1/ Quick thread on the Russian May 9 Victory parade - quick because it was, in fact, over very quickly - the official video is less than 1.5 hours (1 hour 24 mins to be exact), compared to much longer parades of the past.
2/ Very few vehicles on display - just one T-34-85 tank leading the armored column, instead of several as in past parades. No other tanks at all, not even a single T-72. Several armored vehicles - Tigers, Kamaz, BTR-90, Boomerangs, plus Iskander, S-400 and Yars rockets.
3/ No aircraft flyover, usually one of the more interesting parts such parades. This time, the obvious empty spaces was filled with the military marching bands singing the song titled "Victory." (Btw, it was a BTR-82A and not the BTR-90 APC, correcting the previous post)
4/ President Putin spoke in person, and his speech did not offer any surprises, stating that victory will be Russia's against a global threat to his country. The short parade and the obvious absence of so many vehicles and systems indicated a nation under stress...
5/...that almost rushed through one of its key holiday celebrations. Other Victory parades across Russia were also greatly curtailed, and some cancelled altogether. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and Uzbekistan leaders were present...
6/...displaying political and historical solidarity even as tensions simmer between Russia and some of these nations. This is usually one of the most-televised events in Russia, and tens of millions watching probably also noticed a very thinned parade lineup.
7/ A parade in Ulan-Ude in Buryat Region featured few vehicles as well - a few WW2 vehicles, lots of military trucks and some older armored cars, plus an Iskander unit. Buryat Region sent many of its fighters to Ukraine.
8/ Probably the more interesting parade was held in Verhnaya Pishma in Sverdlovsk Region - this annual historical parade featured only WW2 vehicles. Even here, there are major space gaps between each passing vehicle.
9/ Other useful threads about this parade, with data about previous parade lineups for comparison.
10/ In contrast with Moscow, the parade in Kaliningrad featured a T-72BM tank, along with Pantsir-S1 air defense system, Bal and Bastion anti-ship missile batteries, and a Grad MLRS.
11/ The parade in Perm featured MSTA and Nona self-propelled howitzers, and 2S31 Vena amphibious self-propelled mortar system, which were absent in Moscow. According to official Russian media, "some of these systems went directly to Ukraine after the parade."
12/ The parade in Novgorod featured lots of historical WW2 vehicles and systems, including GAZ-67 - a mass-produced Soviet "Jeep" equivalent.
13/ The parade in St. Petersburg also lacked an air show, and had a similar vehicle and systems line up as in Moscow: T-34 tank, Tiger vehicle, Iskander and Bastion missiles, and a S-400 system.
14/ The parade in Samara featured a mix of WW2 and modern systems, as did a parade in Tula. The parade in Volgograd featured a T-90 tank, along with WW2 vehicles.
15/ The airspace over Moscow was closely guarded, with many police and law enforcement personnel fielding CUAS rifles such as the one in the photo.
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1/ QUICK TAKE on the lagging Russian military education that is behind the current combat trends in Ukraine, from a Rus military commentator: "I attended a lecture at one of the military training centers in the Samara region, and excuse my French..." t.me/voickokipchaka…
2/ "...dear teachers of this center, but I have never heard so much nonsense from anyone. Of course, out of respect for their shoulder straps, I tried to smooth things over, but it got to the point where the lecturer said that 75% of all tactical targets were hit by "artillery".
3/ "Let me remind you, for those who have forgotten: this is the fourth year of the special military operation (Russian name for its invasion of Ukraine), and this war is unlike any other. Now, for your information, 70% of the targets are hit by drones."
1/ Rus state media reports that the Sukhoi Design Bureau (that built S-70 Okhotnik UCAV) is "actively developing eight distinct UAV types. Next step in tactical aviation is transitioning from viewing it as a mere collection of individual high-tech aircraft to developing integrated aviation systems." tass.com/defense/2015511
2/ Okhotnik took years to go through testing and evaluation, and was shot down by Russia's own forces in 2024 when it went out of control over Ukraine. It was not seen in Ukraine combat, is expensive and in very few numbers, and would likely not survive Ukrainian air defenses.
3/ More form Sukhoi: "...countering multi-layered air defense systems with manned aircraft alone has become prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the focus is shifting toward a network of functional complexes, each designed to address specific targets and tasks."
1/ THREAD: On September 6-7, 2025, the fourth annual "DRONNITSA" meet-up took place in Russia's Novgorod region, organized by KCPN (Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossiya) and Ushkuynik Enterprise (that builds KVN fiber-optic drones), with assistance from Novgorod region government. t.me/dronnitsa/554
2/ This year, the event theme was "learning from mistakes" - what the larger Russian volunteer and start up community learned after years of assisting the Rus military and what gaps still remain. See this link for previous DRONNITSA threads.
3/ A key figure in organizing this event is Aleksei Chadaev, who head "Ushkyunik" Enterprise and is one of the key figures in the Russian tech volunteer space (below). His co-organizer is Aleksandr Lyubimov who is involved with KCPN.
1/QUCK TAKE: Rus commentators on the impact of FPV strikes on Ukrainian logistics: "Until recently, the Slavyansk-Izyum section of the highway was considered relatively safe for enemy movement. Drone strikes here were extremely rare and episodic. Now the situation has changed." t.me/VictoryDrones/…
2/ "Today, systematic work of FPV crews has been noted in this direction, and the result is immediately visible. From a military point of view, this is a turning point. FPV drones allow firing at a range of up to 25-30 km, which makes it possible to strike a target even before it enters the immediate frontline zone."
3/ "This effectively transfers the section of the highway to the category of "partial fire control". The change in tactics is obvious: the enemy can no longer use the road as a guaranteed safe supply route; columns are forced to split into small groups..."
1/ QUICK TAKE: Russia's Aleksei Chadaev, co-founder of the annual "Dronnitsa" meet up that will take place on Sept 6-7, and a key figure behind the "KVN" fiber-optic drone, on some of his own lessons and mistakes as a tech volunteer and developer - summary below: t.me/chadayevru/4072
2/ "The most difficult development for me (since 2022) is the demand to pour new wine ("military innovations") into old wineskins ("development institutes", aka "venture model"). In short, it did not turn out very well. Two main reasons behind this failure are..."
3/ "One: "techno-feudalism" (the unwillingness of everyone, from garage developers to a large industrial complex) to create a common space for technology exchange and Two: a procedural model where the key factor is the desire of budget managers to insure any risks associated with the management of state money."
Russian DefMin Belousov at the latest Miliary Commission meeting: "Starting this September, three military academies will begin training military personnel in 11 new specialties, including in the use of UAVs and robotic systems." t.me/tass_agency/33…
"We have significantly increased the volume of deliveries of tactical UAVs to the troops. This has certainly had a positive impact on the course of military operations. It is necessary to complete the work on creating an effective system for providing UAV troops with logistics and repairs."
"It is also necessary to increase the pace of training UAV operator crews and speed up the implementation of the necessary organizational and staffing measures. We have supplied the troop groups with effective electronic warfare systems, including "trench" (tactical) ones."