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Fabian Hoffmann Profile picture
Fabian Hoffmann
@FRHoffmann1
Doctoral Research Fellow @NuclearOslo @UniOslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy. Views are strictly my own. Speaks 🇬🇧🇩🇪🇫🇷.
Chris Bugbee Profile picture Sue Strong @strong_sue@mastodon.sdf.org 🇺🇦 Profile picture Daniel O'Donnell Profile picture giovanni dall'olio 🇮🇹🇪🇺🇺🇦 Profile picture A. T. ✙ 🇺🇦🇪🇺🇫🇮 Profile picture 29 subscribed
Apr 28 • 20 tweets • 5 min read
Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.

I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19 Image Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.

In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19

Apr 27 • 21 tweets • 6 min read
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21 Image The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21 Image
Apr 14 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
Sharing some initial reflections here on the implications of last night's missile raid by Iran for the likelihood of a regional war, the role of nuclear weapons in Israel's deterrence posture, and the evolving technological landscape of modern warfare. 1/11 Image First, while the missile raid was targeted and calibrated in nature, it constituted a massive assault clearly intended to overwhelm Israel's missile defense system.

In my opinion, this was more comprehensive than what you would typically classify as a "signalling strike". 2/11 Image
Apr 11 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Let's face it, Ukraine's largest power station being permanently disabled is really bad. We are witnessing the failure of the appeasers and escalation managers' strategy in Ukraine.

Not providing Ukraine with the means to disable Russian launchers was never sustainable. 1/3 Image At this stage of the war, state capacity is the crucial factor. We rightly commend 🇺🇦 for having found a way to undermine Russia's state capacity with indigenous long-range drones. But at the same time we are content to stand by and watch Ukraine's state capacity burn? 2/3
Mar 30 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
In a recent interview I was asked an interesting question: Why are European missile defense arsenals so empty when acquiring such weapon systems, due to their purely defensive nature, should have been politically easy, even in the post-Cold War environment? A short thread. 👇1/11 Image There is no monocausal explanation to this. But one reason is that it was, in fact, not politically easy to deploy missile defenses in Europe. This is because 🇷🇺 successfully managed to intertwine tactical-operational missile defense with strategic (nuclear) missile defense. 2/11
Mar 26 • 24 tweets • 6 min read
This thread discusses the role of 'risk' in the ongoing war and highlights the problematic approach the West has towards risk management.

In essence, my argument is that risk is a feature, not a bug in the situation we are currently in, and we have to treat it as such. 🧵👇 1/24 Image The West's approach to supporting Ukraine, especially that of key players like Germany and the United States, has been to supply necessary equipment while minimizing perceived risks of escalation that could arise due to weapon deliveries. 2/24
Mar 19 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
What if a coalition of willing nations decided to intervene to protect Ukraine and potentially confront Russia? Could they establish from the start that casualties wouldn't automatically trigger Article 5? There are options to consider. 1/4 Remember though that one of the key objectives of Russian doctrine is to prevent conflicts from escalating from the local to the regional level. This is initially achieved through the use of conventional strategic weapons, and later, by resorting to non-strategic nukes. 2/4
Mar 16 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Hie liegt @winkelsdorf falsch. Die Bundeswehr hat 600 Taurus KEPD 350 bestellt und bekommen. Es gibt keinen Taurus MP. Dieser wurde geplant, aber letztlich nie entwickelt, da es keinen Kunden gab (wie für andere geplante Versionen). Ein kurzer Thread. 👇 1/5 Taurus ist modular ausgelegt, um auf potenzielle Fähigkeitsforderungen von Kunden reagieren zu können. Es gibt aber keine modularen Taurus im deutschen Arsenal (oder in irgendeinem anderen). Image
Mar 16 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
There's a rumor circulating about Taurus having a modular payload. This rumor likely stems from an information request by @SevimDagdelen from Aug 2023, who queried, "Is the 🇩🇪 government aware that Taurus can be equipped with different payloads, including nuclear warheads?" This claim is of course entirely inaccurate. Let me explain: 1/5Image Only one Taurus variant has ever been produced and entered into service: the Taurus KEPD-350. This variant is equipped with a multi-effect warhead, featuring a primary shaped charge warhead and a secondary penetrator warhead. Other variants were conceived but never developed. 2/5 Image
Mar 15 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
To no one's surprise, it took around 24h for the secret information that was referenced in the parliamentary debate on Taurus to leak. This information pertains to the processing power required for inputting & processing targeting data. Some thoughts: 1/10
t-online.de/nachrichten/de… The notion that the Taurus targeting process necessitates large amounts processing power and data is not a new or secret revelation. Broadly speaking, there is a "simple" and an "extended" Taurus mission planning protocol. The two are also referenced in the leaked call. 2/10
Mar 8 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
Here's a thread discussing the range of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG. Some have asked me to explain why I believe the range of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG supplied to Ukraine is comparable to that of Taurus (500+ km), and why Ukraine has yet to attack the Kerch Bridge. 1/11 Image Two relevant variants of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG have been developed over the years. The baseline model with a range of around 550 km and an export version, the 'Black Shaheen' with a range of 290 km. Apart from their range difference, both missiles are identical. 2/11
Mar 3 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Once again, @WAJKoenitz is proving himself as someone who has no understanding of Taurus and missile systems in general. Suggesting that Taurus, or any modern cruise missile, has a CEP of 10m is the dumbest shit I've read on this app today. 1/9 Image CEP (circular error probable) is a probabilistic method used to evaluate accuracy. It represents the smallest radius of a circle within which 50% of projectiles are expected to land. A 10m CEP indicates that 50% all shots fired fall outside a 10m radius of the target. 2/9
Feb 27 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
This will be my final comment on the Taurus issue, as I'm growing weary of repeating the same points.

Unfortunately, many in 🇩🇪 still view Taurus as optional, when in reality it is not. Without a replenishment of long-range strike weapons, 🇺🇦 will inevitably face depletion. 1/4 At a consumption rate of 30-50 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG per month, Ukraine will run out by the end of 2024.

Yes, the consumption rate could drop further, but Ukraine is already struggling to integrate LRS usage into a coherent missile campaign at the current rate. 2/4
Jan 29 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
Because I keep receiving comments like these, here's a comprehensive thread explaining why I don't believe Taurus deliveries are being held up by the 🇺🇸. My position is based on the available data points and considering both alternatives (🇩🇪 at fault vs. 🇺🇸 at fault). 👇1/7 1. Taurus does not include highly sensitive American technologies.

Two significant components in Taurus of US origin are the Rockwell Collins GPS receiver with a Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) and the Williams International P8300-15 Turbofan engine.

This is the reason why Germany would require US approval before delivering Taurus to Ukraine. However, these technologies are not considered highly sensitive.

In the past, turbofan engines were considered a proliferation risk. However, with increased access to this technology, these concerns have largely subsided. Currently, every US adversary has access to these types of cruise missile engines.

I don't believe it would have any significance, but it may be worth noting that the engine utilized in the Taurus missile differs from the F107 turbofan engine employed in JASSM-ER. Consequently, Russia could not draw any conclusions regarding propulsion of U.S. long-range strike weapons.

When we consider the GPS receiver, it is evident that the United States has already sent numerous jamming-resistant GPS receivers in Ukraine. This technology has been notably utilized in GMLRS artillery rockets. As such, this technology is, in theory, already at risk of falling into Russian hands.

Also, the receiver only plays a role if Ukraine were to receive upgraded Taurus from Germany's operational stock. If it receives only recertified older ones than the upgraded American receiver would not be not included.
Jan 19 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
How long would it take to get a Taurus production line running? There are two aspects to consider:
1) Setting up the physical production line (physical spaces, tools/machines, hiring workers)
2) Establishing the supply chain necessary for production. 1/10

The most recent Taurus cruise missiles were part of South Korea's second batch, ordered in 2018. The final Taurus missile arrived in South Korea in 2020. Since then, Taurus Systems GmbH has not yet dismantled its physical production capacity. 2/10
Jan 14 • 20 tweets • 4 min read
In this thread, I will explain why we are much closer to war with 🇷🇺 than most people realize and why our time window for rearmament is shorter than many believe. In my opinion, we have at best 2-3 years to re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis 🇷🇺. Here's why 👇 1/20 Image One common mistake in analyzing the threat posed by Russia is falling into the trap of 'mirror-imaging'. This means assuming that Russia views a potential conflict with us in the same way we view a potential conflict with them. Nothing could be further from the truth. 2/20
Jan 10 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Some recent news regarding Taurus I had missed as reported by @JanesINTEL. Taurus Systems GmbH has signed an MOU with South Korean manufacturer LIG Nex1 for joint development of an adapted version of the KEPD-350K Taurus missile for the KAI FA-50 light fighter jet. 1/8 Image The adapted version, The Taurus KEPD-350K-2 is slightly shorter than the baseline KEPD-350K version (4.5 m compared to 5.1 m) and weighs about a third less (907 kg compared 1,400 kg). These changes were implemented to make the K2 viable for the FA-50. 2/8 janes.com/defence-news/n…
Jan 4 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Interessanter Thread von @LukasMengelkamp. Als starker Befürworter von Taurus/ATACMS-Lieferungen, die ich als extrem wichtig ansehe, hier ein paar Gegenargumente. 1/10

Ja, Langstreckenpräzisionswaffen stellen entscheidende Fähigkeiten im modernen Krieg dar. In einem Krieg wie den in der Ukraine, in dem es vermehrt um Abnutzung geht, ist es unabdingbar dem Gegner auch hinter der Frontlinie Verschleiß zuzufügen. 2/

Jan 3 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
COMLOG, the joint venture of @MBDADeutschland and @RaytheonDefen__, received an order for a combined total of 1,000 MIM-104 PAC-2/GEM-T interceptors for Patriot batteries operated by 🇩🇪🇳🇱🇷🇴🇪🇸. The interceptors will be produced at MBDA Germany's facilities in Europe. 1/4 This is the second large order of PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors COMLOG received in a short amount of time. About two weeks ago, the German parliament greenlighted the procurement of 500 MIM-104 PAC-2/GEM-T interceptors for the German Air Force. 2/4
Dec 28, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
I published a new op-ed in @derspiegel.

I argue that wars in the modern period, at their core, have constituted competitions between the industrial capacities of two or more states and their will to fight. The ongoing war in Ukraine is no exception. 1/4 spiegel.de/politik/deutsc… The outcome of this war will not be determined by tactical genius, superior training, or wonder weapons. In the end it comes down to the sheer mass of equipment and manpower that Ukraine can deploy on the battlefield over an extended period of time. 2/4
Nov 15, 2023 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
It's time to reassess Ukraine's consumption of Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG missiles and the sustainability of its remaining land-attack cruise missile arsenal. The analysis shows that in order to ensure a robust long-range strike capability, 🇺🇦 requires Taurus cruise missiles. 1/14 Image In August 2023, roughly three months after first receiving Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles from France and the UK, I estimated that Ukraine had received between 250 to 500 cruise missiles and was using around 75 per month. 2/14