Numbers in War: a thread. I wanted to write this because it highlights some significant dilemmas in writing about ongoing conflict, and can hopefully help readers interpret and properly use reports. 1/17
Today my colleague Nick Reynolds and I published ‘Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine rusi.org/explore-our-re… In which we report that the AFU are losing 10,000 UAVs a month. 2/17
How robust is this number? Is it plausible that the AFU are losing 323 UAVs per day? Well, UAVs are being used for reconnaissance, strike and situational awareness across 1,200 km of front and dozens of kilometres of depth. 3/17
Each platoon tends to keep two up. I’m not going to go into tactics here, but both sides need them up for situational awareness. Then command posts put them up to see what is going on. Then artillery units do recce with them. SOF too. 4/17
Then UAVs are launched for the purpose of strikes. Jury rigged loitering munitions are used throughout operational depth, including by saboteurs. In those areas where there are significant ongoing operations it is not unusual to have 25 UAVs a side for each 10 km of frontage 5/17
A lot of these UAVs are non-hardened commercial UAVs. A lot of them have to stay up to provide situational awareness, irrespective of the EW threat. The loitering munitions don’t come back, irrespective of whether they destroy a target. So the consumption rate is high. 6/17
So, it is quite easy to get to 323 lost per day. But the numbers are also extremely variable. More skilled pilots lose far fewer UAVs. UAVs in artillery units that can plan their routes, can work down the seams in the electromagnetic spectrum where infantry units can’t. 7/17
Thus the head of Ukrainian artillery noted that while the infantry get through a UAV in an afternoon, in the artillery they survive much longer. wartranslated.com/pravda-com-ua-… 8/17
Consumption does not just differ between units but also depends on the level of operational activity ongoing at a given time. Thus the actual number of losses will fluctuate massively, day by day 9/17
How many are being lost? If the AFU had a unified logistics system it could be simple to track. This is not the case though. Across Ukraine UAVs are being crowdfunded, gifted by Ukraine’s partners, and are mass produced by Ukrainian private companies. 10/17
Then there is the fact that UAVs are being used by the Ukrainian Ground Forces, by the Territorial Defence Forces, by the National Guard, the Border Guards, and Ukraine’s Special Services, and they don’t all draw from the same stores. 11/17
Thus the AFU don’t know how many UAVs they are operating. So how confident am I in the number 10,000 per month? As an exact number, I’m not. The actual total varies month by month and day by day and is not closely tracked. But consumption is definitely very hgih. 12/17
So if the figure isn’t exact - any neatly rounded figures are suspicious - why use it at all? Firstly because it is the number we got from the Ukrainian General Staff and from the part that has the best data. Other organisations concurred that the number was reaosonable 13/17
Putting a number to consumption is important in making the policy relevant point. The point is, unhardened UAVs are disposable tools like munitions and get consumed very rapidly. You need them in your force and you need them to be cheap. 14/17
If we weren’t confident in the number, why use a number at all? Because if we’d written “you need lots of UAVs because many are destroyed” this would do nothing to give a sense of the scale of consumption. It would not help bound the problem set. 15/17
Let us suppose that this month the actuall loss rate is 9,000ish, does that change the policy implication? No. If it were 5,000 then that would be a meaningful deviation from the number we gave. But that would just be a random number. 10,000 was the number given by the AFU. 16/17
The challenge here is that numbers can be necessary in getting the right message across while also being misleading in their exactitude. It is important that any numbers coming out of a war are read in this context. 17/17
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I was asked to write a piece today on the challenges in ramping up munitions production in @NATO for @Telegraph. Unfortunately it had a very misleading headline added to it which needs clarification: telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/02/1… 1/5
NATO has munitions stocks which will last some months. However, because of various challenges in expanding manufacture, a decision to increase production will see a lag before output increases. The decision needs to be made now therefore, otherwise we will get into trouble. 2/5
That is not a comment on the position relative to Russia. Russia has a range of major challenges in its supply chain and is firing a lot more ammunition than the Ukrainians. As they bring more systems out of storage supplying things like charge bags gets harder. 3/5
There has been a lot of discussion around the effects of winter on operations. I thought I’d outline a couple of aspects of winter fighting that are both critical and often under appreciated. BLUF: Winter will likely favour the Ukrainian military. 1/17
A lot of discussion has revolved around the question of mud and tanks. We’ll circle back to this but fundamentally it is not significant. The real impact of winter is on infantry, secondly on logistics, and the impact on logistics has a secondary effect on military vehicles. 2/17
To begin with infantry. Winter sees the loss of a lot of cover as trees lack foliage. That means you have to keep low. Unfortunately low also means wet and muddy. Wet means cold. There is a limited period you can be wet and cold and remain alive. 3/17
The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence; @Justin_Br0nk with Nick Reynolds and myself assess the stages of Russia's air and strike campaigns against Ukraine. rusi.org/explore-our-re… BLUF 1/17
Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 2/17
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered. 3/17
Thread on Methodologies for Assessment. There are a few different kinds of assessment that often get compared on social media when they aren’t necessarily comparable. For those who don’t work in the field, I thought I’d outline a couple of them and the challenges involved. 1/22
When reading any assessment ask why the assessment is useful to a decision maker. The first kind of assessment is prediction. “x is highly likely/likely/unlikely to happen”. This assessment flags a problem the decision maker is going to have to contend with 2/22
Another kind of assessment is an impact assessment: ‘if x happens these are the consequences’. This is important because it frames how a decision maker prioritises problems. An unlikely, but high impact event may still be worth investing resources to prepare for. 3/22
So, I got some things wrong in June and figured it is worth outlining why and how it changes analysis for the conflict. In short, the Russians have less ammunition than colleagues and I thought. Have to be wary jumping to opposite conclusion however. reuters.com/world/russia-i… 1/15
In June we were looking at the weaknesses in the Russian military (what could be targeted). Ammo was an obvious tactical target as it required fewer strikes than the guns. We outlined this publicly here: static.rusi.org/special-report…, 2/15
The question arose whether this would suppress Russian guns or cause long term shortages. Assessing Russian ammo was difficult. The question was not just about old Soviet stocks but also about their production since 1991, storage, wastage, and consumption. 3/15
Lots of debate about whether something is an offensive. I think there has been some confusion because the military use some ordinary terms to have specific technical definitions and it can lead to mil and non-mil statements no lining up exactly. Short thread outlining some 1/10
TACTICAL: A military action conducted using the resources organic to a military unit. Thus, a company attack is a tactical action by a company. A Brigade attack means an attack conducted with the organic assets of a brigade. Highest tactical echelon is Corps or CAA in Russia 2/10
ATTACK: An attack is an offensive tactical action. The order to attack will be given to a unit which will be briefed on the commander’s intent to seize an area, defeat a unit etc. 3/10