One important indicator for me is how often people in Russia talk about possible defeat. I must confess that it happens now really often, which is a dramatic turn from the early months of the war 2/23
For quite a while, nobody took the word “defeat” in their mouth, even if they considered the invasion to be an insane choice. That has changed 3/23
While majority in Russia remains detached and prefers to avoid bad thoughts, those who dare to think are increasingly accepting that the war is likely to end with a defeat 4/23
That applies perhaps mostly to those who tend to support Putin in this war for one reason or another (mainly because they fail to make difference between Putin’s and national interests). This is a mood I notice in people from various industries, all of them rather elevated 5/23
Similar mood flows over into the public sphere. Both Prigozhin and Kadyrov play their games, but between the lines they let out the shared assessment of the situation. Kadyrov says "it is very difficult", while Prigozhin warns of a looming catastrophe 6/23
The whole public fight between feudal warlords makes it extremely difficult to imagine this army achieving any success. Their language projects defeat, and this is what I often hear – “I don’t know how this can possibly end with a victory” 7/23
A recent confession from Andrey Kovalev, one of the major Russian developers, is indicative, too. Putin was feeding the rich people with the stories of how he is going to win it in the end, and now they seem to lose confidence 8/19 cnn.com/videos/world/2…
I am no military expert, but I have a better view of morale in the Russian army. It is very low, and the two motives to go to war remain (1) rare chance to earn some money and (2) submissiveness 9/23
I wouldn’t be surprised if the Russian army collapses after a couple of setbacks. I have no idea how likely that is (the Ukrainian offensive capabilities are often debated), but I consider it to be a distinct possibility 10/23
The state-controlled media are preparing the audience for possible setbacks. meduza.io/en/feature/202… 11/19
Putin’s ability to recruit more soldiers remains significant but limited. Importantly, it is affected by the situation on the battlefield. Nobody wants to be part of a losing army, but that matters more for the sort of motivation dominant among the Russian soldiers 12/23
These are all early signs, of course, and Putin will be constantly killing the flames. In order to translate into action, these attitudes should rely on some vision of how the future might look like 13/23
That poses a difficult question. How a defeat might look like? 14/23
Putin has been pushing the idea that a defeat will mean the invasion of Russia, the country dismembered, the Russian women raped, children slaughtered and crucified, the foreigners ruling the land. Even Kovalev’s ends with stressing that defeat would be a catastrophe 15/23
Many Russians are convinced that the country is mortally threatened by the NATO forces. Several times I was told by the people I respect as cold-headed that this is all extremely bad, but what can we do – “if we don’t take Kyiv, they will take Moscow anyway” 16/23
The conversation about defeat is taking off in Russia, and it is important to untie the idea of defeat from the fears of catastrophe. Whose defeat it will be? This is another question 17/23
While there is no doubt that Russian people will take significant responsibility for this brutal assault on Ukraine – it is still important to discuss the differential responsibility. The defeat of Putin’s atrocious plans should be separated from the defeat of Russia 18/23
Russia has already lost when this war was launched – an unspeakable damage has been done to the country. Ending this war by recognizing internationally recognized borders of all countries is not a defeat for Russia, it is a beginning of the revival 19/23
It is no coincidence that Zombie TV tries to convince the audience that “everyone will go to the Hague is we lose”.
This is a lie, however, that shouldn't be supported. THEY will lose, and they will go to hell, and they know it. While WE have already lost when this war started, and we will have to rebuild the country and start restoring relationships with neighbors 21/23
This new emerging attitude offers new opportunities. Instead of trying to figure out what part of Ukraine will be enough for Putin (my answer is always Dresden), it is high time to think what are the costs and opportunities for Russia after Putin’s defeat and removal 22/23
This is a task for both the conversation between Russians and an international dialogue. There is no doubt Putin will do everything possible to preclude this conversation. But the sooner the solution emerges, the faster this war ends with justice 23/23
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An important investigation released by Dossier Center on the ongoing planning within FSB to invade and annex Moldova. Unfortunately, I was not able to find any English translation 1/11
The investigation makes evident what many people, including myself, have been saying for a long time: the invasion of Moldova is not a question of whether, but a question of when. It is now delayed out of tactical considerations 2/11
Most interestingly, the film shows a leaked footage of an anniversary of FSB officer in charge of Moldova. With this, one gets a rare window into the thinking of people who rule Russia now. Guests are part of the Russian ruling elite gravitating towards security services 3/11
There are three reasons why Putin is losing this war. Two of them cannot be fixed. That’s why Putin doubles down on solving the third 1/9
First: Motivation. Russian army has no business in Ukraine. No number of draftees will solve this problem. In fact, it will only make things worse, because every next batch is less motivated that the previous one. Russia is simply running out of idiots 2/9
The Kremlin has just started severe ideologization and militarization of Russian education to get the young committed to fight. Most probably, it is too late. Russian young are skeptical about this war, and will be increasingly opposed to it 3/9
The chaotic and barbaric shelling of Ukrainian cities looks like an act of desperation. Rather than pursuing a military purpose, it is rather meant to solve the rapidly internal problem 1/8
First, these attacks are precisely something the radicals were demanding long time ago. Putin was ignoring these demands for quite a while, and now he yielded to them immediately after the blowup of the bridge 2/8
Second, they are preceded by appointment of Surovikin – again, something the radicals were pushing through for a long time. This is not typical of Putin to give in to pressure so evidently – and now these people aren’t even afraid to claim they have forced Putin’s hand 3/8
There will probably appear very soon some poll numbers suggesting that Russians are incredibly enthusiastic about annexation. This was the case in 2014 with annexation of Crimea: on the Russian territory proper polls functioned as ersatz-plebiscites on admission 1/21
Several concepts that might be helpful in interpreting Russian polls.
1. Depoliticization. Almost all Russians have deep scorn and contempt for politics. Those who believe politics is meant to make society more just or free are usually considered childish or outright insane 3/21
A brief summary of what current mobilization is from the political viewpoint.
It is, of course, not partial at all, but I would still call it targeted/selective, and therefore not total.
There is a clear asymmetry in terms of groups affected 1/10
In the villages and little towns roughly 3% are mobilized, which is up to 10% of adult men (elderly excluded). The numbers tend to be higher among ethnic minorities that have even less real political representation and leverage compared to other Russians 2/10
In the bigger cities the number decreases to 1% of the population. In Moscow, it is likely to be somewhere at 0,1%. 300,000 looks plausible as a figure. There are strong rumors that this is only the first wave, and the total number will be above 1,000,000 3/10
Many requests to explain how Russians are likely to react to Putin’s speech.
Basic fact: the majority of Russians only care about their everyday life.
Hence, the reaction will depend on whether these decisions will affect everyday lives 1/5
This is unclear yet. Putin can very well continue with his piecemeal strategy. He created legal framework to extend it and stop/compensate for the leaks in his military. In that case, few people will be affected. 2/5
We witness a rush to leave the country/break a leg etc. However, the borders are not closed. It could be that people are allowed to leave and then return freely when they realize there is no imminent danger – as it happened in February.