The timeline doesn't really fit:
March 2021: Russia begins buildup near Ukraine, including units from Siberia that would not return
April: Biden announces AFG withdrawal
August 3rd: First reports of new BARS reserve system (decision likely made in July)
August 15: Kabul falls
That doesn't mean the AFG withdrawal had no effect, but Russia's leadership likely decided to make all preparations for the invasion in July.
Putin thought it would be easy and there would be minimal resistance. Hard to deter a leader with such a fundamentally incorrect understanding of the situation.
Sladkov says that the biggest surprise from the war is probably the role of infantry. Because Russian infantry rely heavily on armored vehicles, they had smaller squads and fewer heavy weapons. So Russia has relied on naval infantry, VDV, and spetsnaz. t.me/Sladkov_plus/7…
As mobile infantry. This worked in local conflicts, but was insufficient for such a large war. And the intensity of the war led to heavy losses in these units. In particular, he says that VDV and spetsnaz are not organizationally suited to this use in a combined arms fight. 2/
He says a review of the role of transport and armored vehicles is needed. He says spetsnaz need to be used in their intended role, and that more can be done in terms of performing sabotage missions and improving the correction of artillery fire and aviation. 3/
The Fighter Bomber says this was probably a UMPK FAB-500M62 glide bomb, but the wings didn't initiate for some reason so the bomb just fell. He says the fuze was set on delay, and detonated as it should (for targeting an underground target). 3/ t.me/fighter_bomber…
One of the reasons I’m skeptical when people say the tank is obsolete is that technological advances, such as in thermal optics, UAVs, more accurate and longer range artillery and machine guns, have also made light vehicles and infantry more vulnerable. t.me/adamtactic/104