The standard military medical term of art for measuring in war is "Casualties per thousand per day."
When you work out the numbers for a cumulative 40% loss in five days in terms of "losses per 1000 per day."
It is 80 per thousand per day.
2/
The chart below is WW2 USMC casualties per thousand in the Pacific island ASSAULTS.
TARAWA averaged 54.64 per thousand for the entire operation.
Iwo Jima shows a lot less per day, but that is deceiving due to its length & total number of support units involved diluting it 3/
The 26th Marines at Iwo Jima had an average casualty rate of 40.18 per thousand per day (4% casualties per day) during the time they were on the island.
Their peak was 119.21 casualties per thousand per day (11.9%) on 3 MAR 1945.
4/
The US Army's 116th Regimental Combat Team+Rangers at Omaha suffered 171.38 casualties per thousand per day (17.1%) on D-Day, June the 6th, 1944.
And I'm going to underline here that these were ASSAULTS, not defense.
5/
So...why are Russian Mobiks dying at rates on defense that rival Americans at Tarawa, Iwo Jima or Omaha Beach while on the assault?
It's more than 'Mobiks bad.'
The Mobiks are in field fortifications with automatic weapons with artillery support.
5/
The US Army in 1991 did this sort of thing to entrenched Iraqis with F-16's, Abrams, Bradley's and lots of heavy artillery Ukraine doesn't have.
How's AFU doing it?
"Whatever else happens, Ukraine has one drone operator per 100 troops...
...and Russia does not.
6/
Ukraine has been using drone forward observation to reduce the number of 105mm/122mm/152mm/155mm required to destroy a target from sixty to FIVE shells.
Five to 12 $1000 155mm conventional shells are cheaper than a single $100,000 Excalibur 155mm shell.
7/
And for killing Mobiks in a trench, such cheapness is required.
It is the mass of Ukrainian drones replacing masses of munitions with information that makes these unprecedented defensive Mobik casualty rates a happen.
8/
This drone based technological change in ground based indirect fire power is equivalent to the arrival of the Dreadnought battleship.
Then as now, everything that went before it is obsolete in the face of the new technological innovation.
This "Dreadnought Effect" 9/
...means the indirect fire organizations in every Army in the world is obsolete in the face of this new Ukrainian Army indirect fire technological paradigm.
Every Army in on the same ground floor with the same drone and smart tablet commercial tools.
That the Armed Forces of Ukraine would become the "1st Sea Lord Jackie Fisher" of world ground combat power wasn't something I expected in late February 2022.
But come May 2023, here we are.🤯
Now what the h--l are we going to do?🤷♂️
11/11 End
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Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.
Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.
2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.
Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.
Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
3/
We have just seen over Moscow today - with Ukrainian drones - the Russo-Ukrainian War's version of the RAF’s first 1,000-bomber raid of World War II, codenamed Operation Millennium, which took place on the night of May 30–31, 1942.
Operation Millennium, marked the first tactical deployment of the RAF "bomber stream".
That is, the tactic of flying a dense, tightly timed formation along a narrow corridor to overwhelm German radar networks and anti-aircraft defenses of the Kammhuber line. 2/3
When I look at the design of the air defense rings around Moscow.🧐⬇️
I can't help but think Ukraine used a 2026 "Drone Stream' to saturate one sector of these ring defenses like the RAF did to the Kammhuber line.
The Soviets built their industrial plants to minimize transportation impact on its railway system, and later, it's trucking.
This 2013 time stamped Jon Parshall presentation on WW2 US vs German Vs Soviet tank industries underlines this Soviet reality
2/
In the 1950's and 1960's the CIA and Strategic Air Command (SAC) Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targeting planners discovered this quirk of the Soviet centralized economy.
Via a question to @grok of Cities of 500K(+) in OWA Drone range:
"Distances are approximate great-circle (straight-line/air) from Havana or central Cuba; actual drone paths could vary due to routing, wind, altitude, & launch site (e.g., closer to Florida from western Cuba) 2/
All listed cities are well under 2,700 km.Florida and Southeast (easiest reach)
Miami, FL (~370 km / 230 miles) — Well within range.
Jacksonville, FL (~1,000–1,100 km) — Within range.
Tampa/St. Petersburg area (metro >500k in cities/urban) — ~400–500 km.
Fearless prediction: N. Ireland will be 90%(+) migrant free in 3 months.
It is now clear to me that what we are seeing in N. Ireland is a sectarian pogrom.
One which will in 3 months be utterly successful in driving out 90%(+)...
N.I. "Troubles Pogrom"🧵
1/
...of the migrants the UK government has placed there. Then Liverpool will be next.
The UK government utterly failed to stop mutual Catholic/Protestant pogroms in the late 1960's early 1970's troubles. When half N. Irish population was nominally...
2/
...on-side with UK/N.I. law enforcement. The situation is far worse now.
Currently the vast majority of white middle and working classes in Northern Ireland are on-side with the anti-migrant pogrom...
The ability of Taiwan to operate it's HIMARS is tied directly to it's ability to deny China drone air superiority inside Taiwanese air space.
China can throw 1 million OWA drones to suppress Taiwanese air defenses to take those off shore islands.
2/
The PLA holding the Pescadores, Green and Orchard islands as launch platforms for HQ-9 SAM's, heavy MLRS rockets and Hornet class truck hunting drones means it can overwatch & reduce Taiwanese beach defenses, all while denying air space to ROCAF fighters.