Thread 🧵on the Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missile delivered by the UK that provides Ukraine, in principle, with an extremely potent long-range strike capability against hardened targets at operational and strategic depth. 1/12
Storm Shadow entered into service in 2002 and is manufactured by the European missile manufacturer @MBDAGroup. The French equivalent is known as SCALP-EG. Comparable cruise missiles include the American AGM-158 JASSM and the German-Swedish KEPD 350 Taurus. 2/12
Storm Shadow is equipped with a TR60-30 Turbojet engine, providing it with a range of 250-400 km. The variant delivered to Ukraine is likely to be at a lower end of this spectrum, similar to the Black Shaheen export version (290 km range) delivered to the UAE. 3/12
The warhead is where it gets interesting. Storm Shadow is equipped with a 400 kg BROACH warhead. This is a two-stage warhead, made up from an initial shaped charge, which cuts a passage through concrete, earth, etc., allowing a follow-on warhead to penetrate the target. 4/12
This warhead design allows cruise missiles to achieve the degree of hard-target penetration formerly only possible using laser-guided gravity bombs. As such, Storm Shadow constitutes an incredibly effective weapon against hardened targets, if it can be brought to its target. 5/12
The video below of the Taurus cruise missile (@MBDADeutschland) which uses a similar warhead design to BROACH (named MEFISTO) offers a great illustration of how multi-effect warheads can threaten deeply buried targets, like command-and-control bunkers. 6/12
For midcourse guidance, Storm Shadow employs a triple navigation system using inertial navigation, GPS, & Terrain Reference Navigation. For terminal guidance, it uses an imaging infrared seeker & automated target recognition software for pin-point accuracy (in theory). 7/12
However, given that the electromagnetic spectrum is contested, access to satellite navigation cannot be taken for granted. In addition, Storm Shadow may be susceptible to interception by Russian air defense capabilities. 8/12
So far, this war has demonstrated that low-flying, subsonic vehicles can be intercepted, perhaps more easily than priorly assumed. If this S-300 has indeed shot down 22 Kalibr cruise missiles, there is no reason to assume that Russian S-300s cannot intercept Storm Shadows. 9/12
While I assume that Storm Shadow has better active & passive countermeasures than Russian equivalents, it is not invulnerable. The system is, after all, more than 20 years old. Engaging heavily defended targets, like Kerch bridge, therefore remains a challenge. 10/12
Talking about Kerch Bridge: The combination of pinpoint accuracy and hard-target kill capability renders Storm Shadow a much more potent weapon against the bridge than ATACMS could, in principle, ever be. See the thread below on ATACMS’ shortcomings. 11/12
In general, the good news is that command posts, logistical facilities, ammunition depots and other high-value targets outside of HIMARS range are no longer invulnerable. This will likely exacerbate Russian planning and logistics. 12/12
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I published a new Missile Matters post today, offering an initial battle damage assessment of Flamingo’s first combat use.
Proof of concept was established, but the strike also revealed likely shortcomings.
Access the post via the link in my bio. Summary below.
1/6
High-resolution satellite imagery shows two impacts.
Depending on the nominal aimpoints, missile one probably missed by 15 to 40 meters and missile two by 80 to 200 meters.
Missile three did not reach the target area, whether due to outside influence or internal failure.
2/6
Fire Point stated that the Flamingo has a CEP of 14 meters, meaning 50 percent of missiles should land within 14 meters of their aimpoint, about 93 percent within 28 meters, and the remainder outside the 28-meter radius.
3/6
With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs.
Link in bio, short summary below.
1/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.
2/6
From relying almost entirely on Western partners in 2023 for long-range strike capabilities, Ukraine by 2025 fields a diverse but still imperfect missile arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone.
3/6
I published my latest newsletter post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.
You can find the full post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload.
This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield.
2/6
The ultimate impact of the Flamingo on the battlefield will depend on Ukrainian production levels and its survivability against Russian missile defenses.
Ukrainian output goals of more than 200 units per month by the end of the year are certainly ambitious.
3/6
I estimate U.S. and European production of ballistic missile interceptors and compare it to Russia’s output of conventional ballistic missiles.
Access the post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/7
Russia is currently estimated to produce a total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually, or 70 to 85 per month.
This represents roughly a 15 to 40 percent increase compared to 2024.
2/7
In contrast, combined Patriot interceptor production (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) stands at 850 to 880 in 2025.
By 2027, this will increase to over 1,100 interceptors, and to over 1,400 by 2029 (if Rheinmetall starts producing PAC-3 MSE interceptors).
3/7
I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russia’s inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6