(Sorry the previous ones got disrupted by our stunning victory in the recent Tunbridge Wells local elections).
Here is a round up of where we are so far.
Ukraine has been conducting ‘shaping operations’ for the last few weeks or so.
These have had many strands:
- Information
- Attacks on logistics and command
- Dislocating operations on Russian territory
- Probing operations / establishing of bridgeheads
The aim of all of these elements of the shaping operations is to create lots of ambiguity in the Russian military command about:
- where exactly the major blows of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will fall
- when exactly it will start
The continual activity by Ukraine - blowing up oil dumps in Crimea here, flying drones over Moscow there, hitting logistics behind the Zaporizhzhia front etc. - is designed to raise, and keep maintained, levels of anxiety among the Russian command, and Russian soldiers.
Exhausted and anxious soldiers do not make good decisions
Now there are several basic premises that underlie the Ukrainian counteroffensive
1) The aim is not to kill every last Russian in Ukraine, but to affect the minds of decision makers in Moscow. This requires some sort of battlefield spectacular, localised defeat, major encirclement of Russian forces, or serious momentum to be generated by the Ukrainians.
2) This diagram is still pertinent. Ukrainians have interior lines; Russians have exterior lines (in hostile territory). This means the Ukrainians can move troops, equipment and supplies backwards and forwards along the font line much easier than the Russians can.
3) The Ukrainians probably don’t have a developed plan about where their main blow will fall. Eventually they probably want to strike south from Zaporizhzhia to cut the Russian forces in two. See here (the X is knocking out the Kerch bridge which isolates the Russian troops in… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
3 Con’td) but until that point they should just probe in one area, see if the Russians respond, if they do, fine, head to another area, if they don’t respond, then exploit that axis.
They can just move up and down the front line to keep the Russians moving resources up and down… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
And we are already staring to see these probes.
So here is an area over the Dnipro river opposite the city of Kherson. At the moment they are hitting targets in the town of Oleshky. Let’s see what will happen.
Here is probably the most interesting thing. There are early reports of a Ukrainian assault on the Russian flanks at Bahkmut, which if they collapse will enable the Ukrainians to encircle the Russian forces that are currently themselves encircling Bahkmut. This is called a double… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
There’s also lots of activity on other areas of the front - and depending on how the Russians respond, will determine how which the Ukrainians reinforce.
It’s all about creating dilemmas for the Russians.
That’s all for now, but I’ll update this as things develop. It seems like things are starting to get going.
Oh and if you like these analyses and want to learn more then please buy my book, How to Fight a War
OK - we are starting to see the UK provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles in action.
Goodbye Russian logistics and command & control
Russian lines continuing to crumble around Bahkmut.
It really does look like Ukraine is pushing for a double enveloppent
And it’s all because of the disfunctionality between Wagner and the Russian Army. Wagner is still pushing forward in the centre while the Army collapses on the flanks.
At some point Wagner will have to pull out of the centre to protect itself.
Ok and now some more islands taken and solidification of Ukrainian positions south of Kherson.
At the moment - this and Bahkmut seem to be the two probing axes.
Probably means there’ll be a third one opening up soon 😜
It’s becoming clearer now what is happening.
Ukraine is pushing the flanks of Bahkmut and making some gains.
Wagner is still pushing in the centre of Bahkmut.
This could either end up in a double envelopment of Russian forces (note for one of the variants of a double envelopment the Ukrainians should withdraw their centre and push on their flanks - in slow time this is actually what is happening).
But I don’t actually think that this is what is happening.
The Ukrainians have realised that the Russians are fixated on Bahkmut. Fallacy of sunk costs and all that.
And so by using a relatively small amount of resources, they are fixing an EVEN greater number of Russian forces into the Bahkmut area.
This means that they have less Russian forces to deal with elsewhere.
Like Kherson, where they are steadily consolidating their position.
Or Tokmak, where they struck AGAIN yesterday.
So what we’re probably going to see if Ukraine making small investments in the front line, here and there, to get Russians to commit forces to defending particular areas.
This just creates more freedoms for Ukraine further down the line as the Russians run out of troops.
There is one school of thought that whoever commits their reserve last wins.
I’m not sure that is what is going on here, but I certainly think the Ukrainians are smoking out the Russian reserves and making sure they are all tied down.
This then give Ukraine the chance to survey the whole front line and choose where they will strike.
Bahkmut is now in Russian hands.
Now the aim is to tie up as many Russian forces as possible there
And from a politico-strategic point of view, now that Wagner have announced they will hand it over to the Russian armed forces, Ukraine should then retake Bahkmut (via the flanks, not directly) massive exacerbating the already huge tensions within the Russian military set up
Good move Ukraine.
A limited (one assumes, but who knows?) incursion in Bolgograd region in Russia.
Have to say I didn’t see that coming.
Does two things
Creates a dilemma for Russia - how many troops do we now need to garrison the border (which means less in Ukraine)?
And will start the accusations flowing in Russia and really pumps up all the factional wars in Moscow.
Watch them all tear themselves apart.
Which bit of the front line will Russia thin out to reinforce its border?
Even more pertinent now (sorry for creating a Möbius Thread)
The last week has seem some momentous changes in Syria.
Here are some first thoughts.
A 🧵
Firstly, we should see the fall of the House of Assad as a function of a weak and rotten Syrian government, and stretched and weakened allies of Iran and Russia - more than HTS or any other rebel movement becoming vastly more competent.
The Assad government has grown progressively weaker - this generally happens when corruption is utterly rampant - I mean who wants to die when your officers are skimming your pay and selling your ammunition?
Let’s take a look at the economic side of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
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Once wars go beyond a couple of months, they tend to become a battle of the economies—that is, who is will to turn a bigger part of their economy into a machine that produces arms and munitions.
Obviously, if you have two sides that are both willing to turn as much as possible of their economies over to the war, then the side with the bigger economy will tend to win (all other things being equal).
The US has decided to allow Ukraine to use longer-range missiles in Russia.
This brings to a close a pretty feckless period of US policy towards Ukraine.
A 🧵
It’s quite hard to even work out what the White House is trying to do these days, apart from vainly responding to events.
Let’s dig into it.
This permissions - that Ukraine be allowed to use the longer range US supplied ATACAMS missiles (range 300km) inside Russia - is all of a piece with a series of decisions stretching right back to 2014.
There is a lot going on in the news at the moment, but there is a story that is consistently being underreported: Russia.
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(potentially with 🖍️)
And in the UK - we have to recognise that Russia, and her actions, are the NUMBER ONE strategic threat that we face.
(You wouldn’t know this from the House of Commons where a lot more time is spent debating the Middle East - which - although it is important, is an order of magnitude less important to the UK in strategic terms than the Russia story)