Excited to have @mpiccininni3 speaking at the @turinginst causal inference interest group about whether cognitive screening tests should be corrected for age and education
Marco explains it is fairly standard, when performing cognitive screening tests, to 'correct' (or standardise) the result for demographic characteristics (e.g. age and level of education). The resulting score tells you someone's result for people of similar age & education
'Correcting' the cognitive score for age and education is therefore equivalent to ignoring the part of the cognitive test score that is due to age and education.
So an older (or less educated) person needs to score lower on the raw test to achieve the same 'corrected' result.
One philosophical argument in favour of 'correcting' for age is that cognitive performance naturally declines with age. But for a screening test, we're interested in detecting pathology, not aging. There isn't however a similar argument for correcting for education!
Statistically, correcting for age and education is also thought to improve the accuracy of the screening test by removing variability in the test. However, in practice, the corrected scores appear to perform worse than uncorrected scores.
The reason: age and education don't just contribute to variability in the screening test, they also influence the probability of the impairment that we are interested in detecting. So 'correcting' for them removes information about the impairment we are trying to predict.
Marco explains that this apparent 'paradox' can be understood with a causal perspective. 'Like all good projects, we start with a directed acyclic graph'.
Within a DAG, we can see that when you correct for age and education, you block two key causes of both the cognitive screening tool and the level of cognitive impairment. This hence leads to lower discriminating performance.
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Many nutrition studies are interested in substitution effects.
Substitution effects are the effect of SWAPPING a particular nutrient or food with one or more other nutrients or foods while keeping the total energy (or mass) the same.
Our paper examined common approaches to adjusting for energy intake using a causal framework. Willet et al raised 4 points of disagreement with our conclusions.
I'll try to summarise with our responses. Beware, it jumps straight into technical details!
Willet et al: 'the energy partition model is not appropriate because it does not ultimately control for total energy intake" & this "is not consistent with the isocaloric diet/disease relation of greatest interest'
Our new study confirms the tragic consequences of delaying the UK's first lockdown.
If it started 1 week earlier, there would have been 20k-35k fewer deaths. The required duration, for the same exit incidence, would also have halved from 69 to 35 days 1/6 journals.plos.org/plosone/articl…
The UK experienced one of the highest per-capita death tolls during the first #Covid19 wave.
It has been fiercely debated whether this was partly due to the UK government's relatively slow initiation of lockdown measures.
Our study used novel simulations to estimate the number of #Covid19 cases & deaths that would have happened in England during the first wave if lockdown measures had been started 1 week earlier, & the impact on the required duration of lockdown. 3/6 journals.plos.org/plosone/articl…
Most people don't realise that academic science is a very long way from healthy.
In fact, all good academic scientists must, at some point, go through a reckoning. When they awaken from the 'dream of science' to realise just how broken things are.
My own crisis happened during my PhD. It was gradual, but at some point I realised academic science wasn't driven by truth, quality, or collectivism, but ego, opportunism, and exploitation. I couldn't believe it. It seemed so wrong and unfair.
It hit me like grief. Anger, depression, bargaining. Years later & I'm still struggling. It hurts when I see bad science or a bad scientist getting celebrated.
I've been been told my 'problem' is I 'care about doing good science'. But I refuse to give in.
A thread on our study in @BJOGTweets, which uses a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the separate effects of fasting plasma glucose and diagnosis of gestational diabetes in women screened during pregnancy
/1 #EpiTwitter
In England, women are diagnosed with gestational diabetes if they have a fasting glucose above 5.6mmol/L. This is a higher than other countries, including Scotland, where the threshold is 5.1mmol/L. It's thought women with 'mild' hyperglycaemia have low risk.
If 'evidence based medicine' is working there should be REGULAR occasions when the 'evidence' not only disagrees with 'clinical experience' but actively contradicts it.
Wherever 'clinical experience' is allowed to overrule 'scientific evidence', we return to quackery.
'Clinical experience' can be extremely misleading, and history is littered with examples. That's why we take a wider dispassionate view and aim to update practice based on science. This principle is the main distinction between contemporary medicine and 'medicine' of old.