The standard military medical term of art for measuring in war is "Casualties per thousand per day."
When you work out the numbers for a cumulative 40% loss in five days in terms of "losses per 1000 per day."
It is 80 per thousand per day.
2/
The chart below is WW2 USMC casualties per thousand in the Pacific island ASSAULTS.
TARAWA averaged 54.64 per thousand for the entire operation.
Iwo Jima shows a lot less per day, but that is deceiving due to its length & total number of support units involved diluting it 3/
The 26th Marines at Iwo Jima had an average casualty rate of 40.18 per thousand per day (4% casualties per day) during the time they were on the island.
Their peak was 119.21 casualties per thousand per day (11.9%) on 3 MAR 1945.
4/
The US Army's 116th Regimental Combat Team+Rangers at Omaha suffered 171.38 casualties per thousand per day (17.1%) on D-Day, June the 6th, 1944.
And I'm going to underline here that these were ASSAULTS, not defense.
5/
So...why are Russian Mobiks dying at rates on defense that rival Americans at Tarawa, Iwo Jima or Omaha Beach while on the assault?
It's more than 'Mobiks bad.'
The Mobiks are in field fortifications with automatic weapons with artillery support.
5/
The US Army in 1991 did this sort of thing to entrenched Iraqis with F-16's, Abrams, Bradley's and lots of heavy artillery Ukraine doesn't have.
How's AFU doing it?
"Whatever else happens, Ukraine has one drone operator per 100 troops...
...and Russia does not.
6/
Ukraine has been using drone forward observation to reduce the number of 105mm/122mm/152mm/155mm required to destroy a target from sixty to FIVE shells.
Five to 12 $1000 155mm conventional shells are cheaper than a single $100,000 Excalibur 155mm shell.
7/
And for killing Mobiks in a trench, such cheapness is required.
It is the mass of Ukrainian drones replacing masses of munitions with information that makes these unprecedented defensive Mobik casualty rates a happen.
8/
This drone based technological change in ground based indirect fire power is equivalent to the arrival of the Dreadnought battleship.
Then as now, everything that went before it is obsolete in the face of the new technological innovation.
This "Dreadnought Effect" 9/
...means the indirect fire organizations in every Army in the world is obsolete in the face of this new Ukrainian Army indirect fire technological paradigm.
Every Army in on the same ground floor with the same drone and smart tablet commercial tools.
That the Armed Forces of Ukraine would become the "1st Sea Lord Jackie Fisher" of world ground combat power wasn't something I expected in late February 2022.
But come May 2023, here we are.🤯
Now what the h--l are we going to do?🤷♂️
11/11 End
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The additional accumulated damage - beyond revisits to already damaged refineries - to the Russian power grid and POL supply chain in the next two months may speed this up to four months, to late November 2026, AKA just in Time for the US elections.
Russia lost 83 power 2/7
...sub-stations since 1 July 2026 in occupied Ukraine.
Russia will have to strip its own unique power grid to replace these losses, shutting down supply in "less significant" parts of Russia.
This 2023 post is where I posed the question of how large Russian riverine/littoral/brown water logistical efforts were to support Russian occupation forces in southern Ukraine. 3/
Given the massive Ukrainian victory in the "Battle of the Azov Sea."
We can say Ukraine has achieved “Usable Drone Air Superiority" over the Sea of Azov in exactly the way the Chinese would in the waters around, & air over, Taiwan when it invades.
🧵
The "Battle of the Azov Sea" shares a lot of historical elements of both the WW2 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the slaughter of Allied oil tankers in 1942 during Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) and Operation Neuland.
2/
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the slaughter of 12 ships of a 16 ship Imperial Japanese convoy of eight IJA freighters and eight IJN destroyers moving 6,900 IJA troops.
Tipped off by IJN seaplane deployments & radio intercepts, only 2,700 IJA troops arrived w/o weapons or ammo.
3/
I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:
"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.
I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:
Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
2/
2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).