Fabian Hoffmann Profile picture
May 11, 2023 12 tweets 5 min read Read on X
Thread 🧵on the Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missile delivered by the UK that provides Ukraine, in principle, with an extremely potent long-range strike capability against hardened targets at operational and strategic depth. 1/12 Image
Storm Shadow entered into service in 2002 and is manufactured by the European missile manufacturer @MBDAGroup. The French equivalent is known as SCALP-EG. Comparable cruise missiles include the American AGM-158 JASSM and the German-Swedish KEPD 350 Taurus. 2/12 ImageImage
Storm Shadow is equipped with a TR60-30 Turbojet engine, providing it with a range of 250-400 km. The variant delivered to Ukraine is likely to be at a lower end of this spectrum, similar to the Black Shaheen export version (290 km range) delivered to the UAE. 3/12 Image
The warhead is where it gets interesting. Storm Shadow is equipped with a 400 kg BROACH warhead. This is a two-stage warhead, made up from an initial shaped charge, which cuts a passage through concrete, earth, etc., allowing a follow-on warhead to penetrate the target. 4/12 ImageImage
This warhead design allows cruise missiles to achieve the degree of hard-target penetration formerly only possible using laser-guided gravity bombs. As such, Storm Shadow constitutes an incredibly effective weapon against hardened targets, if it can be brought to its target. 5/12 Image
The video below of the Taurus cruise missile (@MBDADeutschland) which uses a similar warhead design to BROACH (named MEFISTO) offers a great illustration of how multi-effect warheads can threaten deeply buried targets, like command-and-control bunkers. 6/12
For midcourse guidance, Storm Shadow employs a triple navigation system using inertial navigation, GPS, & Terrain Reference Navigation. For terminal guidance, it uses an imaging infrared seeker & automated target recognition software for pin-point accuracy (in theory). 7/12 ImageImage
However, given that the electromagnetic spectrum is contested, access to satellite navigation cannot be taken for granted. In addition, Storm Shadow may be susceptible to interception by Russian air defense capabilities. 8/12
So far, this war has demonstrated that low-flying, subsonic vehicles can be intercepted, perhaps more easily than priorly assumed. If this S-300 has indeed shot down 22 Kalibr cruise missiles, there is no reason to assume that Russian S-300s cannot intercept Storm Shadows. 9/12 Image
While I assume that Storm Shadow has better active & passive countermeasures than Russian equivalents, it is not invulnerable. The system is, after all, more than 20 years old. Engaging heavily defended targets, like Kerch bridge, therefore remains a challenge. 10/12
Talking about Kerch Bridge: The combination of pinpoint accuracy and hard-target kill capability renders Storm Shadow a much more potent weapon against the bridge than ATACMS could, in principle, ever be. See the thread below on ATACMS’ shortcomings. 11/12
In general, the good news is that command posts, logistical facilities, ammunition depots and other high-value targets outside of HIMARS range are no longer invulnerable. This will likely exacerbate Russian planning and logistics. 12/12

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More from @FRHoffmann1

May 11
What happens if Russia employs a nuclear weapon? The reality is that no one really knows.

However, what is equally true is that NATO is prepared for this type of scenario, and we have capabilities and contingency plans in place.

Some thoughts on what this might entail. 👇🧵 1/7 Image
How exactly NATO's response would look like depends on a range of factors, most notably warhead yield, location, casualties, etc.

Importantly, we have non-nuclear options to respond to Russian nuclear use, meaning we don't necessarily have to match 🇷🇺's nuclear escalation. 2/7
For example, a retaliatory mass cruise missile strike led by the US can arguably inflict as much damage as deploying a low-yield nuclear warhead.

This is crucial as it potentially offers a more credible deterrent, helps manage escalation risks, and fosters alliance cohesion. 3/7 Image
Read 7 tweets
Apr 28
Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.

I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19 Image
Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.

In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19

While the Minister and other senior officials have not provided details on these national security interests and how they arise, they more than likely relate to the role of the Taurus cruise missile in German military strategy and its implications in wartime. 3/19
Read 20 tweets
Apr 27
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21 Image
The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21 Image
Most above-ground structures will crumble or collapse under an overpressure of 20 pounds per square inch (psi) caused by a high explosive detonation. The capacity to generate such overpressures is largely a function of the warhead's yield and its distance to the target. 3/21 Image
Read 21 tweets
Apr 14
Sharing some initial reflections here on the implications of last night's missile raid by Iran for the likelihood of a regional war, the role of nuclear weapons in Israel's deterrence posture, and the evolving technological landscape of modern warfare. 1/11 Image
First, while the missile raid was targeted and calibrated in nature, it constituted a massive assault clearly intended to overwhelm Israel's missile defense system.

In my opinion, this was more comprehensive than what you would typically classify as a "signalling strike". 2/11 Image
This puts Israel in a tough spot. From a deterrence and future bargaining perspective, not responding at all will be a difficult sell to decisionmakers.

But without US support, 🇮🇱 cannot sustain an effective air campaign against Iran and might face the prospect of defeat. 3/11 Image
Read 11 tweets
Apr 11
Let's face it, Ukraine's largest power station being permanently disabled is really bad. We are witnessing the failure of the appeasers and escalation managers' strategy in Ukraine.

Not providing Ukraine with the means to disable Russian launchers was never sustainable. 1/3 Image
At this stage of the war, state capacity is the crucial factor. We rightly commend 🇺🇦 for having found a way to undermine Russia's state capacity with indigenous long-range drones. But at the same time we are content to stand by and watch Ukraine's state capacity burn? 2/3
I derive no satisfaction from this, but I have to ask those historians, political scientists, & military strategists on this platform who for months have argued against "technocentric" solutions & downplayed the role of missiles in 🇺🇦: How does this picture make you feel? 3/3
Read 4 tweets
Mar 30
In a recent interview I was asked an interesting question: Why are European missile defense arsenals so empty when acquiring such weapon systems, due to their purely defensive nature, should have been politically easy, even in the post-Cold War environment? A short thread. 👇1/11 Image
There is no monocausal explanation to this. But one reason is that it was, in fact, not politically easy to deploy missile defenses in Europe. This is because 🇷🇺 successfully managed to intertwine tactical-operational missile defense with strategic (nuclear) missile defense. 2/11
Think of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which was started in 2009 under the Obama administration and forsaw the gradual deployment of missile defense assets to Europe to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Iran. 3/11 Image
Read 12 tweets

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