Thread by @Jack_Mrgln

Lots of speculation about events in Bakhmut, so here are my two cents:

1. It’s possible that Wagner stays at least some time longer, but in face of coming counteroffensive and w their exhausted forces, its not a bad time to bow out and let someone else claim the failure.

2. Other Russian PMCs do not have the manpower, equipment, structure, or leadership to take Wagner’s place, at least not immediately. MoD could cycle field commanders off dissolved Wagner to other structures, but that takes time & doesn’t mean immediate battlefield effectiveness

3. It’s unclear to me exactly what role Wagner would even be suited to play during UA counteroffensive. Their best option would likely be return to form, running sabotage and harassment like they did in UA in 2014-2015.

That requires far less men and involves relatively less risk than grinding assaults - but Ukraine is a very different adversary than they were 9 years ago, and Wagner has lost a lot of its human capital.

4. In terms of what happens with Prigozhin, it is not yet possible to say. His best bet is likely to focus on his Africa ventures but I think he would have a hard time settling for that. Ukraine was a momentous opportunity to go beyond his business to date. Sunk costs etc.

Prigozhin has crossed virtually every red line in rhetoric except criticizing Putin himself or the choice to invade. It’s too early to say what will happen to him. Girkin is still around, after all.

We shouldn’t overestimate Prigozhin (he has no coalition, the concept of him being Putin’s mouthpiece feels a bit too involved to me), but he has established loyalty in certain quarters.

There are paramilitary and patriotic types that have been struck by his anti-elite narrative. To Prigozhin’s credit, he is out there on the front. He might live in a lavish mansion and his family might have spent a lot of time in Europe but that’s no bother .

Prigozhin seems to still have Kovalchuk in his corner (though I don’t know if he would stick his neck out for him), and some folks within GRU and Southern VO. He could pull through this, but without an active role in the war effort, his tune would have to change.

It’s interesting that he has peeled of Mizintsev but there’s simply too many things we don’t know about how that went down. It seems to me like a big snub to MoD but it could also be a way to put him out to pasture.

Ultimately, this going to come down to whether Prigozhin’s PR crusade ends up pitting him against the state. He has been intentional to go over a sort of “fifth column” rather than the system, but at what point does that become too threatening to system itself?

Prigozhin can’t challenge Putin for a range of reasons, but he could create visible rifts among elites in wartime that at the very least see him separated from his fortune or prosecuted. This would be messy and I’m sure leadership wants to avoid it if possible.

Wagner is still useful even if their numbers are reduced. It’s a recognizable brand that has an important role to play in mobilization. But if Prigozhin does more harm than good for recruitment, that can change.

Prigozhin has tried very hard to conflate himself with Wagner. But ultimately, he needs Wagner more than it needs him.