Despite all the talk about how the world is standing in the way of China's growth, the world (including the US) continues to supply China with one thing it cannot generate domestically -- demand for its manufactures.
China's surplus again topped 10% of its GDP.
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Even with relatively high commodity prices, China's overall trade surplus (in goods) is approaching its pre-global financial crisis peak. As is the surplus in manufacturing.
Even scaled to China's GDP
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And of course in dollars the surplus is WAY bigger than it was prior to the global financial crisis (dollars are an OK proxy for scaling the surplus v the size of its trading partners).
The world still supplies China with a ton of net demand.
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What is striking - at least to me - is how rare it is for China's surplus in manufacturing to shrink. It happened after the global financial crisis & after the '15 commodity crisis + USD/ CNY appreciation. But not after the Trump tariffs/ COVID ... rather the contrary
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Imports of manufactures have also been squeezed out of China's market over time -- I don't know anyone who forecast at the time of China's WTO accession that it would eventually in result in a 5 pp fall in China's manufactured imports v its GDP
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China simply doesn't import many manufactures for its own use (it imports chips for reexport) ...
Net of processing imports, exports are about 14% of GDP and manufactured imports are now under 4% of GDP.
This is true "deglobalization"
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China couldn't run these kinds of surpluses globally without the big US deficit in manufactures -- we don't yet trade with Mars (& I increasingly doubt that Elon is gonna let us start)
China may complain about the chip restrictions, but the US is still helping it grow ...
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But China doesn't just rely on the US to supply it with net demand for its manufactures that it cannot generate internally.
This chart, together with the charts on China's sudden emergence as a net exporter of autos, should prompt a bit of reflection in Europe ...
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Very useful WSJ report on how China gained control of rare earths processing/ permanent magnet production -- and how it kept control
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The Journal goes through past attempts to revive Mountain Pass/ US rare earths production -- including the now forgotten case of Molycorp from 05 to 14
"Beginning around 2005, China’s government tightened the screws, levying export taxes on rare earths that made it costlier for Western magnet makers to churn out products ... Rare-earth production became so limited in the West that an American company, Molycorp, attempted to revive the Mountain Pass mine and make its own magnets"
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And in 2021 the Biden administration did make an effort to revive interest in US rare earth production as part of a broader supply chain push -- but it foundered when China flooded the market
Secretary Bessent has a bit of work to do to convince Americans (and perhaps the market) that the bailout of Argentina (and direct peso purchases):
a) will work
b) is a good idea
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My former colleague Mark Sobel
“Were the United States to offer Argentina a longer-term support package to back an unsustainable exchange rate, that would be a major folly and waste of U.S. taxpayer resources"
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There is a pretty broad consensus that putting US money into Argentina to backstop the current exchange rate regime (i.e. the peso's current trading band) isn't a good use of taxpayer funds
The IMF needs to take a serious look at its methodology for forecasting the current account balance in key countries -- the current approach is yielding somewhat absurd outcomes that forecast real problems (notably China's surplus) away
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The WEO forecast for China's 2025 surplus is 3.3% of GDP (the h1 surplus) so an upward adjustment from the absurd $370b surplus in the ESR. That surplus is forecast to fall to 2.8% of GDP in 26, and then down to 2% of GDP in 2020. No problem here worth global concern ...
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The basis for the forecast seems to be Chinese policies that now support domestic demand ..
"China and Germany have recently announced and expanded spending measures to boost domestic demand, which will lower net savings and reduce external surpluses"
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Building out capacity (including refining capacity) for rare earths/ other critical minerals should indeed by a real priority now, and the risk of weaponization of this this and other supply chains should have been taken more seriously in the past. But it won't be easy
Just as an example of how far the political debate has come -- Bob Lighthizer (no China dove) excluded rare earths and permanent magnets from the 301 tariffs back in 18 and 19 ...
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Pharmaceuticals from China too (why raise the price of meds ... )
For rare earths and magnets there was essentially no US supply, so the tariffs just raised costs (absent a plant o build out capacity over time)
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China -- per the excellent reporting on the WSJ/ @Lingling_Wei -- appears to be pursuing a strategy of applying maximum pressure in pursuit of maximum concessions ... full tariff rollback, rollback of export controls, relaxation of nat'l security review on Chinese investment
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China though may have miscalculated -- Trump's "Truth" suggested real frustration. Betting on an even bigger (and more publicly visible TACO) has its own risks
China really has put its full economic toolkit on the table -- using its control of grain and oil seed imports (COFCO) to zero out orders for beans (having a bit of a stockpile helps), and rolling out an extraordinary set of export controls ...
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