I've spend a significant amount of time investigating Ukraine's air defenses since the Teixeira leaks showed a possible defense missile shortage.
This thread is the result. I call it:
Ukraine's Air Defense Dilemma of Political "Let's Pretend"
1/🧵
Ukraine started the war with a minimum of 20 S-300 (18 SA-10 & 2 SA-12), nine Buk M1 (SA-11), two reactivated S-125 (SA-3), and one reactivated 2K12 Kub (SA-6) medium range SAM batteries.
A Ukrainian journalist...
2/
[editor in chief of Defense Express] by the name of Sergey Zgurets in late 2016, citing parliamentary disclosures, estimated the remaining Ukrainian warstock of SAMs as follows:
- 5V55 / S-300PS & PT (SA-10A/B) rounds at almost 3,000,[An OSINT expert 3/
...I know counted missile tubes on racks and TELs on Google Earth after 2014 and got 3,300]
- 9M82/83 / S-300V1 (SA-12A/B) at 800, [Ukrainian media speculated that PSU had the bigger 9M82 in stock, although the PSU position was none] 4/
- 9M38M1/ Buk M1 (SA-11) at 1,300. [Other Ukrainian sources said 1,100]
Many of the 5V55 were lost in the opening week of the war. At least two, maybe three S-300PT/PS batteries were killed in Feb-Mar 2022. One S-300PS was killed escaping Berdyansk,
5/
...another unserviceable S-300PT battery in Zhytomyr was caught at its base, & one S-300PT was claimed killed in the Kharkiv area.
The Oryx site lists 10 Flap Lid radars used by PSU S-300's as visually confirmed as destroyed. However I'm told by 6/
...another OSINT expert I've known for some years that one Flap Lid pictured on Oryx is a known Russian 5N63S from Crimea and others looked like repeat photos of the same systems at different times & angles.🤷♂️
Other contemporaneous to Zgurets Ukrainian
7/
...sources gave a number of 10K to 12K missiles for twenty legacy SA-3 Goa/S-125 batteries in mothballs, but only two batteries had been restored to service by Feb 2022, "many" of these missiles were exported, and it was reported but not visually
8/
...confirmed that both operational S-125 batteries were lost in the South in the opening week of the war.
Ukraine also had 20 batteries of 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) in mothballs but some were exported and only one battery was thought to be operational
9/
...in Feb 2022.
The Ukrainian 2K12 could only shoot the 9M9M missile. Early pre-invasion videos showed some 9M9M cooking off in depot fires, but how many were destroyed I have never seen reported. Soviet logistical practice was to stock 1 round per
10/
...rail in a battery plus one or more sets of reloads. So 20 batteries x 12 loaded missiles x 2 = 480 9M9M missiles. Or more if multiple sets of reloads were stocked.
Assuming 4,800 of 5,580 medium range SAMs survived initial Russian SEAD strikes 11/
...and 428 days elapsed, an order of slightly over 11 SAMs/day would have been expended, if the inventory was gone by now. Some of the early air battles may have seen 100+ SAMs/day expended.
So Ukraine will run out of legacy SAM inventory in the coming
12/
...month(s), exactly when depending on how many cruise missiles & drones the PSU has to shoot down.
Western supplied SAM replacements delivered to date are maybe 1/2 of the legacy SAM fleet in terms of area coverage at low/medium levels. So far Ukraine
13/
...has been promised 9 batteries of I-HAWK and HAWK 21, 8 batteries of NASAMS, 4 batteries of Iris T, and two batteries of Patriot PAC2/PAC3. Plus upgrades for Buk M1 launchers to shoot RIM-7 Sea Sparrows.
Poland has supplied at least one Newa SC 14/
...mobile S-125/SA-3 battery, but we have no idea how many more, also, there are at least two 2K12 Kub/SA-6 being supplied from Eastern European NATO states. But a lot of this gear is still in the delivery pipeline and many months away.
And one of the 15/
...NATO missile batteries was returned due to unrepairable technical faults. It has been speculated this was a I-HAWK battery.
In comparing all systems, defended footprint versus altitude is an issue. For most of these "medium range" SAMs low altitude
16/
...footprint is a circle of 40-50 km due to the radius of the Earth and radar horizon, limited by antenna elevation above ground level. Range at medium to high altitude is usually determined by the specific impulse of the propellant and size of the SAM 17/
So even an ancient MIM-23 I-HAWK has the low level coverage comparable to S-300P systems lacking the 40V6M radar mast - and the MIM-23 outranges the Buk M1. PSU S-300PT or S-300PS with the 40V6M mast see/engage farther than I-HAWK.
However, mobility 18/
...is important for survivability.
Soviet battlefield SAMs are usually best for this, usually 5 minutes to shoot 'n' scoot. I-HAWKs and Patriots just aren't that mobile. I-HAWKs are not as capable as S-300 in medium/high altitude coverage and are
19/
...inferior to both S-300PT/PS and Buks in mobility.
In terms of full capability replacement, only the Patriot can replace Ukraine's S-300PT/PS and S-300V1 for high/fast targets.
A MIM-23 I-HAWK replaces the low altitude capability of S-300s but has a
19/
...fraction of the medium to high altitude capability and inferior mobility. The MIM-23 does replace the capability of the Buk M1 at all altitudes and goes a bit further, but it lacks the firepower of the Buk M1.
I-HAWK batteries can only engage two 20/
...at a time while each Buk TELAR can engage one at a time because a battery has four TELARs so it can engage twice the number of targets an I-HAWK battery can engage. Late model Phase III I-HAWK illuminators include the Low-Altitude Simultaneous Hawk
21/
...Engagement (LASHE) fan beam antenna to increase the number of engaged targets but this was designed to engage closely spaced targets.
More Patriot batteries are desperately required. The high altitude coverage of one ~160 km range Patriot battery 22/
...is equivalent to around either four S-300PS batteries shooting the 5V55R SAM or four S-300V1 batteries shooting the 9M83 SAM. The math here is grim. Two Patriot batteries only replace the capability of eight S-300 batteries of the 20+ batteries
23/
...of S-300PT/PS Ukraine had at the start of the war.
Basically a mix of Patriots, I-HAWK and HAWK-21, NASAMS and Iris-T SLM can make up the required capability. But most of the latter two missiles systems have yet to come off production lines.
24/
Only Patriot and HAWKs can be delivered right now from stock and operational units.
And as for the RIM-7 reloads on the Buk M1, that missile has a smaller footprint than the legacy 9M38M1 SAM. Depending on the variant of Sea Sparrow provided,
25/
...Ukraine gets maybe 1/3 up to 1/2 at best the area coverage of the 9M38M1. So you would need 2 to 3 times as many Buk or Kub batteries for the same defended air space volume.
All Ukrainian area defence SAMs are operated by the PSU, all SHORADS by
26/
... the Army. They both have critical warshot shortfalls and, as demonstrated above, the Biden Admin is asleep at the wheel.
Fighters are seen by Ukraine as means to kill Russia's most accurate cruise missiles, the KH-101, KH-555 & Kaliber plus Shaheds 27/
...as soon as they cross the border - see the PSU fighter pilot Juice's interview on that.
28/
The prolonged cruise missile and Shaheed bombardment has seen a lot of SHORADS diverted to Ukrainian strategic air defence. But for the offensive Ukraine needs both more area defence and SHORADS to cover the bigger area they are operating in.
And the permanent national security bureaucracy in the Biden Administration is saying with a straight face that there is "no urgency" in supplying Ukraine Western fighters.
31/
...and it looks like prima facie misleading Congress.
33/
This is the same "Let's pretend" game the Clinton Administration saw in 1990's Bosnia and Kosovo with the permanent national security bureaucracy, but Biden lack's Bill Clinton's youthful energy to make them follow the national interest over their own narrow careerist ones.
34/34
This was an "Anyone with two brains cells to rub together could see this" reality.⬇️
Both because the Russians were not that good, but especially due to it being dead center of Ukraine's "Death of a 1000 Cuts" attritional grand strategy.
Ukraine would take any engagement with the Russians that gave it a high exchange ratio and would swiftly abandoned any which were not.
It's how Ukraine rolls.
2/4
And Ukraine's "Death of a 1000 Cuts" attritional grand strategy has been systematically targeting Russia's high tech & impossible to replace equipment and personnel on a priority basis to hollow out the Russian military firepower.
3/4
Missiles are expensive. Guns & cannons are both cheap & effective against the drone threat.
Combined arms ADA was a lesson Ukraine practiced...
...until Shahed strikes at its power grid pulled much of its short range air defense combined arms team to cover those assets.
2/
Every US Army 90mm gun and 40mm autocannon had minimum ranges & overhead arcs covered by one of these.⬇️
A .50 caliber Maxon mount could be pointed nearly straight up, slewed like a fiend and could lay on four barrels of Dakka h--l for any Axis pilot thinking he could notch
I have not seen enough fuel truck and trailer logistics supplied to the Ukrainians to support an offensive of the scale “@noclador thinks is on the table.
2/
My impression is Ukraine will need two months between major counteroffensives to line up the logistics with a month involved in the operations themselves.
3/
Russians have been hunted by Ukrainian grenade-dropping drones over the past year plus. G-d only knows what the word of mouth amongst the Mobiks is by now.
The use of the burning BMP shows those mobiks knew the difference between concealment and overhead cover.⬇️ 1/3
They weren't clear on much else because of their fear of Ukrainian grenade-dropping drones, mind you, but that is a direct reflection of Russian lack of training of their mobiks.
There are no standard operating procedures for infantry being hunted by grenade dropping drones.
2/3
The horror of living that in war has yet to be written...