What's been causing inflation is important. Get it wrong, and we get the wrong policies. And we learn the wrong lessons for the future.
Today’s post is my reaction to “What Caused the U.S. Pandemic-Era Inflation?“ by Ben Bernanke and Olivier Blanchard @ojblanchard1. Any errors here are my own.
Go to the authors, too: here’s the paper, news coverage, a video, and a tweet thread.
Both inflation optimists and inflation pessimists were right and wrong about inflation in different ways. There's something for everyone in the debate here.
Here's their Money Chart:
Shortages (yellow), food (light blue), and energy (dark blue) explain spikes in inflation more than labor market (red). Even so, as the supply-side contributions wane, those from the labor market have persisted and could keep inflation staying elevated.
Bernanke and Blanchard’s model-based findings largely align with the statistical decomposition by Adam Shapiro, an economist at the San Francisco Fed. Of course, there is research that comes to the opposite conclusion.
In my opinion, it’s impossible to look at inflation in recent years and say it’s only demand and then blame the Rescue Plan and the slow-to-lift-off Fed. Likewise, it’s impossible to say it was only supply. This debate matters because it informs monetary and fiscal policy.
Workers have the upper hand, or do they?
How strong the labor market is key. And what’s driving wages.
Nominal wage growth in their model depends on three elements:
-Inflation expectations
- aspirational real wage to catch up to past inflation.
- Labor market tightness.
Ok, so how do they assess the labor market: the vacancy rate, that is. the ratio of job openings to unemployed persons. By that measure the labor market is hot.
Rather than lean heavily on the vacancy rate (as Bernanke and Blanchard did), it is better to track several measures. Vacancies point to more tightness than nearly every other measure.
The "catch-up" or "aspiration wages" is a neat addition to their wage equation. It's not standard in macro models. It's a clever way to see if wage-price spirals could take hold because workers have bargaining power. They find no evidence of it affecting wages.
Inflation expectations lookin’ good.
Inflation expectations are anchored, albeit near the top end of the range, and did not move much in the past three years. And that’s very good. Had expectations de-anchored (moved up persistently, we would have more than a 5% fed funds rate.
Other measures of inflation, like the Michigan Survey, tell a similar story: anchored expectations. Inflation remains elevated, and there is no reason to declare victory. Inflation expectation is reassuring that markets and consumers believe we will get inflation back to normal.
What’s missing?
Bernanke and Blanchard’s model allows for worker bargaining power in a “catch-up” concept. But there's nothing on market power. Watch out for wage-price spirals, as in the 70s that pushed inflation up. What about price-price spirals? What about profits?
Isabella Weber @IsabellaMWeber has been at the forefront of how crises like the pandemic and the war in Ukraine allow firms to raise prices aggressively, even more than their rising costs.
Bernanke and Blanchard briefly discuss the “markups” of price over cost. That explains some, but not all, of the rise in markups, leaving reasons to keep studying markups since the pandemic began.
According to Bernanke and Blanchard, no single factor has pushed up inflation. Instead, it’s been a series of evolving factors. The pandemic, the war in Ukraine, policy responses, a strong labor market, and changes in behavior all matter.
Bernanke and Blanchard’s summary of their paper is a good place to close it out. #goteam
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Many are tying the Democrat losses in the election to high inflation in recent years. There's some truth to that, but it's complicated, and it's crucial to take the right lessons.
There are many lessons to learn from the election, but I see a wrong lesson circulating that must be nipped in the bud. Here is an example from @BetseyStevenson, a professor of economics who served in the Obama Administration:
I’m not taking part in the reckoning because it’s not true. People want low unemployment and low inflation. The real lesson is that leaving inflation to the Fed alone was not good enough.
Also, the simple Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment is not a thing, and leaning on it would have led to worse outcomes in people’s lives and at the ballot box.
""The US is not in a recession, despite the Sahm Rule indicator bearing my name saying that it is. That said, the risk of a recession is elevated, strengthening the case for the US Federal Reserve to cut interest rates.""
my @opinionbloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
In saying no recession for July 2024 despite the Sahm rule, I am looking broadly at the data the NBER uses , not just the Sahm rule and unemployment rate. My assessment is that even after possible downward revisions it's not a contraction. Not not. fredaccount.stlouisfed.org/public/dashboa…
Note I could be too upbeat about the current situation, and @AnnaEconomist is putting out great content on revisions and turning points. Where we are is always hard to know, especially at times like these. PS I trained the Sahm rule on the unrevised data.
"Why don’t economists ever talk about the fact that more and more workers at the lower end of the payscale have to work at more than one job to make a living? ... It seems to me that is a big reason why many don’t feel the economy is good right now."
Facts:
Comment (continued):
"Workers have to work multiple jobs, far more hours than their parents worked, and still can’t save enough to buy a house like their parents and grandparents did. That should be a quantifiable statistic included in every news story."
Facts:
Both. PS: Building more housing is at the top of my list for policymakers.
Four years ago, the harsh reality of Covid hit the United States; the bottom fell out for millions of lives and livelihoods. We're in a far better place now, and where we are headed holds promise.
Today’s post may start too heavy for some with its look back on four years ago at the start of the pandemic. It’s important because it gives us context for where we are now, but if it's too much, skip ahead to the sections on the present and future; they are more optimistic.
The day that changed everything.
March 11, 2020, was the day Covid became real for Americans. The oral history of that day is powerful, as Garrett Graff (@vermontgmg) collects in his compelling, must-read piece. wired.com/story/an-oral-…
Labor shortages hit hard in 2021-2022, affecting business owners and customers with inflation.
How important were immigrants in getting us out of that mess? Very important. Covid was deeply disruptive. Millions left the labor force, and immigrants came back more quickly.
That simple chart has so many things going on under the hood. But let's step back from the immigrant vs US-born debate, which often gets xenophobic.
Why did millions of people drop out of the labor force? They are not unemployed; they are not looking.
COVID!!!!!!!!
My biggest frustration -- and there are many -- with the macroeconomic debate is too often, it acts like the pandemic never happened. It did.
This was a once-in-generations disaster. Here is a good piece on why so many left. We are all in this together. stlouisfed.org/publications/r…
The "worst possible outcome" for the Fed is an unnecessary recession, not reversing a cut.
The Fed must decide when and how much to cut rates this year. Several Fed officials in recent weeks have said they will move slowly. What are they thinking?
🧵(long) draws on my new Stay-At-Home Macro (SAHM) Sub.st@ck post. (Google it). I explain why the Fed should cut the federal funds rate now and why they are unlikely to do so before May.
The FOMC’s next vote is on January 31.
After hiking the federal funds rate aggressively by 5 1/4 percentage points, it’s time to start cutting. Why?
Inflation has decreased substantially. The consensus is that inflation ended 2023 with a two-handle on both total and core, at 2.6% and 2.9%, respectively.