Brad Setser Profile picture
Apr 26, 2023 8 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Despite all the talk about how the world is standing in the way of China's growth, the world (including the US) continues to supply China with one thing it cannot generate domestically -- demand for its manufactures.

China's surplus again topped 10% of its GDP.

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Even with relatively high commodity prices, China's overall trade surplus (in goods) is approaching its pre-global financial crisis peak. As is the surplus in manufacturing.

Even scaled to China's GDP

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And of course in dollars the surplus is WAY bigger than it was prior to the global financial crisis (dollars are an OK proxy for scaling the surplus v the size of its trading partners).

The world still supplies China with a ton of net demand.

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What is striking - at least to me - is how rare it is for China's surplus in manufacturing to shrink. It happened after the global financial crisis & after the '15 commodity crisis + USD/ CNY appreciation. But not after the Trump tariffs/ COVID ... rather the contrary

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Imports of manufactures have also been squeezed out of China's market over time -- I don't know anyone who forecast at the time of China's WTO accession that it would eventually in result in a 5 pp fall in China's manufactured imports v its GDP

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China simply doesn't import many manufactures for its own use (it imports chips for reexport) ...

Net of processing imports, exports are about 14% of GDP and manufactured imports are now under 4% of GDP.

This is true "deglobalization"

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China couldn't run these kinds of surpluses globally without the big US deficit in manufactures -- we don't yet trade with Mars (& I increasingly doubt that Elon is gonna let us start)

China may complain about the chip restrictions, but the US is still helping it grow ...

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But China doesn't just rely on the US to supply it with net demand for its manufactures that it cannot generate internally.

This chart, together with the charts on China's sudden emergence as a net exporter of autos, should prompt a bit of reflection in Europe ...

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More from @Brad_Setser

Mar 22
Petrodollars! Nothing produces more heated discussion and, in my experience, less insight. Myths trump facts, because the actual data is a bit obscure --

But here is the most important thing to know. Before the Hormuz crisis, the flow of petrodollars had more or less dried up

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At $60-70 a barrel, the oil exporters just weren't generating large surpluses --

Saudi Arabia's external deficit offset Russia's surplus, so the two biggest oil exporters (~ 15mbd of exports together) were not generating petrodollars, petroeuros or petroyuan

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And the GCC countries (no quarterly data for the Emirates, but its surplus is roughly the size of Qatar and Kuwait combined) no longer really stash away their oil surplus in liquid dollar reserves --

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Read 25 tweets
Mar 16
Back before the bombardment of Iran, China's currency was under considerable appreciation pressure -- the settlement data showed $70b in fx purchases by the PBOC/ SCBs ($840b annualized). A huge sum for a holiday month ...

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Over the last 12ms of data, settlement (my preferred intervention measure) shows purchases of $500-600b ... or more than enough to trigger the Treasury "manipulation" thresholds

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And for whatever reason, in both January and February a small fraction of that total (~$10b) did show up on the balance sheet of the PBOC -- so it isn't all flowing through the state banks right now (tho most of the flow is still via the state banks)

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Read 8 tweets
Mar 3
Some basic oil shock math, focusing on the impact on global trade ...

Remember that we are starting from an unusually low surplus in the fuel exporting economies ...

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And also an unusually large surplus in East Asia.

Core east Asia looks to (per the old BP data) import ~ 20 mbd on net, so each $10b/ barrel change in the oil price reduces East Asia goods surplus by ~ $75b

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a $20 a barrel shock knocks $150b off their surplus -- a manageable sum for a region that has a $1.5 trillion surplus (and rising fast on AI chip demand). 60% of that is China, and China can definitely manage ...

(note this leaves out LNG)

3/
Read 6 tweets
Feb 26
A day that was a long time coming -- TSMC's dominance of chip manufacturing led Taiwan to post a $70b quarterly current account surplus in q4. That is $280b annualized, or a surplus of ~ 33% of GDP

Never though that would be possible for a non-tax haven without oil

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And there is of course a capital flows story -- as the TWD depreciated in q4 in the face of this massive surplus (2x its level in 24), and Taiwan technically sold reserves too!

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For the year as a whole Taiwan's surplus was $180b (gulp, a sum not much smaller that the, artificially low to be sure, surplus that China was reporting mid 2024)! Reserve outflows and foreign bond purchases were only $20b each, leaving $140b to flow out in other ways

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Read 10 tweets
Feb 26
I actually don't think Mark and I are that far apart

(tho I wouldn't start by arguing that a BoP deficit is meaningless, as I certainly find value in some cuts of the balance of payments + get annoyed when the IMF ignores the components of the BoP)

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The most policy relevant question is whether the courts will strike down the 122 balance of payments tariffs & I think the answer to that is likely to be no, for the reasons that Peter Harrell (an actual lawyer) laid out today

2/

lawfaremedia.org/article/are-tr…
The court of international trade more or less invited a case in its initial IEEPA ruling (rejecting the notion that there no BoP deficits/ surpluses b/c everything ultimately balances) & it seems likely the courts will defer to the administration on what constitutes an international payments problem

3/
Read 17 tweets
Feb 25
This is a thread that only Adam Tooze, a few international economist and a couple of very well paid trade lawyers are likely to enjoy …

The basic question is what did Congress mean back in 1975 when they wrote about payments problems and balance of payments deficits

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It is clear from the Senate report on the legislation that the authors were concerned about trade and payments surplus countries (Germany and Japan at the time) & the equitable sharing of balance of payments adjustment responsibilities across surplus and deficit countries

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But the Senate report is written in the balance of payments equivalent of old English – it doesn’t use IMF BPM 6 standard terms. There isn’t much discussion of the current account, there is a lot of discussion of the official reserve balance and the net liquidity balance

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Read 22 tweets

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