2/ The Rapid Support Forces media effort is well-funded, international, and fairly sophisticated.
RSF Facebook page managers are located in UAE (2), Saudi Arabia (1), Sudan (1), and USA (1).
3/ These page managers may act somewhat as newsroom leaders (editors), coordinating with media specialists on the ground embedded in RSF units.
4/ RSF media team employs personnel with experience in video production, likely some with former journalism experience, and social media specialists. This is an example of one of their more refined videos:
5/ RSF media team operates mostly anonymously but there are some instances where they have identified themselves by name or filmed themselves.
Can anybody identify this man? He filmed and narrated an RSF propaganda video May 1st. Please reply with more examples if you see them.
6/ Of course, the media team is under the control of the RSF political-military leadership. However, Hemedti likely takes little direct interest in daily operations and has delegated control to a trusted officer or affiliate. If anybody knows who this is, please reply or DM me.
7/ As somebody with experience in newsroom operations, I can attest there is always a tradeoff between speed and quality control. Judging by the quality & pace of output, the RSF media team has some controls but does not have an elaborate or overly restrictive editorial process.
8 / Last year Hemedti met several times with representatives of French public relations firm Think Doctor to discuss a partnership that would include management of social media pages and media training. It's unclear they made any agreement. aljazeera.com/amp/news/2023/…
9/ Whether or not RSF finalized a deal with Think Doctor, it likely made arrangements with at least one international media consultancy. This would be a natural step to take for a media team looking to professionalize and scale up.
10/ The Sudanese media profession is large but fairly tight-knit. I believe through crowdsourcing we should be able to identify at least some members of the RSF media team. That in turn will lead to investigative breakthroughs to unveil further details about the entire operation.
11/ To start, please could somebody identify what the person at the beginning of this film says. I believe he identifies himself by name as Ishaq Aina Abdalbanaat, but I could be mistaken. I geolocated this film to the RSF base at al-Salha, South Omdurman.
12/ In some previous social media posts, a certain lieutenant Al Sheikh Said was identified as being responsible for the RSF Facebook page and military media generally. However, this information is 4 years old and I'm unsure if it was true at the time.
13/ In addition to producing and publishing its own media content, the RSF has employed networks of bots and influencers to amplify it. An investigation last year by @DFRLab (a nonprofit that has a research partnership with Facebook) provides details: medium.com/dfrlab/sudanes…
14/ The report by @DFRLab says Facebook in Sept 2021 removed a network of 116 pages, 666 user accounts, 69 groups, and 92 Instagram accounts linked to RSF for violating the platform’s policy against "coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity.”
15/ RSF's social media influence reaches beyond Sudan into other Arabic-speaking countries, including Chad. This short TikTok video from Niger is another example. Please reply with other examples if you find them, but look for the original source.
17/ I will add to this thread as I learn more. Please send tips and ideas. It would also be helpful if somebody could translate the thread or some of it. Thanks to all and looking forward to a good collaboration to reveal a comprehensive picture of Rapid Support Forces media.