Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.

I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.

TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15 But first recap, why 2-3 years?

Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.

Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.

2/15

When people claim medium-range missiles in Germany are destabilizing because they can reach homeland targets deep inside Russia, including Moscow, ask how often they’ve complained about short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles stationed in Kaliningrad.

1/5 For over a decade, Russia has been threatening European capitals and homeland targets with its Iskander-M ballistic and cruise missile systems, both nuclear & conventionally armed, from Kaliningrad.

Russia has also frequently hinted at using them in first-strike scenarios.

2/5

The lack of a public debate on the deployment of INF-range missiles in 🇩🇪 has been criticized.

But such a debate would have been counterproductive. Why?

1) It would have been more damaging than helpful
2) It would have undermined our credibility
3) There was no need for it

1/9 Most importantly, I disagree with the notion that this debate would have been some kind of enlightened discourse on the relative benefits of deterrence, reassurance and arms control.

The opposite: It would have been ugly and damaging to our democratic system and reputation.

2/9

I saw a few takes today on why deploying INF-range missiles to Europe/Germany might strategically backfire, and that the timing of the decision was overhasty.

I want to present the counter-narrative: this move is strategically sound and the timing is appropriate. 1/8 1. INF-range missiles in Europe will offer NATO substantial military advantages and strengthen our deterrence posture.

To fight wars effectively, you have to be able to threaten the adversary's rear, including time-sensitive targets. 2/8

What happens if Russia employs a nuclear weapon? The reality is that no one really knows.

However, what is equally true is that NATO is prepared for this type of scenario, and we have capabilities and contingency plans in place.

Some thoughts on what this might entail. 👇🧵 1/7 How exactly NATO's response would look like depends on a range of factors, most notably warhead yield, location, casualties, etc.

Importantly, we have non-nuclear options to respond to Russian nuclear use, meaning we don't necessarily have to match 🇷🇺's nuclear escalation. 2/7

Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.

I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19 Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.

In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19

https://twitter.com/Golemiker/status/1783246317717745771

This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21 The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21

Sharing some initial reflections here on the implications of last night's missile raid by Iran for the likelihood of a regional war, the role of nuclear weapons in Israel's deterrence posture, and the evolving technological landscape of modern warfare. 1/11 First, while the missile raid was targeted and calibrated in nature, it constituted a massive assault clearly intended to overwhelm Israel's missile defense system.

In my opinion, this was more comprehensive than what you would typically classify as a "signalling strike". 2/11

Let's face it, Ukraine's largest power station being permanently disabled is really bad. We are witnessing the failure of the appeasers and escalation managers' strategy in Ukraine.

Not providing Ukraine with the means to disable Russian launchers was never sustainable. 1/3 At this stage of the war, state capacity is the crucial factor. We rightly commend 🇺🇦 for having found a way to undermine Russia's state capacity with indigenous long-range drones. But at the same time we are content to stand by and watch Ukraine's state capacity burn? 2/3

In a recent interview I was asked an interesting question: Why are European missile defense arsenals so empty when acquiring such weapon systems, due to their purely defensive nature, should have been politically easy, even in the post-Cold War environment? A short thread. 👇1/11 There is no monocausal explanation to this. But one reason is that it was, in fact, not politically easy to deploy missile defenses in Europe. This is because 🇷🇺 successfully managed to intertwine tactical-operational missile defense with strategic (nuclear) missile defense. 2/11

This thread discusses the role of 'risk' in the ongoing war and highlights the problematic approach the West has towards risk management.

In essence, my argument is that risk is a feature, not a bug in the situation we are currently in, and we have to treat it as such. 🧵👇 1/24 The West's approach to supporting Ukraine, especially that of key players like Germany and the United States, has been to supply necessary equipment while minimizing perceived risks of escalation that could arise due to weapon deliveries. 2/24

What if a coalition of willing nations decided to intervene to protect Ukraine and potentially confront Russia? Could they establish from the start that casualties wouldn't automatically trigger Article 5? There are options to consider. 1/4

https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1770016358392029382

Remember though that one of the key objectives of Russian doctrine is to prevent conflicts from escalating from the local to the regional level. This is initially achieved through the use of conventional strategic weapons, and later, by resorting to non-strategic nukes. 2/4

Hie liegt @winkelsdorf falsch. Die Bundeswehr hat 600 Taurus KEPD 350 bestellt und bekommen. Es gibt keinen Taurus MP. Dieser wurde geplant, aber letztlich nie entwickelt, da es keinen Kunden gab (wie für andere geplante Versionen). Ein kurzer Thread. 👇 1/5

https://twitter.com/winkelsdorf/status/1768782945173782742

Taurus ist modular ausgelegt, um auf potenzielle Fähigkeitsforderungen von Kunden reagieren zu können. Es gibt aber keine modularen Taurus im deutschen Arsenal (oder in irgendeinem anderen).

There's a rumor circulating about Taurus having a modular payload. This rumor likely stems from an information request by @SevimDagdelen from Aug 2023, who queried, "Is the 🇩🇪 government aware that Taurus can be equipped with different payloads, including nuclear warheads?" This claim is of course entirely inaccurate. Let me explain: 1/5 Only one Taurus variant has ever been produced and entered into service: the Taurus KEPD-350. This variant is equipped with a multi-effect warhead, featuring a primary shaped charge warhead and a secondary penetrator warhead. Other variants were conceived but never developed. 2/5

To no one's surprise, it took around 24h for the secret information that was referenced in the parliamentary debate on Taurus to leak. This information pertains to the processing power required for inputting & processing targeting data. Some thoughts: 1/10
t-online.de/nachrichten/de… The notion that the Taurus targeting process necessitates large amounts processing power and data is not a new or secret revelation. Broadly speaking, there is a "simple" and an "extended" Taurus mission planning protocol. The two are also referenced in the leaked call. 2/10

Here's a thread discussing the range of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG. Some have asked me to explain why I believe the range of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG supplied to Ukraine is comparable to that of Taurus (500+ km), and why Ukraine has yet to attack the Kerch Bridge. 1/11 Two relevant variants of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG have been developed over the years. The baseline model with a range of around 550 km and an export version, the 'Black Shaheen' with a range of 290 km. Apart from their range difference, both missiles are identical. 2/11

Once again, @WAJKoenitz is proving himself as someone who has no understanding of Taurus and missile systems in general. Suggesting that Taurus, or any modern cruise missile, has a CEP of 10m is the dumbest shit I've read on this app today. 1/9 CEP (circular error probable) is a probabilistic method used to evaluate accuracy. It represents the smallest radius of a circle within which 50% of projectiles are expected to land. A 10m CEP indicates that 50% all shots fired fall outside a 10m radius of the target. 2/9

This will be my final comment on the Taurus issue, as I'm growing weary of repeating the same points.

Unfortunately, many in 🇩🇪 still view Taurus as optional, when in reality it is not. Without a replenishment of long-range strike weapons, 🇺🇦 will inevitably face depletion. 1/4

https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1724793283128488040

At a consumption rate of 30-50 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG per month, Ukraine will run out by the end of 2024.

Yes, the consumption rate could drop further, but Ukraine is already struggling to integrate LRS usage into a coherent missile campaign at the current rate. 2/4

Because I keep receiving comments like these, here's a comprehensive thread explaining why I don't believe Taurus deliveries are being held up by the 🇺🇸. My position is based on the available data points and considering both alternatives (🇩🇪 at fault vs. 🇺🇸 at fault). 👇1/7

https://twitter.com/WAJKoenitz/status/1751909520438182015

1. Taurus does not include highly sensitive American technologies.

Two significant components in Taurus of US origin are the Rockwell Collins GPS receiver with a Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) and the Williams International P8300-15 Turbofan engine.

This is the reason why Germany would require US approval before delivering Taurus to Ukraine. However, these technologies are not considered highly sensitive.

In the past, turbofan engines were considered a proliferation risk. However, with increased access to this technology, these concerns have largely subsided. Currently, every US adversary has access to these types of cruise missile engines.

I don't believe it would have any significance, but it may be worth noting that the engine utilized in the Taurus missile differs from the F107 turbofan engine employed in JASSM-ER. Consequently, Russia could not draw any conclusions regarding propulsion of U.S. long-range strike weapons.

When we consider the GPS receiver, it is evident that the United States has already sent numerous jamming-resistant GPS receivers in Ukraine. This technology has been notably utilized in GMLRS artillery rockets. As such, this technology is, in theory, already at risk of falling into Russian hands.

Also, the receiver only plays a role if Ukraine were to receive upgraded Taurus from Germany's operational stock. If it receives only recertified older ones than the upgraded American receiver would not be not included.

How long would it take to get a Taurus production line running? There are two aspects to consider:
1) Setting up the physical production line (physical spaces, tools/machines, hiring workers)
2) Establishing the supply chain necessary for production. 1/10

https://twitter.com/MBDADeutschland/status/1720038473644572881

The most recent Taurus cruise missiles were part of South Korea's second batch, ordered in 2018. The final Taurus missile arrived in South Korea in 2020. Since then, Taurus Systems GmbH has not yet dismantled its physical production capacity. 2/10

In this thread, I will explain why we are much closer to war with 🇷🇺 than most people realize and why our time window for rearmament is shorter than many believe. In my opinion, we have at best 2-3 years to re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis 🇷🇺. Here's why 👇 1/20 One common mistake in analyzing the threat posed by Russia is falling into the trap of 'mirror-imaging'. This means assuming that Russia views a potential conflict with us in the same way we view a potential conflict with them. Nothing could be further from the truth. 2/20