Despite all the talk about how the world is standing in the way of China's growth, the world (including the US) continues to supply China with one thing it cannot generate domestically -- demand for its manufactures.
China's surplus again topped 10% of its GDP.
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Even with relatively high commodity prices, China's overall trade surplus (in goods) is approaching its pre-global financial crisis peak. As is the surplus in manufacturing.
Even scaled to China's GDP
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And of course in dollars the surplus is WAY bigger than it was prior to the global financial crisis (dollars are an OK proxy for scaling the surplus v the size of its trading partners).
The world still supplies China with a ton of net demand.
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What is striking - at least to me - is how rare it is for China's surplus in manufacturing to shrink. It happened after the global financial crisis & after the '15 commodity crisis + USD/ CNY appreciation. But not after the Trump tariffs/ COVID ... rather the contrary
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Imports of manufactures have also been squeezed out of China's market over time -- I don't know anyone who forecast at the time of China's WTO accession that it would eventually in result in a 5 pp fall in China's manufactured imports v its GDP
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China simply doesn't import many manufactures for its own use (it imports chips for reexport) ...
Net of processing imports, exports are about 14% of GDP and manufactured imports are now under 4% of GDP.
This is true "deglobalization"
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China couldn't run these kinds of surpluses globally without the big US deficit in manufactures -- we don't yet trade with Mars (& I increasingly doubt that Elon is gonna let us start)
China may complain about the chip restrictions, but the US is still helping it grow ...
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But China doesn't just rely on the US to supply it with net demand for its manufactures that it cannot generate internally.
This chart, together with the charts on China's sudden emergence as a net exporter of autos, should prompt a bit of reflection in Europe ...
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The (limited) diversification of reserves observed over the last twenty years is above all a function of the fact some countries have more reserves than they really need.
a) I happen to know relatively well; and
b) also happens to be of global significance ...
China ...
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Back in 2004, China (according to an official Chinese publication) had about 80% of its reserves in dollars (the CNY was managed exclusively v the dollar then) and most of those were in Treasuries ...
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China provided state subsidies (and massive preferences for local production by local firms) and state financing to state firms.
The US, unsurprisingly, mostly has opted for tax breaks for private firms ...
And while China's enormous local preference was mostly implicit (imports and Chinese production by foreign firms never made it onto certain all important lists ... ) US preferences are explicit (and can be broadened to include "friends" in some but not all cases.
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China's scale (and inexperience) has disrupted the restructuring process for low income countries. Bond holders (including some who bought at par and never sold) also sometimes act a bit like Chinese policy banks; they too are new to the low income country world.
I have some sympathy with the argument that bondholders are often "being kept in the dark."
Academics too only see the debt sustainability analysis after official creditors like China --
Indeed, amazing. I don't think American business does itself any long-term favors by defending some of the least savory aspects of contemporary globalization (legalized tax avoidance) either.
What's more, the actual impact of the 2017 reform turned out to be much more modest than expected. Remember the trillions trapped abroad that would return home? Turns out only a few hundred (billions of course) did (to my surprise actually).
The Tax Cuts and (Irish) Jobs Act (my nickname of course) ended the penalty on repatriation of income notionally "earned" abroad. I assumed most profits would start to return. But it also meant that there was no penalty to continuing to stash cash abroad.
The "dedollarization" of global reserves is in the news today. Geopolitical fragmentation too.
But there is one surprise in the US data that hasn't been reported -- China doesn't appear to have changed the dollar share of its reserves since 2012.
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A bit of background --
China publicly reported that it reduced the dollar share of its reserves from 79% to 58% between 2005 and 2014 ...
I plotted inflows from China in the US BoP data against reserves -- and could infer the following path of diversification
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Note that this "diversification" (in share) came as China's absolute exposure to the US rose massively, and that I think diversification was over by 2012 ...
The US flow data incidentally has tracked China's BoP data since.