Doctoral Research Fellow @NuclearOslo @UniOslo / Non-Resident Fellow @CEPA. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy. Views are strictly my own.
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Sep 5 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Hi all,
I published a new Missile Matters post today, offering an initial battle damage assessment of Flamingo’s first combat use.
Proof of concept was established, but the strike also revealed likely shortcomings.
Access the post via the link in my bio. Summary below.
1/6
High-resolution satellite imagery shows two impacts.
Depending on the nominal aimpoints, missile one probably missed by 15 to 40 meters and missile two by 80 to 200 meters.
Missile three did not reach the target area, whether due to outside influence or internal failure.
2/6
Aug 31 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Hi all,
I just published my latest Missile Matters post.
With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs.
Link in bio, short summary below.
1/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.
2/6
Aug 23 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Hi all,
I published my latest newsletter post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.
You can find the full post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload.
This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield.
2/6
Jul 6 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Hi all,
I sent out my latest newsletter earlier today.
I estimate U.S. and European production of ballistic missile interceptors and compare it to Russia’s output of conventional ballistic missiles.
Access the post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/7
Russia is currently estimated to produce a total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually, or 70 to 85 per month.
This represents roughly a 15 to 40 percent increase compared to 2024.
2/7
Feb 9 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Hi all,
I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
Oct 2, 2024 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
Sep 29, 2024 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
On September 25, the Kremlin announced plans to revise its nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions for nuclear use.
This raises a critical question: How credible is this latest nuclear threat, and how credible are Russian nuclear threats in general?
Short thread 🧵👇:
1/10
I categorize 🇷🇺 nuclear threats into four types: cheap talk, state-sanctioned rhetoric, preparations for limited nuclear use, and preparations for large-scale nuclear use. Each varies in intensity & credibility.
We have observed the first two types, but not the latter two.
2/10
Sep 6, 2024 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
A few people asked if all 22 S-300/S-400 sites around Moscow are still active or if some systems have been removed and redeployed, likely closer to Ukraine.
In other words, does Moscow's air defense network underperform because it no longer exists?
A short thread. 1/8
First, @AS_22im is the true expert on tracking S-300/S-400 sites. I recommend you follow him.
My TL;DR: Satellite imagery indicates that most air defense sites around Moscow remain intact, although some have lost a few launchers, while other sites are completely gone.
2/8
Aug 27, 2024 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Ukraine's Sapsan SRBM is one of three primary missile projects that 🇺🇦 is working on. The other two are the Neptune ASCM (in production) and the Korshun LACM (in development).
Hrim-2 is a shorter-range variant intended for export and is largely identical with the Sapsan.
1/5
The missile missile follows other SRBMs, like the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M and the South Korean Hyunmoo-2, in form and function.
The missile is powered by solid fuel & has a claimed range of 400-500 km, though reports have stated that this may be extended to 700 km or more.
2/5
Aug 17, 2024 • 10 tweets • 4 min read
As promised, here is a short thread on AGM-158A JASSM's bridge-busting capability, which I didn't cover in yesterday's thread.
JASSM's ability to destroy bridges is largely on par with Taurus, thanks to its advanced fuse system.
With the AGM-158A JASSM now emerging as a viable option for Ukraine, it's a good opportunity to explore the basic capability profile and main advantages of JASSM compared to ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, and Taurus. 🧵👇
1/15
The AGM-158A JASSM is, broadly speaking, the American counterpart to the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 & the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
Due to its significant export success, it's increasingly becoming the standard land-attack cruise missile in Western arsenals. 2/15
Jul 22, 2024 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Critics of deploying U.S. medium-range missiles to Germany have overstated the risks & drawbacks of this decision.
In this article for Behind the Front (@FPRI), I address these misconceptions & outline the benefits of the deployment.
Short 🧵 1/5
Link: behindthefront.substack.com/p/return-of-th…
Militarily, medium-range missiles provide deterrence benefits by allowing NATO to more credibly hold at risk targets at operational and strategic depth, including those of time-sensitive nature.
Politically, the decision restores NATO's role as a credible arms control actor. 2/5
Jul 16, 2024 • 16 tweets • 3 min read
Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.
I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.
TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15
But first recap, why 2-3 years?
Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.
Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.
2/15
Jul 15, 2024 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
When people claim medium-range missiles in Germany are destabilizing because they can reach homeland targets deep inside Russia, including Moscow, ask how often they’ve complained about short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles stationed in Kaliningrad.
1/5
For over a decade, Russia has been threatening European capitals and homeland targets with its Iskander-M ballistic and cruise missile systems, both nuclear & conventionally armed, from Kaliningrad.
Russia has also frequently hinted at using them in first-strike scenarios.
2/5
Jul 13, 2024 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
The lack of a public debate on the deployment of INF-range missiles in 🇩🇪 has been criticized.
But such a debate would have been counterproductive. Why?
1) It would have been more damaging than helpful 2) It would have undermined our credibility 3) There was no need for it
1/9
Most importantly, I disagree with the notion that this debate would have been some kind of enlightened discourse on the relative benefits of deterrence, reassurance and arms control.
The opposite: It would have been ugly and damaging to our democratic system and reputation.
2/9
Jul 11, 2024 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
I saw a few takes today on why deploying INF-range missiles to Europe/Germany might strategically backfire, and that the timing of the decision was overhasty.
I want to present the counter-narrative: this move is strategically sound and the timing is appropriate. 1/8 1. INF-range missiles in Europe will offer NATO substantial military advantages and strengthen our deterrence posture.
To fight wars effectively, you have to be able to threaten the adversary's rear, including time-sensitive targets. 2/8
May 11, 2024 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
What happens if Russia employs a nuclear weapon? The reality is that no one really knows.
However, what is equally true is that NATO is prepared for this type of scenario, and we have capabilities and contingency plans in place.
Some thoughts on what this might entail. 👇🧵 1/7
How exactly NATO's response would look like depends on a range of factors, most notably warhead yield, location, casualties, etc.
Importantly, we have non-nuclear options to respond to Russian nuclear use, meaning we don't necessarily have to match 🇷🇺's nuclear escalation. 2/7
Apr 28, 2024 • 20 tweets • 5 min read
Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.
I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19
Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.
In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21
The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21
Apr 14, 2024 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
Sharing some initial reflections here on the implications of last night's missile raid by Iran for the likelihood of a regional war, the role of nuclear weapons in Israel's deterrence posture, and the evolving technological landscape of modern warfare. 1/11
First, while the missile raid was targeted and calibrated in nature, it constituted a massive assault clearly intended to overwhelm Israel's missile defense system.
In my opinion, this was more comprehensive than what you would typically classify as a "signalling strike". 2/11
Apr 11, 2024 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Let's face it, Ukraine's largest power station being permanently disabled is really bad. We are witnessing the failure of the appeasers and escalation managers' strategy in Ukraine.
Not providing Ukraine with the means to disable Russian launchers was never sustainable. 1/3
At this stage of the war, state capacity is the crucial factor. We rightly commend 🇺🇦 for having found a way to undermine Russia's state capacity with indigenous long-range drones. But at the same time we are content to stand by and watch Ukraine's state capacity burn? 2/3