Thread by @mkolken

BREAKING #2A News: Federal District Court Judge issues preliminary injunction temporarily blocking the State of New Jersey's new gun laws. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.usco…

"...what the State and the Legislature-Intervenors ignore, and what their empirical evidence fails to address, is that this legislation is aimed primarily—not at those who unlawfully possess firearms—but at law-abiding, responsible citizens who satisfy detailed background and… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Our Founding Fathers were aware of the dangers such laws pose. In his Commonplace Book, Thomas Jefferson quoted from Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria’s work, On Crime and Punishment, where Beccaria discussed the 'False Ideas of Utility':

Laws that prohibit the carrying of… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Those words rang true then. They ring true today. Clearly, the State disagrees with Bruen, but it cannot disobey the Supreme Court by declaring most of New Jersey off limits for law-abiding citizens who have the constitutional right to armed self-defense."

"That said, this Court finds that most of the new legislation’s firearm permitting requirements are consistent with the Second Amendment. This Nation has historically disarmed dangerous individuals or those who could endanger the public’s safety if allowed to have a firearm. The… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Thus, for the reasons set forth below and after having conducted a thorough review of the complex issues presented by this new legislation, this Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction."

"based on the State’s historical materials and the Court’s own research, this Court finds this Nation has a historical tradition of disarming dangerous individuals and those who endanger the public safety."

"this Court questions the validity of the 'unvirtuous citizen' justification following Bruen. ...this Court could not uncover any historical laws stripping away an individual’s right to keep and bear arms based on his or her virtue (or lack thereof)."

"As for Chapter 131’s in-person interview requirement of the applicant’s endorsers, the Court finds that such requirement is unduly burdensome. The State has not justified this requirement or explained how, after receiving the endorsers’ certifications, interviewing them… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"While the State has identified no historical evidence to support Chapter 131’s new application process, this Court has. Again, some of the below historical laws are repugnant and clearly unconstitutional today. At the same time, this Court must look to these laws to determine a… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"American colonists disarmed certain religious groups."

"early American colonists disarmed slaves for public safety reasons because of fear of a slave revolt."

"colonial New York prohibited slaves from having or using any gun unless 'in the presence or by the direction of his or her or their Master or Mistress.'”

"Then, in 1704, Maryland prohibited slaves from carrying any firearm 'from off their master’s land without [license] from their said Master.'"

"North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia likewise prohibited slaves from carrying firearms in public without permission."

"While these racist laws certainly violate the Constitution’s demand for equal protection and substantive due process, for the purposes of this inquiry, they suggest that a requirement to establish good character to carry firearms is not a novel one."

"All in all, early American colonial laws reveal a historical tradition of disarming individuals based on reputational or opinion-based fears of danger. Later laws required applicants to obtain character endorsements to carry a weapon in public. While not perfect analogues to… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Therefore, the Siegel Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s reputable persons endorsement provision, and so, their motion for a preliminary injunction on that provision of the law will be denied"

"This Nation has a historical tradition of requiring arms bearers to appear in-person in connection with the right to keep and bear arms."

"As noted, individuals suspected of being 'dangerous' or 'disaffected'— either because of their religious beliefs or attitudes toward the impending Revolutionary War—had to appear in person to take various oaths to keep their firearms."

"Besides those disarmament laws, colonial mustering laws (admittedly not in the self-defense realm) required militiamen to appear in person with their weapons for inspection."

"Mid- to late-nineteenth century laws also required individuals seeking to carry a handgun in public to appear in person. For example, New Jersey’s own Jersey City required individuals to make their applications for a carry permit 'in open court.'”

"The above history reveals a historical tradition of requiring individuals to appear in-person relating to possession or use of firearms"

"Because the in-person interview requirement is limited to determine the applicant’s dangerousness or risk of harm to him- or herself and others, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4(c), this Court finds that Chapter 131’s interview mandate adheres to this Nation’s historical tradition of… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Therefore, the Siegel Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s in-person interview requirement of the Carry Permit applicant. Accordingly, this Court will not preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of that provision."

"However, this Court could not uncover a single law preventing an arms bearer from exercising his or her right to keep and bear arms unless a government official interviewed an arms bearer’s character references." [Emphasis added] twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"The State also has not explained how interviewing an applicants’ endorsers will assist a licensing authority to review an applicant’s Carry Permit application. Despite ample opportunity, the State refused to call a single witness to justify this new and burdensome requirement."

"The State’s failure is telling. Without any historical support, Chapter 131’s provision requiring a licensing authority to interview a Carry Permit applicant’s endorsers violates the Second Amendment. Thus, the Siegel Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"The State has presented no historical laws supporting Chapter 131’s requirement allowing a licensing authority to request 'such other information from the applicant or any other person,' including the Carry Permit applicant’s publicly available statements, the authority 'deems… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"This provision is overbroad and presents potential constitutional problems beyond the Second Amendment and privacy concerns."

"Imagine a licensing authority requiring a Carry Permit applicant to submit to a blood test or provide a urine sample to determine whether the applicant is an alcoholic or uses controlled dangerous substances."

"Chapter 131 allows a licensing authority to deny a Carry Permit to, among others, 'any person with a substance use disorder involving drugs' or 'any alcoholic.' N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:58-3(c)(3), -4(c). A urine sample or drug test might be 'other information' needed to determine… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"That poses thorny Fourth Amendment problems for sure. Suppose a licensing authority demands a Carry Permit applicant to turn over his or her medical records because Chapter 131 allows a licensing authority to deny a Carry Permit to any applicant 'who suffers from a physical… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Besides the lack of historical laws, the State has not explained, or even attempted to explain, how allowing a licensing authority to request 'such other information' is necessary, given Chapter 131’s other robust requirements, including criminal record checks, fingerprinting,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"this Court finds Chapter 131’s provision allowing a licensing authority to request 'such other information' is permissible under the Second Amendment only if the request is limited to objective evidence on the applicant’s dangerousness and risk to the public safety." [Emphasis… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"If appropriate, the licensing authority may request information that is 'reasonably necessary' to determine whether the applicant poses a risk of danger to him- or herself or the public if allowed to carry a firearm in public."

"If the State wants its licensing officials to have more information to review a Carry Permit application, then the State must present historical laws supporting the request for that information and evidence on why the information is necessary. The Court directs the parties to… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"This Court declines to decide the constitutionality of Chapter 131’s new fee schedule now..."

"Finally, this Court doubts the merit of the Siegel Plaintiff’s Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s new fees. A law does not substantially burden a constitutional right simply because it makes the right more difficult or expensive to exercise."

"In Bruen, the Court observed that licensing schemes that require 'exorbitant fees' that 'deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry' may be subject to constitutional attack. 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9. While Bruen provided no guidance on when a fee would be 'exorbitant,'… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"That other jurisdictions charge significantly less fees than New Jersey for firearm licenses does not make Chapter 131’s new fees unconstitutional."

"While this Court questions the merits of the Siegel Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s new fees, this Court will reserve on that challenge pending an evidentiary hearing. This Court will deny the Siegel Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The Constitutionality of the Insurance Mandate

"The State mischaracterizes Bruen by arguing that the Insurance Mandate falls outside the Second Amendment’s text because the mandate is like background checks the Bruen Court found likely permissible." twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"The Insurance Mandate, however, does little to ensure that those seeking to carry firearms for self-defense in New Jersey 'are, in fact, law-abiding, responsible citizens.' Id. Indeed, while a person disqualified from carrying a handgun—say because of a felony conviction, see… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Since the Second Amendment’s text presumptively guarantees the Siegel Plaintiffs’ right to carry their handguns in public for self-defense, the State must show that historical firearm regulations support the Insurance Mandate. To make that showing, the State must come forward… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"the Insurance Mandate burdens an individual’s right to armed self-defense by: (1) requiring proof of liability insurance to obtain a Carry Permit; and (2) criminalizing the failure to maintain the required insurance while carrying a handgun in public."

"This burden is placed on all Carry Permit holders and those seeking a Carry Permit."

"Firearm injuries have occurred throughout this Nation since its founding. Yet the State has not shown that earlier generations addressed this problem by mandating that all arms bearers obtain insurance or post a bond to prevent injuries that may not occur."

"this Court finds the Insurance Mandate is too dissimilar and imposes a greater burden on the right to self-defense than the historical laws the State has presented."

"Accordingly, this Court finds the Siegel Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to prevail on their Second Amendment challenge to the Insurance Mandate."

New Jersey’s “Sensitive Place” Laws

"Public Gatherings or Demonstrations Requiring a Government Permit: The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a sufficiently concrete and imminent prospective injury with respect to Chapter 131’s handgun ban 'within 100 feet of a place for a… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Plaintiffs have shown a concrete and imminent prospective injury at zoos."

"Parks, Beaches, Recreational Facilities, and Playgrounds: Both the Koons and Siegel Plaintiffs challenge Chapter 131’s handgun ban at parks, beaches, recreational facilities, and playgrounds, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(10), and the Siegel Plaintiffs challenge a related,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Importantly, they aver that they would carry a handgun when frequenting these places if permitted by New Jersey law. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the first prong of the Ramirez standing inquiry to challenge to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(10) and N.J. Admin.… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

"Youth Sports Events: As to Chapter 131’s handgun ban at Youth Sports Events, Plaintiff Siegel avers that he regularly takes his son to Tae Kwan Do classes at a martial arts school located in a strip mall, as well as to Tae Kwan Do competitions. [Siegel Decl. ¶ 12 (Siegel Docket… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Public Libraries and Museums: Plaintiffs have also shown a concrete and imminent injury sufficient to challenge Chapter 131’s handgun ban at public libraries and museums, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(12). Although Plaintiff Muller does not recall visiting a museum since… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their standing burden as to airports and transportation hubs.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Chapter 131’s handgun ban at health care facilities, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(21), but only as to medical offices and ambulatory care facilities frequented by the individual Plaintiffs.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their standing burden as to the following types of medical facilities listed in Chapter 131: general hospital, special hospital, psychiatric hospital, public health center, diagnostic center, treatment center, rehabilitation center,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Further, nothing in Plaintiffs’ Declarations supports their standing to challenge Chapter 131’s handgun ban at medical facilities that provide addiction or mental health services and are licensed or regulated by applicable State agencies, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(22). Thus,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have shown a concrete and imminent injury as to Chapter 131’s handgun ban at public film sets,

But this Court finds the Siegel Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Fish and Game Restrictions barring “firearm[s] of any kind . . . within the limits of a state game refuge.”

Private Property and Vehicles:

"such restrictions applicable on all private property without express consent and on carrying functional firearms in vehicles, respectively, both sweep so broadly that there is no doubt that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a concrete and imminent… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Constitutionality of Chapter 131’s Handgun Ban at the Challenged “Sensitive Places”

"the State cannot succeed in claiming that the scope of Plaintiffs’ public carry right does not extend to government property simply because there the State is acting in its proprietary capacity… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Here, the Second Amendment cases that the State cites do not support the sweeping proposition that carrying for self-defense in public does not extend to any location in which the government owns the land

Government Buildings as “Sensitive Places” Where Carrying Firearms can be Prohibited Consistent with the Second Amendment

Thus, this Court reads the Bruen discussion for the proposition that prohibitions on carrying firearms at government buildings tend not to violate the Second… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Whether the sensitive-place designations survive depends on whether the State can meet its burden of demonstrating a historical tradition that is well-established and representative as to such government buildings.

Private Property: Chapter 131’s Default Rule Prohibiting Firearms unless the Property Owner Expressly Consents

Ultimately, the Court concludes that the Default Rule impermissibly burdens Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right to carry for self-defense in public as applied to private… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

As to such private property that is not held open to the public, an “anti-carry presumption” does not come within the scope of the right to carry for self-defense in public, and there the Default Rule does not violate the Second Amendment, nor does it violate the compelled speech… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The State and its amici would propose to treat firearm carriers as trespassers by default, to revoke firearm carriers’ implied invitation to enter. But this cannot be absent a historical tradition justifying the Default Rule. The landowners must affirmatively modify the terms of… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

the Court finds that the presumption to carry onto the property of another only extends as far as the landowners’ permission granted to the public to enter, which is often implied. In that sense, the presumption to carry is “rebuttable”—the owner can always withdraw consent. But… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, because Plaintiffs have shown that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers their conduct—i.e., carrying firearms for self-defense on private lands that are held open to the public—“the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.”

As to private lands that are not held open to the public, the Default Rule—establishing a presumption that express consent is necessary to concealed carry—does not implicate the text of the Second Amendment. The State’s and amici’s other arguments are unpersuasive. twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Ultimately, the Court finds that the State’s evidence is not sufficiently analogous to justify the Default Rule as to private property that is held open to the public.

Having carefully reviewed and analyzed the foregoing, the Court finds the State’s evidence unavailing; it is not persuaded to depart from its prior interpretation. The New Jersey fish-and-game laws the State cites are not analogous to the Default Rule. The 1722 law and its… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The nature of these incremental changes cannot be ignored, nor do they suggest to the Court an intention to prohibit firearms, for instance, in taverns and blacksmith shops and all other private property in New Jersey.

In the end, while the Court finds that the Louisiana, Texas, and Oregon laws support the State and are analogous to the Default Rule, it concludes that they fail to establish a representative historical tradition to justify the Default Rule. twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

In sum, the evidence that the State has put forward does not persuade this Court that the Default Rule permissibly regulates the right to carry for self-defense in public. twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s handgun ban on private property that is held open to the public. twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

the Default Rule, as it applies to private property not held open to the public, does not violate the First Amendment because it does not regulate speech.

The Court finds that the above laws are not “well-established” and “representative” historical firearm regulations to justify prohibiting Carry Permit holders from carrying their handguns at public gatherings or demonstrations requiring a government permit.

In the end, then, the State offers only a handful of state laws of unknown duration and state court decisions mainly from southern and mid-western states (several of which relied on a flawed misunderstanding of the Second Amendment’s original understanding) to justify Chapter… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Put simply, those 19th century laws do not establish a historical tradition of banning firearms at public assemblies or gatherings.

The State also cannot justify Chapter 131’s firearms ban at public gatherings by equating that law to firearm prohibitions at sensitive places such as polling places and courthouses.

Without considering the government-provided security feature of the recognized sensitive places, the State would stretch the sensitive places doctrine to cover all places of public congregation – this is a bridge too far.

Thus, for the above reasons, this Court finds the Siegel Plaintiffs have shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s prohibition on firearms at public gatherings, demonstrations, or events requiring a government… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Finally, the State equates zoos to schools because children are the primary visitors at zoos, and since Heller and Bruen recognized that laws banning firearms at schools are presumptively lawful, states can likewise ban firearms at zoos.

Again, such an argument stretches the sensitive places doctrine too far. The mere presence of children at a particular location does not mean that location is a “sensitive place” where firearms can be completely banned, especially where children are not the predominate visitors.

Because the State has not presented this Court with laws establishing a historical tradition of banning firearms at zoos, see Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s handgun ban at zoos.

As noted, this Court has already temporarily enjoined the State from enforcing Chapter 131’s prohibition on firearms at parks, beaches, and recreational facilities, as well as the regulation on firearms at state parks. [Siegel TRO Op. at 22-28 (Docket No. 51).] This Court refused… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Plaintiffs have thus established a reasonable likelihood of success on their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s prohibition on handguns at parks, beaches, and recreation areas, as well as the state regulation banning handguns at state parks. The Court, however, denies… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Like playgrounds, this Court will not deviate from its prior ruling on Chapter 131’s firearm ban at youth sports events.

the State’s attempt to equate libraries and museums to sensitive places such as schools and government buildings stretches the sensitive places doctrine too far. Again, the mere presence of children is not, by itself, enough to make a certain location like a school.

Likewise, the State cannot stretch every government building into a sensitive place without considering the building’s function and historical laws banning firearms at those locations.

As noted above, the common feature that runs through the sensitive places the Bruen Court recognized—legislative assemblies, courthouses, and polling places (all government buildings)—was government provided security.

Despite the State’s contrary argument, those locations were not historically considered sensitive places just because they involve constitutionally protected activity like voting or petitioning the government

Plaintiffs are thus likely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s prohibition on handguns at public libraries and museums.

the State has not shown that well-established and representative historical firearm laws support Chapter 131’s handgun ban at bars and restaurants that serve alcohol. As a result, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to this Gun Law’s… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The Plaintiffs have therefore established a reasonable chance of prevailing on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s handgun ban at entertainment facilities.

Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiffs have thus shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s laws restricting handguns at casinos.

Without the aid of an evidentiary hearing, this Court is unwilling to enjoin Chapter 131’s handgun ban at airports because some places in the airport may be secure while others are not. The Court directs the parties to take discovery on that issue, and the Court will… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

this Court finds that Plaintiffs may carry their handguns while transporting their relatives or friends to and from airports provided that the Plaintiffs do not physically enter the airport with their handguns. Simply stated, Plaintiffs may carry their handguns while dropping off… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Pending an evidentiary hearing, this Court will temporarily allow the Plaintiffs to check their firearms as checked luggage as allowed by federal law. The Plaintiffs must fully comply with the TSA regulations on checking firearms as luggage—that is, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111(c). To… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Crowded locations are not sensitive places.

The Court finds that the State cannot support Chapter 131’s handgun ban at transportation hubs by relying on the same laws it did to support the law’s firearm prohibition at entertainment facilities.

In any event, this Court could uphold Chapter 131’s handgun ban at transportation hubs by drawing from the historically sensitive places the Bruen Court recognized—legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses. As noted, the government historically provided security at… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The Court will conduct an evidentiary hearing and directs the parties to take discovery on government-provided security at transportation hubs. This Court will administratively terminate this portion of Plaintiffs’ motions pending a full record.

This Court has uncovered no laws from the 18th or 19th centuries that banned firearms at hospitals, almshouses, asylums, or other medical facilities.

But the Court is unwilling to bar the State from enforcing Chapter 131 as to all the health care facilities listed in the law because such relief sweeps too broadly and Plaintiffs make no attempt to show that they will visit such facilities in the near future.

Plaintiffs are thus likely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s handgun restrictions at health care facilities limited to the medical offices and ambulatory care facilities listed in Plaintiffs’ declarations.

this Court finds the State has failed to support Chapter 131’s restrictions on public film sets with historical analogues.

Therefore, the Siegel Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s handgun ban at public film sets.

As noted in this Court’s earlier decisions, Chapter 131 requires gun owners seeking to carry or transport their handguns in a vehicle to keep the weapon “unloaded and contained in a closed and securely fastened case, gunbox, or locked unloaded in the trunk of the vehicle.”

This Court has already found the Second Amendment’s text covers the Plaintiffs’ proposed course of conduct carrying a handgun in public for self-defense.

This law infringes on the Plaintiffs’ right to armed self-defense in public because the law requires Carry Permit holders, in effect, to render their handguns inoperable when traveling in a vehicle in New Jersey.

Just like the law in Heller violated the Second Amendment, so, too, does Chapter 131’s restriction on functional firearms in vehicles. To comply with Chapter 131’s requirements, the Carry Permit holder must in effect render his or her handgun inoperable while traveling in a… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

If encountered with a threat requiring armed self-defense while in a vehicle, the Carry Permit holder would have to remove the weapon from its secured case or gunbox if the weapon is stored in the vehicle’s interior (or in the trunk if kept there) and then reassemble it for… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

And, as Plaintiffs note, the need for self-defense may be more acute in a New Jersey vehicle given the State’s unfortunately large number of carjackings. From 2012 to 2016, New Jersey reported over 1,300 carjacking incidents.

Hence, because Chapter 131’s functional firearms in vehicles restriction makes “it impossible for citizens to use [their handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense,” the law is unconstitutional.

The State’s own historical materials confirm that colonial New Jersey protected carrying firearms on roadways.

As noted above, in 1771, colonial New Jersey enacted a hunting law outlawing hunting on another’s land without permission. That law, however, explicitly protected carrying firearms on the highway.

The State apparently overlooked that provision of the law. twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

The State’s reliance on various 19th century laws criminalizing concealed carrying of firearms and state court decisions construing the “travel” or “journey” exceptions to those laws also does not support Chapter 131’s ban on functional firearms in vehicles.

Plaintiffs are therefore likely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to Chapter 131’s prohibition on functional firearms in vehicles.

The Siegel Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to Chapter 131’s exemption for judges, prosecutors, and attorneys general fails because they have not shown they are “similarly situated” to them.

That exemption allows certain judges, prosecutors, and the state attorney general… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

As the State points out, judges and prosecutors are different from private citizens. They must undergo an extensive vetting process beyond regular criminal background checks such as nomination and confirmation proceedings before a legislative body.

Further, as the State recognizes, their work as prosecutors and judges increases the risk of harm to them. [State Opp’n Br. at 93.] Prosecutors are tasked with enforcing the law and prosecuting individuals who violate it. They must prove an accused’s guilt, and when appropriate,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Given the above, this Court finds that judges, prosecutors, and attorneys general are not similarly situated to private citizens like the Siegel Plaintiffs, and therefore, the Siegel Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails.

Accordingly, the Siegel Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection challenge to Chapter 131’s exemption for judges, prosecutors, and attorneys general.

Given the State’s construction and for the above reasons, this Court rejects the Siegel Plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness challenge to Chapter 131’s new crime of an unjustified display of a handgun and denies their request for a preliminary injunction on that provision of the law.

This Court finds the State has established a historical tradition of comparable laws to sustain the Fish and Game Restrictions. Again, unlike Chapter 131’s handgun ban, the Fish and Game Restrictions do not deprive the Siegel Plaintiffs of firearms to defend themselves— the… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

That said, this Court finds the Fish and Game Functional Firearm in Vehicle Ban to be unconstitutional. Unlike the other Fish and Game Restrictions, this regulation does not relate to hunting.

This Court finds the Fish and Game Functional Firearm in Vehicle Ban indistinguishable from Chapter 131’s prohibition on functional firearms in vehicles. Both infringe on a Carry Permit holders’ right to armed self-defense while in a vehicle. The State’s historical fish and game… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Thus, for the same reasons Chapter 131’s functional handgun ban in vehicles is unconstitutional, so too is the Fish and Game Functional Firearm in Vehicle Ban.

The Siegel Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge to N.J. Admin. Code §… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Unlike the exercise of other constitutional rights, the inability to exercise one’s Second Amendment right when needed could be a matter of life or death.

Because Chapter 131 forces Plaintiffs to choose between the noncompensable loss of their Second Amendment rights or face significant criminal penalties for exercising such rights, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have clearly shown they are more likely than not to suffer… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

the Intervenors’ argument ignores the fundamental right of self-defense. Although the Intervenors cite to statistics involving gun violence, they do not cite to statistics involving law-abiding citizens with carry permits who used their firearms to save lives.

Accordingly, on balance, the Court finds that the final Public Interest factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief.

But what the Second Amendment prohibits the States from doing, and what the State of New Jersey has done here with much of Chapter 131, is to “prevent[] law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” That is plainly… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Bruen required the State to bring its firearm laws in compliance with the Second Amendment. Chapter 131 was the State’s response, but it went too far, becoming the kind of law that Founding Father Thomas Jefferson would have warned against since it “disarm[s] only those who are… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

That said, this Court finds that most of Chapter 131’s firearm permitting requirements are consistent with the Second Amendment. This Nation has historically disarmed dangerous individuals or individuals who could endanger the public with a firearm. With some exceptions, Chapter… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Accordingly, this Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction. Because Plaintiffs are claiming a deprivation of their fundamental right to keep and bear arms, this Court waives Rule 65’s bond requirement.

Link to opinion: assets.nationbuilder.com/firearmspolicy…