@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia While I wholly accept Putin does have a grandiose sense of his historic mission, my point of divergence with you was the notion that from this came a strategy, and that he was in no way fearful about the situation 1/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia First of all, I don't see Putin as a real strategist, but rather an improviser with a very loose sense of his goals; this is something that has marked his whole presidency. 2/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia I also find it hard to believe that he is not at all afraid by the situation (especially having had not one but two authoritarian regimes collapse around him). However cocooned by yes-men, he must have some idea of how dire the situation and the long-term damage to Russia 3/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia I also worry about the notion of a 'messiah complex', which is something much greater than simply the massive ego of most political leaders, especially autocrats who have long been in power (and become in effect caricatures of themselves) as it implies... 4/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia ...some greater cause. Putin may well consider himself part of the pantheon of Russian state-building heroes, but does he necessarily believe that this means that everything with automatically work out? Even Stalin had his fears, and was often driven by them. 5/
@Stanovaya@CarnegieRussia Ultimately, we are both guessing what is going on in his head. You think he is genuinely confident because of this 'messiah complex', I think he is defaulting to inactivity and blind hope because that is the least scary thing for him. All we can do is give our best guesses! 6/end
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.@Stanovaya is always well worth reading but I'm not convinced we're just talking about a 'messiah complex' + a genuine belief on his part that everything will work out. If anything, the opposite: he's least able to make decisions when they're hard 1/ carnegieendowment.org/politika/89826
Micromanaging the war and aspects of reconstruction are distractions from the intractable big issues (like drawing up a detailed revision plan rather than actually revising!), a comfort. When faced with big, hard decisions (eg, end Kyiv offensive, leave Kherson) he dithers 2/
So he tends to make hard decisions too late and too badly - delaying mobilisation until after the campaign season and when so many trainers and so much kit had been lost was a case in point. His apparent desire to hold off any more mobilisations until after Sept elex another 3/
A vicious but fair assessment of Gerasimov from @WarintheFuture - if anything, I'd add another failure, a moral as much as professional one. A short thread 1/
The role of the CoGS is not just to be the foreman of the military imposing the leadership's orders but also the shop steward, arguing the military's case and fighting its corner. This Gerasimov failed to do, and it's hard to get any sense he even tried 2/
Obviously in particular this means before the war: Russian doctrine, its approach to preparing for war and, I understand, even warnings from the GRU all seem to have been ignored. Gerasimov ought to have been the one man to stand up for all this 3/ inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2022/03/23/how…
Hah, when I recorded this, I said that I thought Prigozhin would be walking back his threat to pull Wagner out of Bakhmut, before his deadline. I just hadn't appreciate just how quickly he would! A couple of thoughts 1/ bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
Realistically, Prigozhin couldn't. Apart from the practical point that Wagner depends on the MOD for strategic mobility, short of just walking west, I don't think it would have been politically survivable for a man so wholly dependent on the Kremlin - and with so many enemies 2/
It would have been considered treachery, and we know what Putin thinks about traitors. Prigozhin's whole business empire - and possibly life and freedom were at stake. 3/
Obviously the Kremlin drone story is still very much a breaking one, but people should really stop talking about this as an attempted assassination attempts against Putin. That's just playing to Kremlin talking points 1/
He notoriously rarely goes to the Kremlin, let alone stays there overnight, and there were no scheduled early morning meetings or the like there which might make one assume he might be in his (palatial) flat there 2/
Besides, that is, I understand, quite well protected. Not quite a bunker, but something that would be hard to hit by anything unable to make some sharp turns, which would make it vulnerable 3/
Reconstituting these forces is more than just a matter of finding more warm bodies. Judging by memorials and the like, tactical officers have suffered disproportionate losses, so even if new 'Spetsnaz' are drafted into units, who will train and command them in the field? 2/
Similar things can be said about the VDV (paras) and MP (Naval Inf), but the Spetsnaz seem to have suffered even worse and demand even more from their tactical officers. They will need to be rebuilt near enough from scratch when the war is over. 3/
A key problem with Macron's trip to China and comments is that - whatever his intention - they are interpreted in Moscow as signs of the impending fracture of the West, which only encourages digging in over Ukraine... 1/ kp.ru/daily/27489/47…
...Given that Moscow's strategy is now pinned to victory not on the battlefield but through politics, outlasting the West's will and capacity to support Ukraine. The idea is that when the aid stops, Kyiv will be forced to concessions. Realistic or not, this is the plan... 2/
...Which Putin likely believes because he has to - it fits his prejudices about the West and anyway it's the only real option he's got. To that end, every hint of division in the West becomes magnified to reassure Russians - and Putin - that this will not last forever... 3/