Armchair Warlord Profile picture
May 17, 2023 24 tweets 12 min read Read on X
Let's talk about Russian small-unit tactics on the offensive. With Russian troops stepping up attacks across the front in Ukraine, I suspect this will be very relevant in the near future.

A video came out recently which I will use to illustrate: t.me/DDGeopolitics/…
This video was produced by journalists embedded with Russian troops near Spornoe, which I understand are a former LPR unit filled out by Russian reservists. These are ordinary motorized riflemen, not elite troops, equipped with BMP-1s and T-80BVs. Image
The producers do little to sugarcoat things, although they avoid showing anyone being killed on camera. They freely admit multiple vehicles were hit and at least one Russian tanker was killed during the attack. Image
They also have no problem showing moments that might be unflattering for the Russians, including two occasions where reversing vehicles collide with following vehicles.

What's one more dent on a tank? ImageImage
The mission here was to seize a series of Ukrainian positions west of the Russian-held (but very much front-line) gas compressor station at Spornoye. I've marked them on the map as Strongpoints 1, 2 and 3. ImageImageImage
The Russians attacked with a rather small company, apparently some 50 men in three platoons with one tank and two personnel carriers with infantry each. There seems to have been roughly the same number of Ukrainian defenders with at least one tank in support. Image
Russian troops in the area had made a habit of operating late in the day and at night rather than in the morning, and surprised the defenders by attacking at dawn. ImageImage
The Russians attacked Strongpoint 1 first. It appears they moved infantry into the compressor station under darkness and launched the initial attack on foot, securing a foothold on the north side after suppressing the defenders.

Armor moved up in support after the first attack. ImageImageImage
The infantry broke into two groups, one clearing the trenches while the other covered them against counterattacks coming from outside the trench system.

This was all done after the Ukrainians called down indirect fire on their own positions. ImageImageImage
After the initial wave secured the north side of Strongpoint 1 a second platoon attacked to clear the south half.

This platoon moved up mounted on BMPs and led by a tank, avoiding Ukrainian mortar fire. ImageImageImage
The tank pushed into position to fire directly into the Ukrainian-held ravine while the infantry dismounted, initially using a nearby ditch for cover. ImageImageImageImage
The infantry directed the tank onto remaining pockets of resistance as they assaulted through the position.

With the strongpoint secure and the infantry established in place, the armored vehicles - which attract enemy fire - withdrew. ImageImage
Another platoon was engaged as they moved up to attack Strongpoint 3, with at least one tank hit and disabled with the gunner killed.

A second tank was also hit, with the crew concussed, but pressed on to continue the attack. ImageImageImageImage
To get to Strongpoint 3 they had to deal with Strongpoint 2, a bunker built into a collapsed building on the edge of the compressor station. The damaged tank approached and demolished it at point-blank range.

Russian infantry occupied the ruin shortly after. ImageImageImage
That platoon then pushed on Strongpoint 3, suppressing the trenches with fire from tanks and BMPs and reducing the defenders to holding their rifles overhead to fire back. ImageImage
Two Russian BMPs approached the south side of Strongpoint 3 and dismounted infantry practically on top of the trench, who immediately assaulted. The BMPs withdrew quickly after delivering their troops.

An abandoned Ukrainian tank is visible just past the BMPs. ImageImage
Ukrainian troops fled the strongpoint across open ground as the assault began. The Russians called in artillery to harass them and consolidated on the newly-seized position. ImageImageImage
This was hardly some grand, sweeping offensive - it was a limited attack by a single company to take three strongpoints and move the front line 200m forwards. You can, however, see the intricacy of even this small fight.
The company made one dismounted attack with infantry moving up on foot and two mounted attacks with infantry dismounting close to enemy positions.

Throughout, the infantry cooperated closely with their armored support to suppress the enemy so they could move into close combat.
On the other hand, the tanks led the way across open terrain and blasted their way past exposed positions like Strongpoint 2.

BMP crews seemed quite aware of their vehicles' thin skin and withdrew quickly after dropping off infantry.
The attack was made under persistent Ukrainian artillery fire and against a well-equipped enemy who abandoned at least one tank on the battlefield. The Russians obviously suffered several casualties and at least one tanker KIA.
This is very standard combined arms stuff and hews closely to Soviet doctrine, with combined-arms platoons, tanks leading the way, and infantry dismounting almost on top of enemy positions to immediately assault. The main innovation here is the observing drone.
It's also a very far cry from the nonsensical propaganda we commonly see about Russian operations in Ukraine. There were no "meat waves" here, nor any crushing barrage of artillery fire. Just a dawn attack with Soviet-style combined arms from a modest motor rifle unit.
Addendum: According to @tretter50001 , the Russians also lost three infantrymen KIA.

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More from @ArmchairW

May 6
Trump seems to have concluded a ceasefire with the Houthis, negotiated in Oman, that will see the Bab al-Mandeb reopened to American ships and leave Israel and Yemen to continue their long-range war.

If this was his intention all along, the bombing campaign suddenly makes sense. Image
Rather than waging an open-ended air campaign in effective support of Netanyahu's poorly-defined schemes in the region, Trump may have simply wanted to get the strait reopened to American traffic so business as usual could resume... or at least that was an acceptable step down.
Lest we forget, the Houthis had announced an intention to attack any American traffic passing through the straits some time ago.

I wonder if this whole thing was actually a head-fake with the Israel lobby. Negotiations seem to have been conducted very quietly, via Witkoff.
Read 7 tweets
Apr 27
Breaking the "Drone Wall"

The latest talking point out of the Ukrainian side is that they don't really need NATO's support any more because they have tons of kill drones and they're so incredibly lethal that's enough to hold off the Russians indefinitely.

Let's examine this.⬇️

First of all, let's examine the kill drone as a weapon system. Generally known as FPV drones, or as I prefer to call them, antitank drones, these are small, simple quadcopter drones equipped with a camera, a radio or wire communications system, and an explosive warhead.

This makes for a new type of weapon system that, rather than being extremely powerful at face value, gains its effectiveness through a combination of smart guidance and ubiquity. They do three things that prewar "legacy" antitank systems do not:

1. They have extremely precise guidance and can be maneuvered to attack weak points on an armored target or pursue dismounted troops into cover;

2. They have onboard sensors and sustained flight capability, and are capable of not just attacking targets outside of the operator's line of sight but actively conducting reconnaissance; and

3. They are relatively light and cheap, with two or three kill drones fitting into the size and weight factor of a single old-style antitank missile, and thousands of drones stamped out in Chinese factories daily on no-questions-asked contracts to be jury-rigged to ubiquitous Soviet-era antitank warheads.

These weapons do, however, have drawbacks compared to conventional antitank systems.

1. Radio-controlled models are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures;

2. They have limited lift capability and as such their warheads are generally relatively weak, often simply repurposed single-stage RPG-7 shells or purpose-built charges that are little better;

3. They fly relatively slowly and can be, and frequently are, defeated successfully by defensive fire from determined dismounted troops; and

4. They "fire" extremely slowly, as each drone must be manually prepped, linked to a command system, checked out, flown out to a target that could be several kilometers away, and then carefully maneuvered into the target for maximum effect. The rate of fire for a single drone team is thus measured in minutes per round rather than rounds per minute. Engagements where you see multiple drones hit in quick succession are the result of multiple teams attacking a single target or group of targets.

The Russians and to a lesser extent the Ukrainians have implemented countermeasures to lessen their forces' vulnerability to these weapons, generally consisting of ECM systems, defensive fire (skeet shooting has become a matter of great tactical relevance lately), and elaborate "cope caging" that would have drawn extreme mockery a few years ago and which still does in the circles of people who aren't going to survive the first battle of the next war. As such, the probability of kill (PK) of a given antitank drone launch at the moment is, optimistically, about 10% against an appropriately prepared armored vehicle.

And now, my readers, we see the inherent weakness of a military doctrine centered around these weapons. Recall what I previously said about the slow rate of fire of drone teams and compare it to the low PK to be expected of any system which an adaptive enemy has had a chance to respond to. Assuming a PK of about 8% and a five-minute engagement cycle, any given Russian armored vehicle can expect to have about one "drone-hour" of combat lifetime under attack by these systems. Thus a single vehicle being engaged by six teams, for instance, can expect to last ten minutes before being knocked out.

This combat model is borne out by numerous engagements in which Russian units have pushed through drone attack with few to modest losses despite clearly being under attack by multiple teams for extended periods of time. The "drone wall" tactic does, however, create a sufficiently dense swarm of drones at the point of contact to render advances at the platoon level largely a matter of luck and deliberate company-scale attacks a bloody proposition for the chance of little ground gained.

What about larger-scale attacks, though?

Let's run a little wargame. In this scenario, a Ukrainian division (let's say one of their new "tactical corps" that's effectively a divisional unit) is defending against a Russian divisional attack. The Ukrainian unit has deployed into a formation designed to maximize the intensity of antitank drone fire to be directed against an attack at any point on the front - very similar to AFU deployments on the ground right now - with two defensive lines of dismounted infantry in closely-spaced strongpoints and a final "line" of mechanized reserves to bottle up any breakthroughs. A mechanized Russian division has been tasked to smash its way through.

The exact geometry is also noted on the graphic below, but I'll state it here for completeness' sake - the AFU division is occupying a 27km front with three brigades each occupying nine kilometers. The two infantry defensive lines are each composed of platoon strongpoints located one kilometer apart, with the second line positioned three kilometers to the rear of the first line and able to support it with drone fire under intense combat conditions.

A few notes on the rules here.

1. Every Ukrainian strongpoint is assumed to contain one drone team with an engagement range under "assault" conditions of five kilometers. Each team will fire once every five minutes. Firing strongpoints will be marked with a red box in the graphics.

2. As I pointed out above, Russian vehicles have a combat lifespan of one "drone-hour." As such it will take twelve "shots" from a single drone team to kill a vehicle, or one shot from twelve drone teams.

3. I am assuming that a Russian unit will take 30 minutes to move 3-5 kilometers tactically, accounting for en-route mine clearance, etc. Moving through cleared areas will of course be quite fast.

4. Ukrainian strongpoints attacked from the front must be deliberately assaulted, which will take 30 minutes at 3:1 odds. Strongpoints that have been flanked can be hastily assaulted in the same turn as movement.

5. Ukrainian strongpoints in close combat with superior Russian units are suppressed and cannot fly off drones. This will be marked with a black box in the graphics.

6. Ukrainian artillery has largely been silenced and the Russians have stiff fire superiority and their own drones searching the battlefield. Once a Ukrainian drone team opens fire it will be spotted and destroyed by Russian indirect fire within two hours. Strongpoints with dead drone teams will be crossed out and will not fire, but must still be assaulted and cleared of their infantry for the Russians to progress.

7. The Ukrainian reserves cannot simply blitz to the breakthrough sector - they must be alerted and then move out, under attack by Russian interdiction fires and clearing scatter-mine obstacles on the way. Thus they are going to move relatively slowly.

8. The Russians have achieved operational surprise and there is no large AFU reserve force waiting for the assault. This isn't particularly unusual, a similar situation occurred at the start of the Battle of Avdeevka and the Kharkov incursion last year. The Russians seem to be able to pretty reliably mass large forces for operations if need be, without Ukraine or NATO intelligence noticing.

Simple enough? Maybe I should put in an application at Milton-Bradley!

Let's begin - I'll now transition to thread format.⬇️Image
Here we see the initial battlefield set. Of note, I'm depicting the Russians tactically by company but will be keeping a more precise tally of assault vehicles destroyed. Russian company icons will be removed as appropriate.

The little ovals are Ukrainian battle positions. Image
Dust rises on the war-torn steppe as a huge assault force rolls into view - an entire Russian battalion coming on out of the Russian line some way to the south.

The five closest strongpoints launch drones as artillery begins hammering down across the defensive line. Image
Read 14 tweets
Jan 8
The closest historical analogy to the Ukrainian War I can think of is the American Civil War - ironically a conflict that Europeans have always shied away from carefully studying.

A thread.⬇️ Image
The underlying causes of the American Civil War festered for decades, finally erupting into open conflict after a series of political calculations and miscalculations brought down a national compromise that increasingly resembled a house of cards. Image
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Ditto Ukraine. I've said elsewhere the number of political offramps available to Western leaders to avoid this war were so numerous that the fact war broke out can only be explained as the result of anti-Russian policy - clearly miscalculated policy given the results thus far. Image
Read 22 tweets
Oct 15, 2024
Let's bust some propaganda.

Top 10 pro-Ukrainian talking points - and why they're nonsense.⬇️ Image
10. Ukraine is a democracy!

False. The last free and fair election in Ukraine - not held under an ultranationalist jackboot after the 2014 coup - was in 2010.

All elections in Ukraine have been suspended since 2022, and Zelensky's five-year term from 2019 expired months ago. Image
Image
9. Russia is an autocracy!

False. Vladimir Putin and United Russia enjoy approval ratings among the Russian public that are extremely high, even in polling conducted by Western-backed, anti-Putin organizations.

Putin is popular enough to win any election held in Russia handily. Image
Read 13 tweets
Sep 15, 2024
How many plans has NATO gone through to try to beat Russia in Ukraine?

Let's count 'em! Image
Plan A: The FGM-148 Javelin

It seems absurd now, but in late 2021 NATO's leadership thought Javelin was a tank-deleting magic wand that would deter Putin from challenging Zelensky's scheme to conquer the LDPR.

Javelin failed in service and is a rare sight on the battlefield. Image
Plan B: The Kazakh Gambit

The West quite obviously fomented an uprising in Kazakhstan in January 2022 in hopes of distracting Russia from the then-boiling Ukrainian crisis.

Didn't work. CSTO troops arrived and helped the Kazakh government crush the would-be color revolution. Image
Read 16 tweets
Aug 18, 2024
Anatomy of a Fiasco: The Bridge at Glushkovo

Late last week the Ukrainian command, seeing their offensive in Sudzha-Koronevo bog down, tried to expand the flanks of their salient into Russian territory in Kursk. Part of this was an attack on the Glushkovo district to the west. Image
The Glushkovo District is somewhat isolated from the Russian interior by the Seim River.

Having learned the wrong lessons from their 2022 counteroffensive in Kherson, the AFU command decided to try to induce a wholesale Russian withdrawal by attacking the bridges over the Seim. Image
The large road bridge at Glushkovo, the district center, would be their first target. As in Kherson two years ago, HIMARS fired on the bridge with GMLRS. As in Kherson two years ago, it was ineffective.

Unlike in Kherson two years ago, the Russians killed the HIMARS launcher.
Image
Read 8 tweets

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