Fabian Hoffmann Profile picture
Doctoral Research Fellow @NuclearOslo @UniOslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy. Views are strictly my own.
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Oct 2 6 tweets 2 min read
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:

My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.

1/6 Image The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.

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Sep 29 11 tweets 3 min read
On September 25, the Kremlin announced plans to revise its nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions for nuclear use.

This raises a critical question: How credible is this latest nuclear threat, and how credible are Russian nuclear threats in general?

Short thread 🧵👇:

1/10 Framework for understanding the credibility of Russian nuclear threats. I categorize 🇷🇺 nuclear threats into four types: cheap talk, state-sanctioned rhetoric, preparations for limited nuclear use, and preparations for large-scale nuclear use. Each varies in intensity & credibility.

We have observed the first two types, but not the latter two.

2/10
Sep 6 8 tweets 3 min read
A few people asked if all 22 S-300/S-400 sites around Moscow are still active or if some systems have been removed and redeployed, likely closer to Ukraine.

In other words, does Moscow's air defense network underperform because it no longer exists?

A short thread. 1/8 Image First, @AS_22im is the true expert on tracking S-300/S-400 sites. I recommend you follow him.

My TL;DR: Satellite imagery indicates that most air defense sites around Moscow remain intact, although some have lost a few launchers, while other sites are completely gone.

2/8
Aug 27 5 tweets 2 min read
Ukraine's Sapsan SRBM is one of three primary missile projects that 🇺🇦 is working on. The other two are the Neptune ASCM (in production) and the Korshun LACM (in development).

Hrim-2 is a shorter-range variant intended for export and is largely identical with the Sapsan.

1/5 Image The missile missile follows other SRBMs, like the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M and the South Korean Hyunmoo-2, in form and function.

The missile is powered by solid fuel & has a claimed range of 400-500 km, though reports have stated that this may be extended to 700 km or more.

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Aug 17 10 tweets 4 min read
As promised, here is a short thread on AGM-158A JASSM's bridge-busting capability, which I didn't cover in yesterday's thread.

JASSM's ability to destroy bridges is largely on par with Taurus, thanks to its advanced fuse system.

1/10


Image Germany's Taurus KEPD-350 is arguably the best stand-off weapon in Western arsenals for destroying complex bridge targets.

This is due to its powerful MEPHISTO penetrator warhead system, which combines destructiveness with sophistication.

2/10

Aug 16 18 tweets 5 min read
It's been some time since my last missile thread.

With the AGM-158A JASSM now emerging as a viable option for Ukraine, it's a good opportunity to explore the basic capability profile and main advantages of JASSM compared to ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, and Taurus. 🧵👇

1/15 Image The AGM-158A JASSM is, broadly speaking, the American counterpart to the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 & the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.

Due to its significant export success, it's increasingly becoming the standard land-attack cruise missile in Western arsenals. 2/15
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Jul 22 6 tweets 2 min read
Critics of deploying U.S. medium-range missiles to Germany have overstated the risks & drawbacks of this decision.

In this article for Behind the Front (@FPRI), I address these misconceptions & outline the benefits of the deployment.

Short 🧵 1/5

Link: behindthefront.substack.com/p/return-of-th…
Image Militarily, medium-range missiles provide deterrence benefits by allowing NATO to more credibly hold at risk targets at operational and strategic depth, including those of time-sensitive nature.

Politically, the decision restores NATO's role as a credible arms control actor. 2/5
Jul 16 16 tweets 3 min read
Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.

I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.

TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15 Image But first recap, why 2-3 years?

Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.

Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.

2/15
Jul 15 5 tweets 2 min read
When people claim medium-range missiles in Germany are destabilizing because they can reach homeland targets deep inside Russia, including Moscow, ask how often they’ve complained about short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles stationed in Kaliningrad.

1/5 Image For over a decade, Russia has been threatening European capitals and homeland targets with its Iskander-M ballistic and cruise missile systems, both nuclear & conventionally armed, from Kaliningrad.

Russia has also frequently hinted at using them in first-strike scenarios.

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Jul 13 9 tweets 2 min read
The lack of a public debate on the deployment of INF-range missiles in 🇩🇪 has been criticized.

But such a debate would have been counterproductive. Why?

1) It would have been more damaging than helpful
2) It would have undermined our credibility
3) There was no need for it

1/9 Image Most importantly, I disagree with the notion that this debate would have been some kind of enlightened discourse on the relative benefits of deterrence, reassurance and arms control.

The opposite: It would have been ugly and damaging to our democratic system and reputation.

2/9
Jul 11 8 tweets 2 min read
I saw a few takes today on why deploying INF-range missiles to Europe/Germany might strategically backfire, and that the timing of the decision was overhasty.

I want to present the counter-narrative: this move is strategically sound and the timing is appropriate. 1/8 Image 1. INF-range missiles in Europe will offer NATO substantial military advantages and strengthen our deterrence posture.

To fight wars effectively, you have to be able to threaten the adversary's rear, including time-sensitive targets. 2/8
May 11 7 tweets 2 min read
What happens if Russia employs a nuclear weapon? The reality is that no one really knows.

However, what is equally true is that NATO is prepared for this type of scenario, and we have capabilities and contingency plans in place.

Some thoughts on what this might entail. 👇🧵 1/7 Image How exactly NATO's response would look like depends on a range of factors, most notably warhead yield, location, casualties, etc.

Importantly, we have non-nuclear options to respond to Russian nuclear use, meaning we don't necessarily have to match 🇷🇺's nuclear escalation. 2/7
Apr 28 20 tweets 5 min read
Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.

I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19 Image Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.

In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19

Apr 27 21 tweets 6 min read
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21 Image The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21 Image
Apr 14 11 tweets 3 min read
Sharing some initial reflections here on the implications of last night's missile raid by Iran for the likelihood of a regional war, the role of nuclear weapons in Israel's deterrence posture, and the evolving technological landscape of modern warfare. 1/11 Image First, while the missile raid was targeted and calibrated in nature, it constituted a massive assault clearly intended to overwhelm Israel's missile defense system.

In my opinion, this was more comprehensive than what you would typically classify as a "signalling strike". 2/11 Image
Apr 11 4 tweets 1 min read
Let's face it, Ukraine's largest power station being permanently disabled is really bad. We are witnessing the failure of the appeasers and escalation managers' strategy in Ukraine.

Not providing Ukraine with the means to disable Russian launchers was never sustainable. 1/3 Image At this stage of the war, state capacity is the crucial factor. We rightly commend 🇺🇦 for having found a way to undermine Russia's state capacity with indigenous long-range drones. But at the same time we are content to stand by and watch Ukraine's state capacity burn? 2/3
Mar 30 12 tweets 3 min read
In a recent interview I was asked an interesting question: Why are European missile defense arsenals so empty when acquiring such weapon systems, due to their purely defensive nature, should have been politically easy, even in the post-Cold War environment? A short thread. 👇1/11 Image There is no monocausal explanation to this. But one reason is that it was, in fact, not politically easy to deploy missile defenses in Europe. This is because 🇷🇺 successfully managed to intertwine tactical-operational missile defense with strategic (nuclear) missile defense. 2/11
Mar 26 24 tweets 6 min read
This thread discusses the role of 'risk' in the ongoing war and highlights the problematic approach the West has towards risk management.

In essence, my argument is that risk is a feature, not a bug in the situation we are currently in, and we have to treat it as such. 🧵👇 1/24 Image The West's approach to supporting Ukraine, especially that of key players like Germany and the United States, has been to supply necessary equipment while minimizing perceived risks of escalation that could arise due to weapon deliveries. 2/24
Mar 19 4 tweets 1 min read
What if a coalition of willing nations decided to intervene to protect Ukraine and potentially confront Russia? Could they establish from the start that casualties wouldn't automatically trigger Article 5? There are options to consider. 1/4 Remember though that one of the key objectives of Russian doctrine is to prevent conflicts from escalating from the local to the regional level. This is initially achieved through the use of conventional strategic weapons, and later, by resorting to non-strategic nukes. 2/4
Mar 16 6 tweets 2 min read
Hie liegt @winkelsdorf falsch. Die Bundeswehr hat 600 Taurus KEPD 350 bestellt und bekommen. Es gibt keinen Taurus MP. Dieser wurde geplant, aber letztlich nie entwickelt, da es keinen Kunden gab (wie für andere geplante Versionen). Ein kurzer Thread. 👇 1/5 Taurus ist modular ausgelegt, um auf potenzielle Fähigkeitsforderungen von Kunden reagieren zu können. Es gibt aber keine modularen Taurus im deutschen Arsenal (oder in irgendeinem anderen). Image
Mar 16 5 tweets 2 min read
There's a rumor circulating about Taurus having a modular payload. This rumor likely stems from an information request by @SevimDagdelen from Aug 2023, who queried, "Is the 🇩🇪 government aware that Taurus can be equipped with different payloads, including nuclear warheads?" This claim is of course entirely inaccurate. Let me explain: 1/5Image Only one Taurus variant has ever been produced and entered into service: the Taurus KEPD-350. This variant is equipped with a multi-effect warhead, featuring a primary shaped charge warhead and a secondary penetrator warhead. Other variants were conceived but never developed. 2/5 Image