#Veṅkaṭanātha discussing the nature of #jīva in TMK II.17: There are four groups of people who think that the the ātman is not permanent: 1. the ātman is of the nature of cognition and therefore destroyed at each new cognition (Buddhist Epistemological school?) 1/
2. the ātman is destroyed w the body, 3. the ātman is destroyed at pralaya (these are the Paurāṇikas), 4. the ātman is destroyed at mokṣa (Advaita Vedāntins?). 2/
He then explains that if the ātman were destroyed at the end of each kalpa, then duḥkha would also cease and that would be mokṣa and it would be realised w.o any effort. As for the forth, it cannot be that the mokṣamārga leads to 'svanāśa'. 3/
(Veṅkaṭanātha is always convincing both in analysis and rhetorics:-) 4/
#Veṅkaṭanātha explaining that the ātman is not destroyed: ghaṭanāśe ghaṭākāśo 'pi na naśyaty eva (SS ad TMK 2.17). He also explains that mokṣa cannot mean destruction of everything, the difference created by karman is retained: 5/
muktidaśāyāṃ bhedanivṛttivādāś ca karmakṛtavaiṣamyanivṛttiparāḥ (SS ad TMK II.17.).
(Which leads to a Q: How can one distinguish among #nityasūri-s, that have no karman?) 6/
Things become even more interesting in TMK II.18, which presents an opponent saying that ātmans must be omnipresent (vyāptatva or sarvagatatva).
NB: As in other philosophical discussions on spatiotemporality of God in EU philosophy, 7/
nityatva is treated right before vibhutva in the TMK II. See SS ad TMK II.18: nityatve tatsahacaritaṃ sarvagatatvam api syād—iti śaṅkate.
Anyway, the opponent says that ātmans must be omnipresent because they experience sukha, duḥkha, cognition (dhī) and volition (icchā) 8/
everywhere. The other evidence are the śrutis talking of omnipresence of ātman. Veṅkaṭanātha starts with the latter, and explains that they can be explained otherwise. For instance, śrutis talking of vāyu can be explained on the basis of the presence of repeated 9/
instances of individuals of the same species and the same can be applied to texts talking about the omnipresence of ātman (vāyus sarvagato mahān ityādivad ekajātīyānāṃ sarvatrānupraveśān netuṃ śakyā, SS ad TMK II.18) 10/
What about the case of yogins or people like Saubhari who could control multiple bodies? Does this not prove that the ātman is omnipresent (vyāpta)? No, says #Veṅkaṭanātha), bc the same effect can be reached through its power of jñāna: 11/
jñānavyāptyā—svarūpasannidhānābhāve 'pi jñānasya yugapadanekadehādhiṣṭhānānuguṇāvṛttyeti bhāvaḥ (SS ad TMK II.19). This evokes Anselm's equation of God's omnipresence to Their omniscience, since omnipresence is reduced to a different power. 12/
An obj replies that if this were the case, then yogins could control also objects. The answer is easy for God (They do!), whereas for humans, Veṅkaṭanātha explains that they lack the relevant karmātiśaya. Those who have it, can rule matter like they rule other bodies (ibid) 13/
(It just dawned on me that vyāp- is obviously used also for concepts, as shown by its constant use in the context of anumāna. This cannot have had an impact on discussions of omnipresence as non-occupational) 14/
The discussion in the TMK on vibhutva is fascinating, bc #Veṅkaṭanātha denies that ātman are omnipresent, & deals w objections such as "What about when one is able to inflict a pain on an enemy from far away?" (The SS explains that it's a case of abhicāra 'malefic ritual') 15/
The objector thinks that this possibilities show that the ātman must be vibhu, bc otherwise action from a distance would be impossible. Veṅkaṭanātha does not dispute that this is possible, but denies that one needs #omnipresence for that (TMK II.20 and commentaries) 16/
TMK II.21 explains that ātmans are aṇu. VN first denies that they are of the size of the body (sarve jīvās sarvaśarīravyāpinaḥ […] iti dūṣayati, SS thereon). The main problem is that it would be impossible for the adṛṣṭa produced by sacrifices to be active in a place 17/
different than the body (that is, in svarga). A reader might wonder that having the ātman reduced to the size of aṇu does not make the effect of adṛṣṭa on svarga easier! But, adṛṣṭa works through a viśvasākṣin, who is God Himself 18/
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#HudHudson's chapter on #omnipresence is really well done and offers a balanced approach, quoting from Thomas Aquinas and Anselm, as well as from Hartshorne, Swinburne, Wierenga and Taliaferro. It also discusses theories of omnipresence that do not think of God as occupying a 1/
space as well as "occupation theories". In discussing the latter, HH refers to Josh Parsons' discussion of relations and location.
He also identifies and discusses six puzzles connected with occupation theories: 2/
—1. The problem of simplicity. How can a simple entity be present in multiple locations? (NB: Easy to answer if you think in terms of #SanskritPhilosophy, think of ātman and ākāśa as being simple and vibhu).
—2. The problem of multilocation. How can sth occupy
3/
The #Pali Text Society (PTS ) <palitextsociety.org> is seeking to appoint a part-time (25 hs/week) office administrator to take over the management of the PTS office from 1 July 2023.
1/
The main responsibilities of the position will be the day-to-day management of the PTS office, including the processing of book sales and management of PTS membership. The PTS currently has a small office in Bristol where the officer administrator would be able to work, but 2/
the position would also be suitable for someone wishing to work from home. Please note, however, that the position is only open to those who have the right to live and work in the UK. The salary will be in the range £32,411–£36,333 a year, pro-rata. Letters of application, 3/
A Q concerning eligibility to study a certain philosophy: Let us exclude from the discussion ppl who are doing it for selfish purposes (e.g., ppl engaging w feminist philosophy just to gain "diversity points" on their cv). 1/4
Should only ppl from a certain nation/class (broadly conceived) be eligible to study the texts of said n/c? A practical argument in favour of that would be that this would encourage hires of ppl of such n/c bc a university who wants to offer courses in philosophy X would have 2/4
to hire ppl from n/c X. However, if ppl of n/c X are not hired bc of racism/sexism/…, this is a general problem, and we should encourage more hires of them in whatever field they are specializing, and not just in the philosophy of their own n/c. Should one not want to remove 3/4
I am grateful to Simona Vucu for having recommended to me "The Case of the Animals versus Man Before the King of the Jinn" (10th c.). A few excerpts:
Animals: ``Your vaunted powers of perception & fine discrimination are not unique, for there are animlas with finer senses 1/10
and more precise discrimination. The camel, for example, despite his long legs and neck and the elevation of his head in the air, finds his footing along the most arduous and treacherous pathways in the dark of night, which you could not make out and not one of you could 2/10
see without a lantern, torch, or candle. [\dots] An ass or cow is frequently observed to return to its familiar home when its master has led it away of a path it did not know and left it. Yet there are men who may travel the same road any number of times and still stray from 3/10
Short thread on "Introduction to Philosophy".
My ideal curriculum is the one implemented by Jay Garfield and others and taught by @sutrasandstuff and others, namely a completely non-Eurocentric introductory class.
But, what to do until we get there? 1/
Intro classes are (in the universities I know of) meant both for outsiders who only take 1 class of philosophy & students who will chose philosophy as their major. Thus, the Intro class has at least also the purpose to put students in the position to follow their next classes 2/
Thus, in this sense a completely unconventional Intro class might be risky bc students and professors might resent the fact that by the time they enrolled for, say, "Medieval philosophy" or "Philosophy of language" they did not know about basic names and theories. 3/