Despite all the talk about how the world is standing in the way of China's growth, the world (including the US) continues to supply China with one thing it cannot generate domestically -- demand for its manufactures.
China's surplus again topped 10% of its GDP.
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Even with relatively high commodity prices, China's overall trade surplus (in goods) is approaching its pre-global financial crisis peak. As is the surplus in manufacturing.
Even scaled to China's GDP
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And of course in dollars the surplus is WAY bigger than it was prior to the global financial crisis (dollars are an OK proxy for scaling the surplus v the size of its trading partners).
The world still supplies China with a ton of net demand.
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What is striking - at least to me - is how rare it is for China's surplus in manufacturing to shrink. It happened after the global financial crisis & after the '15 commodity crisis + USD/ CNY appreciation. But not after the Trump tariffs/ COVID ... rather the contrary
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Imports of manufactures have also been squeezed out of China's market over time -- I don't know anyone who forecast at the time of China's WTO accession that it would eventually in result in a 5 pp fall in China's manufactured imports v its GDP
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China simply doesn't import many manufactures for its own use (it imports chips for reexport) ...
Net of processing imports, exports are about 14% of GDP and manufactured imports are now under 4% of GDP.
This is true "deglobalization"
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China couldn't run these kinds of surpluses globally without the big US deficit in manufactures -- we don't yet trade with Mars (& I increasingly doubt that Elon is gonna let us start)
China may complain about the chip restrictions, but the US is still helping it grow ...
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But China doesn't just rely on the US to supply it with net demand for its manufactures that it cannot generate internally.
This chart, together with the charts on China's sudden emergence as a net exporter of autos, should prompt a bit of reflection in Europe ...
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My actual concern -- a concern that is global -- is that China's unbalanced domestic economy has contributed to an incredibly unbalanced pattern of global trade.
China has a great deal of agency. It chooses to have its state banks intervene to hold its currency down v the USD. It has chosen to maintain a regressive tax system (with heavy taxes on low wage work and consumption) and to limit redistribution and social benefits
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I do wonder what parts of my actual policy recommendations Dr. Hauge objects to -- the increase in Chinese social spending? an increase in income tax collections? more central government domestic spending and less state bank fx intervention?
US imports are on track to be up modestly for the year
(with strong electronics imports driven by the AI boom and the tariff exclusion for chips offsetting weakness in vehicle trade)
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Set aside the craziness in pharmaceuticals and gold -- which drove enormous volatility in the reported trade balance in both q1 and q2 -- and the monthly trade data looks surprisingly normal
Probably time for China to try a different strategy
The IMF article IV is due this fall. Shouldn't the IMF be recommending that the central government use its obvious fiscal space to directly support household spending?
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The FT stated the obvious "Beijing has relied on exports in recent years to meet its ambitious annual growth targets" - the IMF should too ...
The IMF staff, in an excellent 2023 working paper, found that the central government doesn't really have any net debt (unlike some of the more indebted local governments). Time for the IMF to start reflecting those findings in its policy advice ...
A chart that I always find interesting -- global reserves v Treasury notes and bonds (reserve managers generally don't buy bills) as a share of US GDP
Period between 03 and 08 notable for reserve growth w-o // increase in supply of US classic reserve assets
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Always striking to me that there is a lot more talk about the dollar as a reserve currency now, when the impact of reserve holdings on markets is waning, than there was talk of the market impact massive reserve growth back when it was happening
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A similar chart for the euro area -- there haven't been enough euro area securities to meet all global reserve demand since 2006!
Not a fan of most of the Miran paper (and the Treasury restructuring proposals), but also not a fan of Employ America's claim that dollar strength doesn't impact the US manufacturing sector
This argument in particular has two particular problems --
a) it ignores lags, and treats 02 to 08 as one period of dollar weakness
b) it doesn't look at petrol and non-petrol trade
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In reality, dollar strength impacts trade flows with long lags (8 to 12qs on exports is standard), so the dollar's exceptional strength in 2000 and 01 and still relatively strong levels in 02 and 03 were weighing on exports for some time (see graph)
Set aside politics for a moment (which no one in Argentina ever does) and focus on the numbers. Milei's core problem is that fiscal adjustment hasn't generated balance of payments adjustment. Net out IMF lending and Argentina has been burning through its reserves
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and set aside funds borrowed from the IMF and SDR conversion -- even so Argentina's net fx reserves are flat (data through July). And ~ half of that fx more or less is CNY from the PBOC swap line which isn't freely convertible into USD ...
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A strong harvest (plus Chinese buying as China isn't buying from the US) actually brought the current account deficit down this summer -- but those inflows aren't expected to last, and the real problem is that there is once again a deficit ...