The standard military medical term of art for measuring in war is "Casualties per thousand per day."
When you work out the numbers for a cumulative 40% loss in five days in terms of "losses per 1000 per day."
It is 80 per thousand per day.
2/
The chart below is WW2 USMC casualties per thousand in the Pacific island ASSAULTS.
TARAWA averaged 54.64 per thousand for the entire operation.
Iwo Jima shows a lot less per day, but that is deceiving due to its length & total number of support units involved diluting it 3/
The 26th Marines at Iwo Jima had an average casualty rate of 40.18 per thousand per day (4% casualties per day) during the time they were on the island.
Their peak was 119.21 casualties per thousand per day (11.9%) on 3 MAR 1945.
4/
The US Army's 116th Regimental Combat Team+Rangers at Omaha suffered 171.38 casualties per thousand per day (17.1%) on D-Day, June the 6th, 1944.
And I'm going to underline here that these were ASSAULTS, not defense.
5/
So...why are Russian Mobiks dying at rates on defense that rival Americans at Tarawa, Iwo Jima or Omaha Beach while on the assault?
It's more than 'Mobiks bad.'
The Mobiks are in field fortifications with automatic weapons with artillery support.
5/
The US Army in 1991 did this sort of thing to entrenched Iraqis with F-16's, Abrams, Bradley's and lots of heavy artillery Ukraine doesn't have.
How's AFU doing it?
"Whatever else happens, Ukraine has one drone operator per 100 troops...
...and Russia does not.
6/
Ukraine has been using drone forward observation to reduce the number of 105mm/122mm/152mm/155mm required to destroy a target from sixty to FIVE shells.
Five to 12 $1000 155mm conventional shells are cheaper than a single $100,000 Excalibur 155mm shell.
7/
And for killing Mobiks in a trench, such cheapness is required.
It is the mass of Ukrainian drones replacing masses of munitions with information that makes these unprecedented defensive Mobik casualty rates a happen.
8/
This drone based technological change in ground based indirect fire power is equivalent to the arrival of the Dreadnought battleship.
Then as now, everything that went before it is obsolete in the face of the new technological innovation.
This "Dreadnought Effect" 9/
...means the indirect fire organizations in every Army in the world is obsolete in the face of this new Ukrainian Army indirect fire technological paradigm.
Every Army in on the same ground floor with the same drone and smart tablet commercial tools.
That the Armed Forces of Ukraine would become the "1st Sea Lord Jackie Fisher" of world ground combat power wasn't something I expected in late February 2022.
But come May 2023, here we are.🤯
Now what the h--l are we going to do?🤷♂️
11/11 End
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The increasing replacement of Russian tactical trucks by impressed civilian "Scooby Vans" is another sign of the collapse of Russian Army truck logistics.
Such vehicles are logistically incapable of supporting defensive mobile operations in the event of an AFU breakthrough.
Ukraine's possession of Storm Shadow is a weapon that will have logistical effects in May-June 2023 rivaling what the HIMARS/GMLRS combination did for Ukraine in the Late Summer of 2022.
First, Ukrainian journalists have identified over 220 Russian military targets outside the range of GMLRS rockets but within the range of Storm Shadow.
This will cause a “HIMARS Effect” on Russian logistics at distances 100km to 200km from the front line similar to what happened to Russian logistics 20 km to 85 km in the late summer of 2022.
Turning that band of 100 km to 200 km distance from the front lines to become the
3/
Welcome to the age of cheap, GPS guided, 2,500 km propeller cruise missiles that is 5-to-7% the price of what it costs to shoot down with an AIM-120 AMRAAM missile ($1 million each).
This @ChrisO_wiki translation🧵makes the idea that Russian wounded soldiers in Ukraine (contract, conscript or mobik) who are sent to Russia for medical recovery have ever returned to Ukraine to fight...
The Russian military manpower implications of that observation are profound, given the recent Euractiv article stating 185,000 Russians were killed during the course of the war and another 555,000 were wounded.