU accession, Azerbaijan expelled Russian influence and turned away 1/
Russia’s invasion destroyed its own base inside Ukraine. Moscow once relied on pro-Russian attitudes in the east and south. After Crimea 2014, separatist violence, and years of brutal occupation, those regions turned firmly against Moscow.
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In August, Pashinyan and Aliyev signed a U.S.-brokered peace at the White House. Armenia endorsed EU accession in February, Azerbaijan pushed out Russian influence. Washington now mediates the Caucasus, where Moscow once dictated.
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