This was timely public spirited policy research at its best. It had a big impact. I know, for I follow the polical dynamics in oil and gas well for reasons not relevant for this post. And I don't know how well you recall the environment their paper was written in. 2/
It was written early in the Ukraine-Russia war. The Germans were very reluctant to impose sanctions. The government was being heavily influenced by "research" by lobby groups. The government was dragging its feet in supporting sanctions fearing gigantic economic cost. 3/
The industry lobbyist predicted gloom and doom if Germany imposed sanctions and lost out on Russia's gas. And in come a few world class academic economist, combining their skills and tools of the trade, using state of the arts methods to address this question.4/
Their answer: The effect will not be all that big. There was a predictable backlash against the team that don't know the "real world" but just "live inside unrealistic models". I even recall the German cancellor calling out @BachmannRudi! 5/
The professional incentives for an academic to engage in this type of work is minimal. You can say it even has negative expected returns, given predictable backlash. 6/
It does not count on our CV's, for promotions, outside offers, salaries, etc. Some econ collegues even turn up their nose and show distain for "policy work" of this kind as not being sufficiently "serious." Many trivialized covid research on the same basis. 7/
That's why it is to be admired and celebrated when we see people providing the public good and sticking their head out. Make the hard call. This was important and may have had an effect on actual policy in a situation where major decisions were being made. 8/
And of course it did not hurt that the pointy-head academics, "living inside their little models with all those silly assumptions" turned out to be -- naturally -- right! 9/
There is a bit of a broader lesson here -- I think. Policy makers very often dismiss "models" pointing out special assumptions and the like in our mathematics. 10/
But I have spend some time in policy institutions. The choice is never really between an explicit theoretical model and some more "sophisticated" model free analysis based on the "real world" -- supposedly making no silly assumptions. 11/
This is a false choice. The choice is not using a model or no model. Dig into it and try to explicitly write down what those people that claim to base their analysis on a more "flexible and sophisticated approach" have in mind. Here is my experience: 12/
They are typically assuming some form of a model, typically partial equilibrium, even if they don't always realized it. And if you take the time to try to explicitly write down what they have in mind and spell out the assumptions the following emerges: 13/
More often than not it turns out that the "sophisticated real world" analysis proves to look exceedingly silly when you spell out the assumptions needed to arrive at the supposedly "model free" approach. 14/
In contrast, explicitly writing models typically helps you avoid making first order mistakes in thinking, however imperfect our models may be. 15/
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Happy to see Krugman is not holding it against us that we shamelessly stole the title of his 98 classic, which is one of my all time favorites and started me off on my research agenda on the ZLB. But I want draw your attention to his is second point in his thread. 1/
While our model predicts a soft landing, Krugman worries whether Fed's "motor control is good enough to do this without precipitating an unnecessary recession". 2/
What I think his concern highlights -- broadly speaking -- is that monetary policy affects the economy with high degree of uncertainty and perhaps more importantly, with a LAG -- hence the motor control problem. 3/
I guess I am not off to a particularly stellar start in the prediction business in my last tweet predicting a "soft landing" with a 70 percent chance and a "hard landing" with a 30 percent chance. But ... I forgot to define what I meant by hard or soft! 1/
Does a mild recession, for example, qualify as a soft landing? Obviously no recession at all is the softest of landings. But, honestly, I have never gotten my self particularly excited over the technical definitions of a "recession". 2/
Some like to use the definition two consequtive quarters of negative GDP growth. Most commonly used are the NBER recession dates nber.org/research/busin…
where recessions are essentially declared by NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee taking a host of factors into account. 3/
I'm entering the forecasting business based on my recent paper with @PierpaBenigno: 70 percent "soft landing," i.e. mild recession to bring down inflation, 30 percent hard landing. Let me explain 1/ nber.org/papers/w31197#…
First off, as an economist, I've lately started to put a lot greater value in making forecasts. The reason: I was spectacularly wrong September 2021. My prediction about inflation? Not a big deal. Nothing to see here! 2/
If I had made that prediction to my own self, I would probably soon have forgotten. But I made it in public -- more precisely in an op-ed. By good fortune, however, it was only published in Japanese based on request! 3/
I just released a paper with @PierpaBenigno.
The inflation surge is due to a nonlinear Phillips curve. And we find ourselves at that non-linear part for the first time since late 1960. 1/ nber.org/papers/w31197#…
We provide some empirical evidence from this and propose a new model, which has the implication, among other things, that once you’re at the "vertical part" of the Phillips curve it is "easy up". 2/
This means inflation can rise very quickly without massive supply shocks or increase in employment. But the converse is also true "easy down", meaning you should be able to bring inflation down without triggering a major recession.3/
For a good while now, I have been greatly annoyed by my tweed at the very beginning of the great inflation debate. The high inflation read yesterday reminded me of my mistake. The tweed minimized the role of the Biden stimulus in contributing to inflation. /1
Making that suggestion, however, was not the problem. The problem was that my logic was sloppy. I should have know better, for example, had I remembered my own paper with Neil Mehrotra, Sanjay Singh and Larry Summers. 2/
My tweed suggested: Biden’s stimulus can’t be responsible for the inflation. Why? Other countries are also seeing inflation. Even those, like many in the euro-zone, that did not do a Biden stimulus. 3/
I have, like many others, been a bit surprised by how quickly inflation took off. It just occured to me that perhaps I should have read my own papers more carefully(!) 1/
The Aggregate Supply relationship (in red) below is from my paper with Mehrotra and Robbins on secular stagnation (linked at the end). It is sort of like an "inverted L". At employment below full employment you have a well behaved static Phillips curve 2/
relating inflation and output (gap). But once you hit full employment (above 1 in the figure) then any increase in demand results in inflation. 3/