The standard military medical term of art for measuring in war is "Casualties per thousand per day."
When you work out the numbers for a cumulative 40% loss in five days in terms of "losses per 1000 per day."
It is 80 per thousand per day.
2/
The chart below is WW2 USMC casualties per thousand in the Pacific island ASSAULTS.
TARAWA averaged 54.64 per thousand for the entire operation.
Iwo Jima shows a lot less per day, but that is deceiving due to its length & total number of support units involved diluting it 3/
The 26th Marines at Iwo Jima had an average casualty rate of 40.18 per thousand per day (4% casualties per day) during the time they were on the island.
Their peak was 119.21 casualties per thousand per day (11.9%) on 3 MAR 1945.
4/
The US Army's 116th Regimental Combat Team+Rangers at Omaha suffered 171.38 casualties per thousand per day (17.1%) on D-Day, June the 6th, 1944.
And I'm going to underline here that these were ASSAULTS, not defense.
5/
So...why are Russian Mobiks dying at rates on defense that rival Americans at Tarawa, Iwo Jima or Omaha Beach while on the assault?
It's more than 'Mobiks bad.'
The Mobiks are in field fortifications with automatic weapons with artillery support.
5/
The US Army in 1991 did this sort of thing to entrenched Iraqis with F-16's, Abrams, Bradley's and lots of heavy artillery Ukraine doesn't have.
How's AFU doing it?
"Whatever else happens, Ukraine has one drone operator per 100 troops...
...and Russia does not.
6/
Ukraine has been using drone forward observation to reduce the number of 105mm/122mm/152mm/155mm required to destroy a target from sixty to FIVE shells.
Five to 12 $1000 155mm conventional shells are cheaper than a single $100,000 Excalibur 155mm shell.
7/
And for killing Mobiks in a trench, such cheapness is required.
It is the mass of Ukrainian drones replacing masses of munitions with information that makes these unprecedented defensive Mobik casualty rates a happen.
8/
This drone based technological change in ground based indirect fire power is equivalent to the arrival of the Dreadnought battleship.
Then as now, everything that went before it is obsolete in the face of the new technological innovation.
This "Dreadnought Effect" 9/
...means the indirect fire organizations in every Army in the world is obsolete in the face of this new Ukrainian Army indirect fire technological paradigm.
Every Army in on the same ground floor with the same drone and smart tablet commercial tools.
That the Armed Forces of Ukraine would become the "1st Sea Lord Jackie Fisher" of world ground combat power wasn't something I expected in late February 2022.
But come May 2023, here we are.🤯
Now what the h--l are we going to do?🤷♂️
11/11 End
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️
TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work. 1/
Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.
That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️
2/
This is Alex Vershinin's truck "Beer Math" for comparison.
It assumes 45 miles vice 50 km, but both show the same mirror imaging of Western mechanized logistics on Red/Russian Army non-mechanized logistics.
Deploying lots of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines with Gator cluster munitions dispensers was one of the major themes of the 1980's Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine.
The doctrine was highly effective, hence Ukraine using it in 2026.