Despite all the talk about how the world is standing in the way of China's growth, the world (including the US) continues to supply China with one thing it cannot generate domestically -- demand for its manufactures.
China's surplus again topped 10% of its GDP.
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Even with relatively high commodity prices, China's overall trade surplus (in goods) is approaching its pre-global financial crisis peak. As is the surplus in manufacturing.
Even scaled to China's GDP
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And of course in dollars the surplus is WAY bigger than it was prior to the global financial crisis (dollars are an OK proxy for scaling the surplus v the size of its trading partners).
The world still supplies China with a ton of net demand.
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What is striking - at least to me - is how rare it is for China's surplus in manufacturing to shrink. It happened after the global financial crisis & after the '15 commodity crisis + USD/ CNY appreciation. But not after the Trump tariffs/ COVID ... rather the contrary
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Imports of manufactures have also been squeezed out of China's market over time -- I don't know anyone who forecast at the time of China's WTO accession that it would eventually in result in a 5 pp fall in China's manufactured imports v its GDP
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China simply doesn't import many manufactures for its own use (it imports chips for reexport) ...
Net of processing imports, exports are about 14% of GDP and manufactured imports are now under 4% of GDP.
This is true "deglobalization"
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China couldn't run these kinds of surpluses globally without the big US deficit in manufactures -- we don't yet trade with Mars (& I increasingly doubt that Elon is gonna let us start)
China may complain about the chip restrictions, but the US is still helping it grow ...
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But China doesn't just rely on the US to supply it with net demand for its manufactures that it cannot generate internally.
This chart, together with the charts on China's sudden emergence as a net exporter of autos, should prompt a bit of reflection in Europe ...
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Since the big move in the Taiwan dollar in May, "Taiwan’s life insurers ... have cut their currency hedging to a record low" and resumed buying foreign bonds ...
Not exactly the response expected!
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So how could the lifers cut their hedges just after taking big losses on their unhedged positions in May?
Tis a good question ...
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Part of the answer is that hedges are costly, and thus the lifers would rather not have them on unless they need them ... the hedged book right now almost certainly loses money
Korean won incredibly weak right now -- at risk of overshooting fundamentals. US return exceptionalism has generated outflows, but Korea underlying financial position remains solid
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Korean memory chips aren't selling at the same premium as Taiwanese made GPUs, but Korea's current account surplus is huge again -- $110b plus
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Korean FX reserves are amply at $400b -- and they would be a lot bigger if Korea hadn't more or less decided to let the NPS accumulate a massive foreign equity portfolio
The IMF has been struggling with the apparent contradiction between the policies needed for internal balance (monetary easing, weaker currency) and external balance (a stronger currency)
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But the contradiction is apparent not real -- it hinges on assumption that China lacks fiscal space, and thus fiscal policy is off the table.
Hallelujah. The IMF has recognized that China's weak real exchange rate is a problem, and that it has contributed to China's export surplus and growing trade tensions. From @KeithBradsher in the NYT
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The IMF has lagged on this issue, not led ... and it still isn't quite calling for a nominal appreciation (though Georgieva may have hinted at the need for nominal appreciation to offset inflation differentials). The EU Chamber is more explicit (from the FT)
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The IMF's formal press statement attributes the Yuan's real depreciation to inflation differentials (nominal moves v the USD also played a role in 22/23)
Brutal -- but accurate -- assessment of the results of Trump's year one policies by @wsj_douglasj and @JonathanEmont of the WSJ
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"Strip out imports of energy, food and raw materials, and China is on track this year to post a surplus in manufactured goods of around $2 trillion, a huge sum that is on a par with the annual national income of Russia or Italy" 2/
Exports are a big enough share of China's economy (~ 20%) that two years of 10% or more export volume growth can drive an overall increase in manufacturing output even if the domestic economy is the in doldrums
"China is now the world’s ... largest exporter, but ... It has never believed in balanced trade nor comparative advantage. Even as it imported critical technology from the West, its long-term goal was always self-sufficiency
Nice chart too
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Very much agree with his overall thesis, and with his policy prescription
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The title of Ip's piece more of less speaks for itself