Despite all the talk about how the world is standing in the way of China's growth, the world (including the US) continues to supply China with one thing it cannot generate domestically -- demand for its manufactures.
China's surplus again topped 10% of its GDP.
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Even with relatively high commodity prices, China's overall trade surplus (in goods) is approaching its pre-global financial crisis peak. As is the surplus in manufacturing.
Even scaled to China's GDP
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And of course in dollars the surplus is WAY bigger than it was prior to the global financial crisis (dollars are an OK proxy for scaling the surplus v the size of its trading partners).
The world still supplies China with a ton of net demand.
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What is striking - at least to me - is how rare it is for China's surplus in manufacturing to shrink. It happened after the global financial crisis & after the '15 commodity crisis + USD/ CNY appreciation. But not after the Trump tariffs/ COVID ... rather the contrary
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Imports of manufactures have also been squeezed out of China's market over time -- I don't know anyone who forecast at the time of China's WTO accession that it would eventually in result in a 5 pp fall in China's manufactured imports v its GDP
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China simply doesn't import many manufactures for its own use (it imports chips for reexport) ...
Net of processing imports, exports are about 14% of GDP and manufactured imports are now under 4% of GDP.
This is true "deglobalization"
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China couldn't run these kinds of surpluses globally without the big US deficit in manufactures -- we don't yet trade with Mars (& I increasingly doubt that Elon is gonna let us start)
China may complain about the chip restrictions, but the US is still helping it grow ...
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But China doesn't just rely on the US to supply it with net demand for its manufactures that it cannot generate internally.
This chart, together with the charts on China's sudden emergence as a net exporter of autos, should prompt a bit of reflection in Europe ...
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The q3 US current account deficit reached 4.2% of US GDP, and, in a milestone of sorts, the US balance on investment income turned negative ...
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Now the US still has a bit of privilege -- with a net external debt position of 45% of GDP (depends a bit on bond market valuation) and a negative net equity position, the income balance should be negative ... the world owns more US assets than the US owns global assets
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The deterioration of the income balance, somewhat surprisingly, has been driven more by a deterioration in the FDI/ equity balance than by higher net interest payments (those have been stable at ~ -1.3 pp of GDP)
As in the pandemic (and for that matter some periods in 2012 and 2013, and most of the period before the global financial crisis) Chinese export growth is far in excess of global trade growth, and thus the export growth of other large economies
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Seems obvious to me & @Mike_Weilandt that China's export growth has come at Europe's expense --
Not sure though that this is the current conventional wisdom across Europe; opinion in Germany in particular still lags reality
The proxies for Chinese intervention for November are out -- and they tell a somewhat surprising story.
China didn't have to sell much fx to keep the CNY stable after the election of Donald J. Trump.
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The Chinese state banks were buying fx (limiting appreciation) earlier this fall (during the carry unwind), and they stopped buying in November -- but there is no real evidence of selling (I expected modest sales)
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Settlement (PBOC plus state banks in theory) was slightly positive, forward adjusted settlement was slightly negative, the net foreign asset position of the state banks was flat -- all the indicators lined up ...
This comment explains perfectly why it is important for the IMF to get China's "true" current account surplus right.
The reported surplus is only 1.5% of GDP (even with the high reading for q3). But that low surplus is a function of the methodology China adopted in 22
China's customs surplus is ~ $1 trillion, or 5-6% of China's GDP. It runs a services deficit of a bit more than 1 % of GDP. But given its massive reserves/ state bank foreign assets (~$6 trillion) it should be running a surplus in investment income too ...
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The reported current account surplus is well below the customs surplus in part because China changed how it calculates the goods surplus in the BoP in 2022 -- and never has justified that switch to my satisfaction ...
There is no doubt that Milei and co delivered an enormous (5 pp of GDP, no fudging ... ) fiscal adjustment, and that more or less crushed domestic demand (down close to 10 pp of GDP from its peak) & helped reduce inflation
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But I argue that Argentina's problems aren't all fiscal, and that it has historically (and currently) has too much fx debt relative to its limited export base (still mostly beans and crushed beans) and limited fx reserves ...
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A few comments on the Treasury market based on the latest Fed flow of funds data.
To start, Treasury coupon issuance has increased relative to the fiscal deficit, and now covers about 2/3rds of the deficit ...
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Net note (coupon) issuance was about 4% of GDP, and if you add in the increase in privately held marketable Treasuries from the Fed's balance sheet contraction, the net "supply" of notes to market mapped to the fiscal deficit
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One factor that is often overlooked that helped the market absorb increased note supply -- the collapse in Agency mortgage issuance after 2023. Clear impact from policy tightening.