Russia achieved limited tactical gains at high cost over the winter. Ukraine correctly held back resources and spent time regenerating offensive potential to give itself a better chance of achieving operational-strategic level gains this summer. 19fortyfive.com/2023/05/sad-re…
If Ukraine had committed all of its resources to the front over the winter, Russia likely wouldn't have made any gains but Ukraine would have reduced its chances for achieving a breakthrough this summer.
I think some people assume that both sides commit all of their resources to the front line at all times and that wars are linear, but that isn't how it works. Ukraine has a much better chance of making serious gains this summer than Russia had over the winter.
I think the focus on Bakhmut has given some people the wrong perception of the war, conflating a tactical-level battle (Bakhmut) with the strategic level. There were several other battles over the winter and none were successes for Russia.
There are still important long-term questions about ammunition availability and other variables, but I'm more optimistic about Ukraine' chances after Russia's failed winter offensive and recent announcements of more capable weapons' deliveries from NATO members.
Russia made some slow and costly gains last spring before that offensive culminated. Similar arguments were made then about the war's trajectory favoring Moscow, but the attrition Russia sustained set the conditions for Ukraine's successful offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv.
Russian equipment issues are growing, and they are increasingly relying on convicts to fight/hold their lines. I'm skeptical that Russia can restore sufficient offensive potential to make serious gains. The question is whether they can defend the territory they currently control.
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Tough report about Ukraine's 28th Mechanized Brigade southwest of Bakhmut, "The major...told me that in Kherson his mortar teams had fired about three hundred shells a day; now they were rationed to five a day. The Russians averaged ten times that rate." newyorker.com/magazine/2023/…
The above section is about fighting in January and the journalist embedded with the brigade in mid-March.
"Pavlo estimated that, owing to the casualties his unit had sustained, eighty per cent of his men were new draftees."
Important to emphasize that the 28th Brigade and other Ukrainian units held the SW flank of Bakhmut and prevented a encirclement, which meant the southern road could be used to reinforce and resupply Ukrainian units in the city.
The Deep State map indicates that Wagner forces have taken the western part of Bakhmut. It appears only the SW corner where the MiG-17 monument was located is still help by Ukrainian forces. deepstatemap.live/en#16/48.5758/…
.@CentreAST wrote about the effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on future Russian military-technical cooperation and international arms demand. bmpd.livejournal.com/4689552.html
They think that, under the most optimistic conditions for Russia, Russian's international trade situation will not normalize until 2027-2028 at the earliest, which means Russian arms exports will remain constrained until then as long as sanctions are in place. 2/
They note that the ability of both sides to conduct maneuver became exhausted quickly, which led to a transition to positional combat. But they say it isn't clear if this was unique to this war or is representative of changes in warfare more broadly. 3/
The Ukrainian Air Force says Russia launched 6 Kinzhal missiles from 6 MiG-31K aircraft, 9 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, 3 S-400 or Iskander-M missiles, and 6 Shahed / Geran-2 drones over night, all of which were successfully intercepted. facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/p…
They also say they shot down 3 ISR UAVs, including an Orlan and a, cough, Supercam. Clearly, Russia launched a diversity of missiles and drones from different directions to try to confuse Ukrainian air defenses. 2/
All 9 crew members of the aircraft were killed. Kommersant says they were likely part of a single group preparing to strike Chernihiv with the Mi-8 providing EW/CSAR support. Their experts suggest this was likely an ambush with air-to-air missiles. 2/ kommersant.ru/doc/5985387
The Fighterbomber channel notes this is the Russian Air Force's worst single day of losses since March 2022. The Helicopter Pilot channel is incredulous that they put a Mi-8MTPR-1 anywhere near the front calling it "idiocy". 3/ t.me/milhelipilot/1… t.me/fighter_bomber…