THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE DEFENCE COMMAND PAPER REFRESH 2023. 🧵
British Army's 2021 Future Soldier strategy was seen more as a structure driven by costs than than a structure defined by strategy, even though it the Integrated Review got more things right than wrong.
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This is the British Army of today. Three primary elements: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ, the Field Army and Home Command. Total headcount reduced to 72,500, the lowest it has been for 200 years. Three divisions, but only one of these is deployable.
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The Field Army's three divisions yield eight combat brigades, but only four of these have Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) enablers. So basically only half of the Army is actually usable. Which is a bummer.
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This is the overall structure of the Field Army. Regular Army infantry battalions rely on the Army Reserve to provide a 3rd rifle company. Take away the Army Reserve and it looks even more anaemic. It's a far cry from the Cold War Army of 1980s. (Reserves shown faded)
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The goal of the 2021 IR and DCP was to make defence relevant and credible, while making it more affordable and sustainable going forward. In the light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we now need to ask ourselves what did we get right and what needs to change?
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We knew Russia was the principal threat while China was a secondary challenge. We recognised the danger posed by Iran, North Korea, and Islamic terror groups. We also acknowledged the risk of a Black Swan, the totally unexpected scenario that erupts out of nowhere.
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We realised that our armed forces needed to offer utility LOCALLY, in the Euro-Atlantic Sphere, but also GLOBALLY, in the Indo-Pacific sphere. Therefore, the Army needed to be "Expeditionary by Design."
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The UK's integrated Operating Concept has been validated by events in Ukraine. This envisages the British Army prioritising the FIRST BATTLE / DEEP BATTLE over the SECOND BATTLE / CLOSE BATTLE. It is about getting there first to prevent territory from being lost.
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The First Battle / Deep Battle concept is about degrading enemy forces at standard off distances using long-range artillery like 52 calibre 155 mm guns and MLRS systems. Unfortunately, we lack mass in this area and need more indirect firepower.
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In war the only certainty is uncertainty. Which means we'll be surprised and lose ground. So as much as might wish to fight the First Battle / Deep Battle over the Second Battle / Close Battle, we will need to conduct combined arms manoeuvre to retake it.
(10 of 20)
The trouble is that while light Infantry equipped with MRAPS and ATGM like Javelin are very good at fighting defensive battles, to attack you need MBTs and IFVs to conduct combined arms manoeuvre. Essentially, it means you need a mix of light and heavy forces.
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Again, the British Army scores well in this area. Its planned brigades offer a balanced mix of capabilities suitable across multiple scenarios. But if there's one criticism, we may be too focused on light forces with a lack of protected mobility and firepower.
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So, how to make sense of this?
1⃣The British Army needs to do more to restore a capacity for high-end war fighting at scale.
2⃣ It needs additional artillery, including more MLRS, air defence and attritable UAS
3⃣ If Warrior is retired, it will need a new IFV.
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4⃣ The British Army needs more MBTs. Assuming 2 square brigades, with 2 x Type 44 regiments each plus training and reserve MBTs, we will need to upgrade all 227 Challengers.
5⃣The Deep Reconnaissance Strike brigade is a paper formation until Ajax finally delivers.
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6⃣Does the British Army really need a Security Force Assistance Brigade and an Army Special Operations Brigade? Couldn't the Ranger Regiment perform both roles assisted by 16 Air Assault Brigade as a supporting Tier 2 SOF unit?
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7⃣ If we're short of frontline troops, can we afford to resource the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps HQ? Can someone else do this, so we can focus on delivering hard power?
8⃣Speaking of HQ units, can we reduce the total number and the number of personnel within each?
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Being realistic, we cannot expect to generate more than the 8 brigades we have today. But let's reorganise them:
2 x Armoured (with Challenger & new IFV)
2 x Mechanised (with Boxer ICV)
2 x Light Mech. (with Foxhound & Mastiff MRAPs)
1 x Army Spec. Ops.
1 x 16 AAB
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The evolution of the British Army 2025 plan would look something like this. While the only uplift in frontline headcount would be making the SFAB battalions regular infantry again, additional CS and CSS enablers are needed to make more brigades sustainable.
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The extra investment required to achieve this would be 227 Challenger 2s upgraded instead of 148, a new IFV to replace Warrior (600 in total), more MLRS (72 HIMARS), and more air defence systems (48 SkySabre instead of 24). Everything else is in the budget.
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Army 2025 Refine could potentially look like this. It provides two deployable divisions (one expeditionary + one manoeuvre) plus a special operations division. This may not be affordable today, but we could start to move towards it from 2025 onwards.
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DEFENDING AGAINST DRONES - A THREAD
The ability of $300 drones to defeat million-dollar armoured vehicles has been a common theme of the war in Ukraine. We are constantly being told that drones are an asymmetric weapon that have fundamentally changed the character and economics of land warfare.
1/18
It is no illusion that low-cost drones have democratised air power. As a surveillance tool, they lift the fog of war. As an artillery tool, they enable rapid and accurate fire control. And, as a strike tool, they allow small units to inflict significant casualties on larger attacking forces.
2/18
We have seen short-range drones used as mobile minefields with swarms rising-up unexpectedly from nearby fields to stop enemy assaults dead in their tracks. We have seen long-range drones used to strike critical infrastructure, enemy HQs, and airfields located far from the frontline.
3/18
THREAD ON AIRBORNE FORCES AND VEHICLES
Russia's failed attempt to seize Hostomel airfield in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine provides confirmation (if any was needed after the lessons of Crete and Arnhem) that airborne assaults against well defended targets can be disastrous. The contemporary use of drones only adds to the risks.
This means that future airborne operations will primarily be conducted at battalion and company level for coup de main missions against bridges, airfields, and objectives that need to be physically seized and held by forces on the ground. Think WW2 Pegasus Bridge. Many previous airborne tasks, especially raiding tasks, can now be accomplished using PrSM, loitering missions, or armed drones, so demolition roles will be the exception rather than the norm.
Airborne missions at brigade level are likely to be risky, particularly for the large fleet of aircraft and helicopters required to deliver them. Where larger formations are needed, they will be used to occupy locations where there are no or limited enemy forces. In this respect, airborne units will become early entry forces rather than assaulting in contact with the enemy.
The cancellation of the US Army's M10 Booker has little to do with the quality of the vehicle itself, and more about the lack of supporting infrastructure of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, which cannot effectively support 40-tonne tracked vehicles. 1/4
In the same way that the British Army's Ajax programme includes six different versions, so that armoured cavalry regiments are self-supporting, the Booker chassis lends itself to a whole range of variants based on the M10 Booker Repair & Recovery variant. 2/4
In case Ajax's issues still aren't fully resolved, migrating each variant to the M10 Booker chassis would be a certain fix for Ajax, Ares, Athena, Argus, Apollo, and Atlas. You'd have to compromise on the original requirements, but you'd have an excellent vehicle. 3/4
It was right to retire the British Army's Thales Watchkeeper WK450 UAS. It took far too long to bring it into service and by the time it arrived, newer and better systems were available. It was also difficult to operate. The question is what do we replace it with? (1/6)
An obvious choice is General Atomics Mojave, which is optimised for STOL operations from austere locations. This has a larger payload, double the range and better ISR sensors. It can also carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles for strike tasks. Crucially, it is harder to jam. (2/6)
Mojave, which is a modified version of General Atomics' MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS, weighs 1½ tonnes and has a reinforced undercarriage. Technically, it compares well to Watchkeeper while also being considerably less expensive to purchase and operate. (3/6)
The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret.
As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.
At each stage of the process, risk was managed. The onus was on @GD_LandSystems to resolve any issues in order to move the program to the next stage. Brigadier Glenn Dean, who has assumed overall responsibility for MPF deserves credit for doing a fantastic job.
Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire.
Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.
Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, the USA had already initiated an upgrade programme to increase GMLRS range from 70 km to 150 km, while the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can hit targets at 499 km, versus the existing ATACMS with a 150 km range. This is a significant upgrade.