Yesterday, I posited that the attack by the "Russian Volunteer Corps" or "Liberty of Russian Legion" into Belgorod/Bilhorod Oblast was likely a raid.
A raid is doctrinally defined as a type of limited attack for a specific purpose. 1/6
While not having additional intelligence on this incursion into Russia, I still believe it is a raid.
Raids are used to threaten or seize a limited objective, they cause movement by the enemy to defend against the raid & they are usually short in duration with a small force. 2/
Raiding forces sustain themselves (no need for a logistics supply line), and after achieving their objective(s) they usually quickly withdraw.
A raid surprises the enemy, throws the enemy off their plan, and causes confusion. 3/
Without additional intel, I still believe this is was a quick and limited raid.
I believe they will 1. Stay in place for between 48-96 hours, then withdraw 2. Sustain themselves while in place with (no resupply operations) 3. Attempt to limit casualties. 4/
If this was a raid, they achieved ALL their objectives: 1. Surprised Russian border guards & defense ministry 2. Scared sh*t out of local Russian citizens 3. Sent a message to Putin 4. Achieved greater distance w/ few casualties. 5. Caused relocation of Russian forces 5/
Telltale indicators of this being a raid will be if/when the force withdraws back to Ukraine.
There may be other such raids/feints/
demonstrations to gather more information about Russian force dispositions and reinforcement priorities.
Well done! 6/6
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I’d suggest it may be continuance of shaping operations, prior to Ukraines’ offensive.
Some things we may see in the near future are types of “strikes” or deception operations like raids, feints or demonstrations. Here’s some info on each. 1/6
A raid is a surprise attack for a specific purpose. Raids threaten or destroy a limited objective, kill or capture small groups of enemy soldiers or equipment, free prisoners, or cause movement of the enemy to protect the object of the raid. 2/
Doctrine suggests that raids last “…long enough to accomplish the intent of the objective, [cause confusion or panic in the enemy force] and then the raiding force withdraws….”
A raid surprises the enemy, throws the enemy off their plan, and causes confusion. 3/
Over the last few days I’ve received a few messages suggesting I’ve “hesitated” in supporting Ukraine getting more US equipment.
Let me say that has NEVER been the case.
I’ve been a proponent of supporting UAF in modernizing since 2012. 1/13
What I did suggest is that it’s difficult deluging a partner army w/ equipment because it’s hard for them to integrate technologically advanced weapons, maintenance, logistics support & training….all while fighting a war.
And, it’s hard to get political & financial support 2/
As the war in Ukraine has evolved, I believe western partners - to include the US - have weighed considerations of what they can pull out of their force & supply. But that must be matched by UAF being able to accept & integrate that equipment.
In discussing the upcoming Ukrainian offensive yesterday with a group of govt officials, one asked me “when will it start?”
I said: “in the attack, it starts when the commander feels it’s the right time…that’s an advantages of the offensive.”
I then explained RSOI. 1/10
RSOI is Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration.
When units enter a combat zone, they are “received” in country, “staged” to move forward, then “moved” to the combat area, and then integrated into a larger unit.
How is this related to Ukraine, you ask? 2/
Remember that Ukraine’s army has been receiving all kinds of different equipment from many different countries, and they are training at different EU training areas on new skills with that equipment.
Some training takes longer than other, depending on the kit. 3/
I believe Ukraines’ upcoming offensive operation will achieve huge tactical and perhaps large operational success.
But for those who believe it will be represented by large arrows on maps, that will not be indicative of this phase. 1/
This will be a tough fight, with newly-formed Ukrainian units conducting (for the first time) large-scale combined arms breeches against prepared Russian defensive positions.
This will be a new phase of the campaign that will be very different. 2/
My belief is that Ukraines’ forces will perform well (even better than before) & the Russian force will continue to perform poorly (though not as bad as they have in the past).
That is partly due to switching roles (attacking vs defending, and time spent by each preparing). 3/
Last night, I tweeted that I had been assessing & considering the challenges Ukraine's Army (UA) Commanders were facing in preparing for the “spring offensives.
I said I'd share some thoughts on what I would be thinking if I were among them.
This is that 🧵 1/
First, there were people who thanked me for this, but There were dozens who said "don't give secrets to the Russians!"
Trust me, this 🧵: 1. Will not help RU 2. May help civilians better understand & manage expectation 3. Is based on what most militaries already know. 2/
Oh...one guy responded "do it, but don't make it too long."
To that guy I would say "this is it...deal with the length and try to stay focused!" 3/