Thread 🧵on the Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missile delivered by the UK that provides Ukraine, in principle, with an extremely potent long-range strike capability against hardened targets at operational and strategic depth. 1/12
Storm Shadow entered into service in 2002 and is manufactured by the European missile manufacturer @MBDAGroup. The French equivalent is known as SCALP-EG. Comparable cruise missiles include the American AGM-158 JASSM and the German-Swedish KEPD 350 Taurus. 2/12
Storm Shadow is equipped with a TR60-30 Turbojet engine, providing it with a range of 250-400 km. The variant delivered to Ukraine is likely to be at a lower end of this spectrum, similar to the Black Shaheen export version (290 km range) delivered to the UAE. 3/12
The warhead is where it gets interesting. Storm Shadow is equipped with a 400 kg BROACH warhead. This is a two-stage warhead, made up from an initial shaped charge, which cuts a passage through concrete, earth, etc., allowing a follow-on warhead to penetrate the target. 4/12
This warhead design allows cruise missiles to achieve the degree of hard-target penetration formerly only possible using laser-guided gravity bombs. As such, Storm Shadow constitutes an incredibly effective weapon against hardened targets, if it can be brought to its target. 5/12
The video below of the Taurus cruise missile (@MBDADeutschland) which uses a similar warhead design to BROACH (named MEFISTO) offers a great illustration of how multi-effect warheads can threaten deeply buried targets, like command-and-control bunkers. 6/12
For midcourse guidance, Storm Shadow employs a triple navigation system using inertial navigation, GPS, & Terrain Reference Navigation. For terminal guidance, it uses an imaging infrared seeker & automated target recognition software for pin-point accuracy (in theory). 7/12
However, given that the electromagnetic spectrum is contested, access to satellite navigation cannot be taken for granted. In addition, Storm Shadow may be susceptible to interception by Russian air defense capabilities. 8/12
So far, this war has demonstrated that low-flying, subsonic vehicles can be intercepted, perhaps more easily than priorly assumed. If this S-300 has indeed shot down 22 Kalibr cruise missiles, there is no reason to assume that Russian S-300s cannot intercept Storm Shadows. 9/12
While I assume that Storm Shadow has better active & passive countermeasures than Russian equivalents, it is not invulnerable. The system is, after all, more than 20 years old. Engaging heavily defended targets, like Kerch bridge, therefore remains a challenge. 10/12
Talking about Kerch Bridge: The combination of pinpoint accuracy and hard-target kill capability renders Storm Shadow a much more potent weapon against the bridge than ATACMS could, in principle, ever be. See the thread below on ATACMS’ shortcomings. 11/12
In general, the good news is that command posts, logistical facilities, ammunition depots and other high-value targets outside of HIMARS range are no longer invulnerable. This will likely exacerbate Russian planning and logistics. 12/12
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I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russia’s inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6
On September 25, the Kremlin announced plans to revise its nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions for nuclear use.
This raises a critical question: How credible is this latest nuclear threat, and how credible are Russian nuclear threats in general?
Short thread 🧵👇:
1/10
I categorize 🇷🇺 nuclear threats into four types: cheap talk, state-sanctioned rhetoric, preparations for limited nuclear use, and preparations for large-scale nuclear use. Each varies in intensity & credibility.
We have observed the first two types, but not the latter two.
2/10
Cheap talk includes non-official rhetoric like TV discussions by excentric talkshow guests about nuking Western cities.
These discussions do not reflect official policy & ignore the immense costs of nuclear use to Russia, making them non-credible and generally ignorable.
A few people asked if all 22 S-300/S-400 sites around Moscow are still active or if some systems have been removed and redeployed, likely closer to Ukraine.
In other words, does Moscow's air defense network underperform because it no longer exists?
A short thread. 1/8
First, @AS_22im is the true expert on tracking S-300/S-400 sites. I recommend you follow him.
My TL;DR: Satellite imagery indicates that most air defense sites around Moscow remain intact, although some have lost a few launchers, while other sites are completely gone.
2/8
A good example of an air defense site that remains fully in-tact is the one near Novovorino (56.1676, 37.82313).
The image on the left is from June 2019, the one on the right from May 2024. The only difference is that the launchers are erected, suggesting higher readiness.
Ukraine's Sapsan SRBM is one of three primary missile projects that 🇺🇦 is working on. The other two are the Neptune ASCM (in production) and the Korshun LACM (in development).
Hrim-2 is a shorter-range variant intended for export and is largely identical with the Sapsan.
1/5
The missile missile follows other SRBMs, like the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M and the South Korean Hyunmoo-2, in form and function.
The missile is powered by solid fuel & has a claimed range of 400-500 km, though reports have stated that this may be extended to 700 km or more.
2/5
Sapsan reportedly has a payload capacity of 480 kg. The tapered warhead seen in the picture of the Hrim-2 is well-suited for a penetrator warhead, providing the missile with significant hard-target kill capability — something currently lacking in Ukraine's missile arsenal.
3/5
Taurus uses a 'smart' fuse that counts the layers and void spaces the warhead penetrates, making sure the warhead explodes at precisely the right moment, rather than relying on a set timer.