The standard military medical term of art for measuring in war is "Casualties per thousand per day."
When you work out the numbers for a cumulative 40% loss in five days in terms of "losses per 1000 per day."
It is 80 per thousand per day.
2/
The chart below is WW2 USMC casualties per thousand in the Pacific island ASSAULTS.
TARAWA averaged 54.64 per thousand for the entire operation.
Iwo Jima shows a lot less per day, but that is deceiving due to its length & total number of support units involved diluting it 3/
The 26th Marines at Iwo Jima had an average casualty rate of 40.18 per thousand per day (4% casualties per day) during the time they were on the island.
Their peak was 119.21 casualties per thousand per day (11.9%) on 3 MAR 1945.
4/
The US Army's 116th Regimental Combat Team+Rangers at Omaha suffered 171.38 casualties per thousand per day (17.1%) on D-Day, June the 6th, 1944.
And I'm going to underline here that these were ASSAULTS, not defense.
5/
So...why are Russian Mobiks dying at rates on defense that rival Americans at Tarawa, Iwo Jima or Omaha Beach while on the assault?
It's more than 'Mobiks bad.'
The Mobiks are in field fortifications with automatic weapons with artillery support.
5/
The US Army in 1991 did this sort of thing to entrenched Iraqis with F-16's, Abrams, Bradley's and lots of heavy artillery Ukraine doesn't have.
How's AFU doing it?
"Whatever else happens, Ukraine has one drone operator per 100 troops...
...and Russia does not.
6/
Ukraine has been using drone forward observation to reduce the number of 105mm/122mm/152mm/155mm required to destroy a target from sixty to FIVE shells.
Five to 12 $1000 155mm conventional shells are cheaper than a single $100,000 Excalibur 155mm shell.
7/
And for killing Mobiks in a trench, such cheapness is required.
It is the mass of Ukrainian drones replacing masses of munitions with information that makes these unprecedented defensive Mobik casualty rates a happen.
8/
This drone based technological change in ground based indirect fire power is equivalent to the arrival of the Dreadnought battleship.
Then as now, everything that went before it is obsolete in the face of the new technological innovation.
This "Dreadnought Effect" 9/
...means the indirect fire organizations in every Army in the world is obsolete in the face of this new Ukrainian Army indirect fire technological paradigm.
Every Army in on the same ground floor with the same drone and smart tablet commercial tools.
That the Armed Forces of Ukraine would become the "1st Sea Lord Jackie Fisher" of world ground combat power wasn't something I expected in late February 2022.
But come May 2023, here we are.🤯
Now what the h--l are we going to do?🤷♂️
11/11 End
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This is one of the most logistically incompetent hot takes by any German journalist in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
95% getting through is a 5% loss rate per trip
95%(x) for 10 to 20 kills means x = 200 to 400 trucks on this route
10 trips means 40% total fleet loss - 80 to 160 trucks
1/
You can follow the 5% loss curve in this 500 unit fleet at 10 exposures in the graphic below.
A 40% fleet loss in 10 days from a 5% drone loss rate is logistical collapse for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine.
Only some trying to get AfD eyeballs would say different.
2/
This leaves out the fact that the Russian Army doesn't use *ANY* mechanized logistical enabler like pallets, Truck D-rings, forklifts, or telehandlers.
Russian trucks are in the drone kill zones 3 times as long as a Western truck due to loading times.
"The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, was specifically designed and publicly nicknamed by Chinese military analysts as the "Guam Killer.""
As laid out by warquants -dot- com, China is buying one million OWA drones to destroy all US/Taiwan/Taiwan allied military logistics from Guam to the China coast.
A quantity of one million "Shaheed plus" class OWA drones has quality all its own.
Homicide statistics since the early 1960s are not comparable to earlier periods because medical advances have turned many fatal injuries into survivable ones.
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.
2/
All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.
They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.
These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
2/
The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.
The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
1/3