Renovation of Two Chinese Hui Mosques in Yunnan and Sichuan: On-the-Ground Observations
Background: The last time I visited Dali was 2015. I rented an e-bike and went up Erhai Lake, taking pics and checking out small villages.
One of those was Meiba Village 美坝村
I had stopped there because Ctrip informed me there was a minor tourist attraction in the village - the Meiba Mosque.
I was curious, because as far as I knew, Dali is a region of the Bai ethnicity, (白族) and the Bai people aren't Muslims. But this was clearly a Muslim village.
Turns out it was not Bai, but a Hui village, so there you go.
The mosque was small. The front building was white, matching the local Bai architecture, with gold and green highlights, some Islamic window styling, a green dome & symmetrical green-accented minarets.
(2015 pic)
Stepping through that front building into the courtyard, the back prayer hall was a small rectangular building, looking like a Chinese temple with more green accents in the walls and doorway.
(2015 pic) (my goodness the weather was nice that day)
Unfortunately I had no idea in 2015 I'd write about it in 2023. I didn't even use Twitter then...
Over the years, I have cleaned my camera roll for space, so I only have these few pics of Meiba village left, including this last shot of one of the minarets.
(2015 pic)
On Sohu, I found a travel blog of someone who had also visited the village in 2015, and had some additional pictures of Meiba, its mosque, and the prayer room - and interviewed people too.
Anyway. Over last few years, with so much discussion about how Chinese gov't was targeting foreign-styled mosques for renovations, I've thought about the Meiba Mosque, with its dome and minarets...
I saw in 2020 it was removed from Ctrip, and was also no longer on Baidu Maps
And then in 2020, the travel site Yunnan Explorer posted a pic of the Meiba Mosque seemingly amidst renovations...the dome was already gone and the minarets were being taken down too.
(This pic of the front building was taken from the courtyard with back against prayer hall)
Fast-forward to 2023.
Last week while in Dali, I noticed the Meiba Village Mosque was now back on Baidu Maps!
So we decided to visit and see what it's like now.
As expected, the dome & minarets have now been replaced by pagoda-like structures and the Islamic styling is GONE.
Passing through the entrance into the courtyard, the back prayer hall has been completely leveled and rebuilt as a much larger, two-story structure based on Chinese temple elements.
This looked very new - completed in the last six months perhaps.
When we went, there were children running around the village and playing in the mosque courtyard. The boys all wore little taquiyah.
Some of the nicer houses had fancy entrance archways with Arabic (?) over the doorways. Otherwise it looked like the other Bai villages.
In the courtyard entrance was a list of villagers and how much they had donated for zakat (it was Ramadan at the time). 200-300 CNY seemed the norm.
Notice nearly everyone is surnamed Ma 马, the dominant Hui surname.
Besides the renovated exteriors, and the new, large prayer room, there were several HUGE new houses and the roads were all paved vs. last time. And very clean.
It was late afternoon and there were only a few children around, no one to ask questions, so we just got pics and left.
Next: Weizhou Town, Wenchuan County, Sichuan
I found myself in Weizhou by accident...because I missed an exit on the highway.
Believe me, you do NOT want to miss an exit in Western Sichuan...the next exit was 30+ km!
Since I had come all this way, I decide to explore a bit...
There's not much in Weizhou Town - I visited a museum and a few parks and in 30 mins I'd just about seen the whole place.
On my way out, I saw the local mosque on Baidu. The street view pic was from 2016, and it had green domes, so I expected it would have some changes too.
Sure enough, when I arrived, I found the entire roof had been changed, with the domes replaced with pagodas and the green + gold aesthetic swapped for a modern Chinese color palette.
I had to check the old pics several times to ensure I was aligning correctly.
2016 | 2023
I stopped to grab a bite at the halal restaurant on the street in front of the building and ask the ladies there some questions.
"Hey is this a mosque? Baidu says it's a mosque, but it doesn't look like one"
"Yes, this is the Weizhou Mosque"
"Oh good, I couldn't tell at first"
"What happened to the building? It looks very different from the pictures on Baidu"
"Oh, the government renovated the mosque"
"When?"
"Last few years"
"Why?"
"I don't know. They said it needs to look more Chinese. They spent a lot of money on the renovation...2-3 million RMB"
"Oh...are there many Hui in Wenchuan? I suppose not many?"
"No, not many. Very few. Less than a thousand I guess"
(Wenchuan County is part of Aba Prefecture, a Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Region in Western Sichuan; Weizhou is the county seat. Most people here are Qiang 羌族)
"After renovations, it's still used as a mosque?"
"Yes. Hui people pray here, and have activities. It's Ramadan now."
"When the government did the renovations, did they change anything inside?"
"Oh, no, it's all the same as before."
(I saw a Ramadan fast schedule):
She gestures to a passage on the side of the kitchen. "That leads into the mosque. You can go look inside if you're interested".
I venture tentatively down the hallway, emerging in a tidy courtyard in front of a large building. There's a bucket of potatoes and some grain drying.
On a blackboard on the side of the building, I find a tally of the 2023 Ramadan contributions for zakat, just like in Meiba. It's a much smaller congregation here though.
There's also a signup sheet for who will lead to break the fast each week (I think?) (请开斋名单)
The prayer room is on the second floor. A small sign outside indicates the salah times for the 5 daily prayers.
The interior decoration is old and perhaps a bit worn, but very clean and dust-free. No one else is around.
I go back outside to eat and find the ladies preparing their own lunch.
"Hey" I say, "Isn't it Ramadan? Can you eat now?"
"Oh, we're not Hui" she says. "We just work here. We don't fast".
"Oh...Is the owner Hui?"
"Yeah"
"Where is he?
"He's busy. He has a lot of businesses."
On my 30+ km highway drive back to my original destination, I reflected on the two mosques.
I really regretted in both cases that I didn't get to speak directly to any Hui people in those communities to find our how they feel.
But anyway, here's how I sum up my thoughts now:
1. The Chinese rationale for the removal of domes and minarets of mosques in China has been public for a few years now; the stated objective of making the visual of the mosques conform to Chinese (and not foreign) architectural styles is clearly met by these renovations.
It's been noted that mosques with more Sinitic or styling seem less likely to be affected. For example, here's the Dujiangyan city mosque, constructed in 1934, with its green tiered pagodas, crescent moon and star, unchanged. My photo + file photo from chinaislam.net.cn
2. At least in the two sites I visited, I couldn't see any evidence that the usage of the mosque had been impacted (or that anything besides the outward appearance had been changed).
They are clearly still places of prayer, congregation, and community for practicing Hui.
I note while researching for this thread that the necessity of domes and minarets for a mosque to be a mosque is a hotly-contested topic in the rest of the Islamic world.
This is also how I found out minarets are banned in Switzerland.
3. From a PERSONAL TASTE perspective, I think the Meiba renovation looks poorly proportioned and kinda ugly.
The Weizhou renovation doesn't look bad, but also you can't even tell it's a mosque anymore.
IMO, the Dujiangyan mosque's fusion aesthetic is a good blend of styles:
4. I don't fool myself thinking that I discovered anything with my little field trip that will change anyone's mind.
Those that think it's a Bad Thing will keep thinking it, and those that think it's Totally Fine will do the same. They'll both see confirmation here I'd expect.
5. You shouldn't care what I think. I'm not a Hui Muslim in China, this doesn't impact me, (I'm an atheist) and I'm not interested in speaking for them when I don't know how they feel.
I have guesses, but without having interviewed any Hui people, my guesses are worth a fart.
6. But as you try to figure out how you feel, I encourage you to look critically at people who aren't Hui Muslims in China, but whom for whatever reason ARE in the business of speaking for them, trying to tell you how you should feel.
Lord knows we have an abundance of them.
That's all for this thread. Thanks for reading to the end. Hope it was...something. Informative? Mildly interesting?
P.S. It's a sensitive topic, and I appreciate people have strong opinions, but if I see you behaving like a turd in my mentions, I'll just block ya.
- End
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This is the layout for China's national computing strategy. Under the "East Data, West-Computer" 东数西算 slogan, high-priority tasks are handled by local clusters, while lower-priority tasks are outsourced to the energy-rich west.🧵
According to China's renewable consumption quota policy, all new data centers in these hub regions must buy at least 80% of their power from renewable sources.
This should be no problem for the blue hubs, located in renewables-rich regions. Might be trickier for red hubs.
Local municipalities might have their own, even more stringent requirements. Ningxia, for instance, requires new data centers be 100% green.
Good news for wind and solar developers, looking for a new offtake channel now that the FiTs are gone. No relief for coal power.
This op-ed on Chinese cleantech overcapacity and competition was in The Wire China a few days ago. Unfortunately it contains many huge errors about Chinese cleantech sectors I can't ignore.
[Oh, and this will be another long thread. It probably should have been a long-form essay instead, but I already wrote more than half of it before I realized how long it had gotten. Sorry in advance.]
This piece has problems immediately in the second paragraph, starting with:
"China's domestic demand for green tech has also peaked given the massive frontloading of installed capacity during the last few years, fueled by subsidies."
This has two big errors:
1. Chinese demand for green tech has not peaked, as evidenced by the steadily rising annual installed capacity figures for wind and solar. In fact, the installed capacity isn't just rising each year, but even the volume of new installs in a single year has grown every year from 2020-2024. Last year saw 277 GW of solar PV and 80 GW of wind.
Even now in 2025, with the offtake policy reforms starting from 1 June, it looks like solar is going to at least match the capacity growth from last year, while wind is actually going to EXCEED the capacity figures from last year. Domestic demand is strong. As for next year, we'll see what the market reforms bring.
2. Chinese newbuild solar and wind farms have not been subsidised for several years already now (since 2021). Over the past few years (until 1 June 2025) they were built on a feed-in-tariff (FiT) basis, which means they earn a fixed on-grid price from the gridco, independent of what's happening in power markets.
If market prices are high, the FiT may be less than the market rate. If market prices are low, the FiT may be more than the market rate. In a power market context, this is very different from a subsidy (although it could be construed as/look like a subsidy if market prices end up lower than the FiT rate for long periods).
Same second paragraph, continued:
"plummeting external and domestic demand have forced Chinese tech companies to compete aggressively to gain market share by cutting prices"
This is wrong on both the domestic and international counts. We already know from the last post domestic demand for wind and solar installs is still rising.
Meanwhile, in the international space, Chinese solar panel exports totaled 236 GW in 2024, rising 13% YoY. Wind turbine exports were 5.2 GW, rising 42% YoY.
In 2025 to date, completed *panel* exports have fallen 5%, but cell and wafer exports are rising dramatically, up 73% and 26% YTD, respectively. Exports to some countries are down, but they have been more than offset by rising exports to other countries and regions. Unfortunately, I don't have a source on YTD wind turbine exports for 2025 so can't comment there.
The point I'm trying to make here is that while there's oversupply relative to demand, it's not reasonable to attribute much - if any - of this supply-demand mismatch to the demand side. Demand is fine. The primary driver of the supply-demand mismatch is coming from the supply side.
This is funny and sad. Secretary Wright's post is so silly and unsophisticated, and yet Twitter's Community Noters managed to find a way to miss the argument entirely and "rebut" with an even more unsophisticated response. It's just all so tiresome. 😞
First, this this broader idea about not conflating energy with electricity is fine, even good and necessary. 💯
Electricity is what's called "secondary energy", a specific kind of energy that has been transformed from "primary energy" sources like coal, oil, sunlight, etc.
In 2024, about 21% of global energy consumption was electricity. This is called "share of electricity in final energy consumption".
China's electricity share is ~28% and rising rapidly, among the top 10 worldwide.
Okay. Here we have a boldly stated series of ideas about Chinese solar. They are unsupported and wrong.
But it's a good opportunity to talk through some issues re: how we integrate solar, and some of the important and hotly-debated considerations. So I'll try to make this educational, not merely critical.
Let's dig in...
1.
"local solar prodution numbers are based on models, not measurements"
No. Models are typically forward-looking, used for forecasting, not describing the past. No matter whether the solar generator is offtaking to a power user, a power retailer, or the gridco itself, there's a business transaction going on there. The generator is being compensated based on how much electricity they generate, so you need measurement (i.e. metering). Without metering each kWh of power, how could you run a power business? 🤨
In China, the grid companies (e.g. State Grid and Southern Grid) and their subsidiaries have a monopoly over installation, maintenance, and reading of metering infrastructure. They report monthly, quarterly, and annual data to the NEA/NBS (or to the China Electricity Council, which compiles data on behalf of the NEA and NBS). That's the source of the generation stats. You could find always find a way to criticize the measuring and reporting methodology I suppose, but it's definitely a measurement approach, not a modeling approach.
2. "Industrial solar production numbers aren’t backed by enough batteries to match consumption curves..."
The claim I think being made here is China's daily power consumption demand curves are not matched to the generation profile of solar, thus solar production would need to be time-shifted to a different time of the day with batteries for those production numbers to be realistic. But since China doesn't have "enough batteries" to do this, then the solar production data must be fraudulent.
This is speculative nonsense. I know OP pulled this argument out of thin air, because it's a fairly complex argument that would necessitate validation via datasets, models, or market access he doesn't have. Are China's 95 GW/222GWh of batteries installed nationwide "enough"? How would anyone besides a Chinese power trader, regulator, or market dispatch modeler know? You need to have a robust, data-backed argument here, because you're seeking to overturn/debunk reported data from State Grid.
But even without a quant-based argument, it's just a weird argument for solar.
Solar produces power during the day, aligning with human activity, as we are generally diurnal creatures. So solar already produces when humans tend to consume power. At low penetration levels for solar (say, <10%) you hardly even need batteries to time-shift solar to another part of the day because solar's production can be fully absorbed by the typical daytime rise in power usage.
At higher penetration rates for solar, you actually will get to the point where production can't be absorbed by the daytime consumption spike and thus storage becomes not just "nice-to-have" but necessary to avoid wastage - unless you have very flexible generators that can easily ramp up and down (more on this later). This issue can arrive earlier for wind than for solar, because wind tends to produce more when humans are asleep and power loads are lower, but we're talking about solar here.
There are a few provinces where daytime overproduction of solar is a real problem, like Shandong...and they are indeed installing storage rapidly, as you would expect from what I have just described. But Shandong is a frontrunner. Nationwide, solar provided just 8% of China's generation mix last year, so its ability to be disuptive is muted, paradoxically both massive, but also mostly absorbed with only a few ripples by the overall vastness of the Chinese power sector.
3. "...but solar producers don’t pay for increased costs and waste induced in competing sources."
In China, this is broadly true, but not true everywhere, as it depends entirely on local market design. China's design has evolved over time but remains reasonable for China.
Non-flexible power sources are typically forced to try to "get out of the way" in spot markets when variable generators are producing, to their disadvantage. They incur losses caused by the existence of the variable generator. Coal generators in particular suffer from very low annual operating hours in China, although this was historically mostly because the coal generation sector is overbuilt and cannibalizes itself, with the "shouldering-out" effect from renewables starting to play a material role only since ~2021.
Generally speaking, generators being pushed out by renewables will usually have the opportunity to make up the losses on power sales by serving as load-following generators or suppliers of capacity, earning revenues in the ancillary services market or capacity market, respectively. Gas-fired power plants and battery farms are very well suited to play this role. Coal-fired power and nuclear can do it as well, although they are less well-suited and may need retrofits to perform in this way. This is how we keep these generators whole and happy and prevent them from exiting the market - assuming we felt we needed them to stick around.
Of course, these ancillary services fees or capacity fees have to come from somewhere, which brings us back to the original issue - whether solar producers are paying for it or not. Broadly, there are two competing philosophies here: "causer pays" and "beneficiary pays". Sometimes it makes sense to force the renewables generators to pay, as their existence necessitated the load-following service ("causer pays"), and sometimes it makes more sense to socialize those costs to everyone who benefitted from the service provided ("beneficiary pays").
The question of how to allocate these costs is a major point of contention in power market and power system design all around the world right now, and there is no "right answer"; it really depends on your country's economic and energy priorities and the ability of each of the stakeholders to pay. Someone who tries to force a one-size-fits-all to this question is not going to make a very good analyst or advisor!
China deals with these costs in a China-specific way that makes sense for its needs in this moment: Capacity charges for backup coal, batteries, gas, are mostly socialized to end-users (i.e., beneficiary pays). Ancillary services are broadly socialized too. Wind and solar generators are mostly exempt and hardly held financially responsible for any of the losses they cause for other generators in the market. They command a low-carbon privilege and the "victims" are primarily coal-fired generators, as China is trying to peak emissions, so this shouldn't be surprising.
Passing charges to end users is a more socially acceptable approach when you've already been highly effective in keeping power rates low. It also helps to have a huge base of power customers to share the burden. Another benefit of China's scale.
Nuclear generators are basically shielded from this mess, since they sell almost all their power via annual contracts to either the grid or large end-users, guaranteeing their dispatch and sidestepping the gladiator arena of the short-term markets. Even if they have to compete in spot markets someday though, they'll likely be fine, since they should be able to handily out-compete coal-fired generators and consistently earn dispatch. Chinese nuclear is cheap.
Translation of key portions of the public statement from China's National Energy Administration (NEA) July press conference re: power supply and demand during the 2025 summer peak.
These comments were from Deputy Director Liu Mingyang of the NEA's Electric Power Department:
"Friends from the media, good morning. Next, I will introduce the power supply situation during this summer's peak demand period.
First, power loads during the summer peak repeatedly set new record highs. In July, peak temperatures were seen, with most provinces experiencing average temperatures 1-2 degrees C higher than the same period in the past. Together with the end of the rainy season in the south, the weather has been hot and humid.
GDP grew by 5.3% YoY in the first half of the year, rapidly driving power loads higher, increasing by over 200 GW versus the end of June. The national peak power load successively saw new records on July 4th, 7th, 16th, and 17th, exceeding 1500 GW and finally reaching a peak of 1508 GW, which is 57 GW higher than the peak load record last year. To date, 19 provinces have seen record-high peak loads, including Jiangsu, Shandong, and Guangdong, breaking records 46 times."
"Second, power supply across the country has been stable overall. In the first half of the year, over 200 GW of new generating capacity was brought online, including 30 GW of supporting and regulating power sources [DF: here, this means dispatchable capacity] including hydropower, gas-fired power, and coal-fired power. Three new cross-region transmission corridors were brought online, increasing cross-region transmission capacity by 16 GW. [DF: this means new UHV lines]
In July, another 10 GW of additional dispatchable capacity was connected to the grid, further strengthening the power supply guarantee. Since summer's start, all kinds of supporting and regulating power have been fully operating. Primary fuels including thermal coal and natural gas have been amply supplied, ensuring stable and orderly national power supply, with only Sichuan needing to implement demand response measures on the evening of the 17th. This demonstrates the system has withstood its first round of high-temperature, high-load challenges this summer."
[DF: This is the first I hear of this, but if Sichuan was truly the only province to use its demand response mechanism during the July peak, then it's quite impressive. I'm quite curious how August has been so far...I have heard some buzz that we might have set ANOTHER new peak a few days ago. Guess we'll find out in the August press conference later this week.]
Chinese power consumption soared to a staggering all-time high of 1,023 TWh (or over 1 petawatt hour) in July 2025.
This blows the previous one-month consumption record out of the water. 🧵
Industrial power consumption was up 4.7% YoY, rising to almost 600 TWh in the monthly of July.
Industrial sector performance continues to strengthen after weaker growth in previous months due to the tariff threat, but still a touch sluggish. Movement in the right direction tho.
Meanwhile, power consumption in the services sector was up a very strong 10.7% YoY in July to 208 TWh. I had to revise my chart's y-axis, as one-month power consumption cracked 200 TWh for the first time.
That's more than 2x the services power consumption of July 2019.