1/🧵By Q1’23 @Tether_to had issued $79.4b of digital tokens, and held $81.8b of assets -> in other words had net assets for $2.4b
Is this over-collateralisation enough? It depends through which lens you look at Tether: 1) Money transmitter (i.e. just a servicer) 2) Bank/ fund
2/🧵What are *MONEY TRANSMITTERS*?
Money transmitters should be mere service providers, they:
- Take your cash, and keep it in quasi-cash assets
- Give you back receipt token/ representation of your cash
- Commit to give you back cash 1-for-1
Money transmitters have very (very) tight guidelines on how to store their reserves - and even like this they aren’t great, look at #SVB and @circle almost-debacle
Tether is definitely non-compliant with those guidelines, see yourself
4/🧵Ok so @Tether_to is not a money transmitter and has risk in their balance sheet
Is it a fund? Maybe
But Tether doesn’t want to be a fund, it wants to be a *BANK*
Why? Because banks can issue cheap liabiliites that are not securities - as Tether wants to do with $USDT
4/🧵 But banks (should) have adequate buffering for this privilege (ask @BIS_org)
Common Equity Tier 1 % is the best proxy we have to see whether this buffering is adequate
5/🧵 Trying to apply standard risk-weights to @Tether_to, we see:
* c. 20% assets not for money transmitters
* c. $10b opaque/ risky assets may require significant weighting
* Huge impact of their $BTC position
Best/ worst scenario is 19.8% / 8.9% CET1 % (vs. EU average 14-15%)
6/🧵 Below is my ultimate cheat-sheet for @Tether_to capital position:
* Gap of $1.5b with strict credit quality assumptions and punitive $BTC weighting
* Fair capitalisation with more benevolent assumptions
-> Tether’s capital position is tightly linked to their $BTC position
7/🧵 *HOWEVER* analysis has several assumptions:
* No non-performing credit
* No add-ons for interest rate, as well as operational risk
* Limited add-ons for directional market risk
* Fair representation of all positions
A bit too much for a 0-yielding quasi-money like $USDT
END/🧵 Here’s for the nerds (please @elonmusk don’t kill my S**s*a*ck link
🧵/ You can choose whether to look at the moon or at the pointing finger instead
With #CreditSuisse#SVBank at al. getting pumped back to life by the State, we should start asking whether the state-bank alliance makes much sense anymore
BANKING IS BROKEN, HALLELUJAH 👇
1/ The fact that #SVBank failure was a shock for markets tells a lot about the quality of markets (and regulators)
Below, an extract from SVB's regulatory disclosures. What was the regulator doing instead of observing the most classic of bank’s maturity mismatches?
2/ I don't want to go all the way to conspiracy theory, but who was extracting the most value from #SVBank, or in other words who had more (short-term) incentives for SVB to keep operating as it was?
Below, another extract. Hint: not only tech benefited from low IR...
0/ I’m on a personal fight to remove the word Real-World Assets (or RWA) from the DeFi jargon
It is truly a logical insult and a counterintuitive definition that can do way more harm than good
*PLEASE* help - here is why 👇🏻
1/ EVERYTHING IS AN ASSET
Whether you can ascribe value to that, and with confidence, it’s a different story. But everything is an asset, from housing to $BTC to watches to reputation to time
2/ WE HAVE BEEN MATERIALISING ASSETS FOR CENTURIES
We started simple and became convoluted. Currently, even (sub-types of) risk, even volatility, is an asset. You own a CDS contract on your balance sheet you have an asset with a fair value
DeFi liquidity went down from 200b ATH to current 60-ish, bettered by interest rates, frauds, bad execution
I couldn’t be happier to invest and build today. These are my:
# 3 most relevant protocols
# 3 protocols I’d stay away from
# 3 things we are missing IMO
With the merge coming, there’s no protocol that has higher potential to transform DeFi:
- Develop new primitive with $stETH
- Spin out native stable
- Expand across other PoS chains
- Express pressure on $ETH governance
0/7 > I had the intuition that flat & naive 1-token-1-vote crypto governance systems are *AWFUL* in uncertain environments, so I tried to prove it. This week Dirt Roads is for *NERDS* and modelled gonzo-mathematical games of governance 🧵👇
1/7 > 1st game: Optimistic Governance Game - OGG:
* Voters are good people
* Voters are not proponents
* Proposals can be benevolent or malevolent, and cannot be distinguished
* Malevolent proposals have huge private benefit at the expense of a probability of blow-up
2/7 > Even by being trivial, OGGs give us few hints:
* There’s incentive for bad proponents to promise a lot
* There’s a dominant incentive to look good
* Illiquidity (delayed outcome) has a premium
* Maximising for value isn’t equal to maximising for survival