Thread by @MarkHertling

This was a small part of a very enjoyable conversation with @IAPonomarenko.

The article is a good description of the challenges with fielding, maintaining & integrating the M1-series of tanks (and some other equipment).

Ilia didn’t mention how the conversation started. 1/15

https://twitter.com/iaponomarenko/status/1663638443711242240

In opening, I stated I’ve never been opposed to providing any type of equipment to Ukraine, but rather I’ve attempted to outline the availability, logistics, training, immediate use, national security aspect & cost (political & fiscal) challenges of each item. 2/

Each nation has their own way of war, and the methods, approaches, equipment, training & doctrine are trained & refined over decades by the armies of those nations.

When a nation goes to war, the training, systems, equipment, processes & doctrine kicks in. 3/

The Ramstein Group - put together by @SecDef @oleksiireznikov & @NATO - considers all those issues to determine what is best to provide to Ukraine.

Many desire a complete, newly-fielded army, every air defense system, & a robust Air Force…right now! That’s pretty tough. 4/

The Ramstein group can’t just go to a military warehouse & put all military kit in a shopping bag.

Instead, each nation considers 4 things:
-What does UAF need right now
-What can UAF incorporate right now.
-What is available to give right now.
-How does giving affect us? 5/

If that sounds like I’m “echoing the Biden administrations slow roll approach,” (as some suggest) I’d counter with “no, that’s what is the best way to support Ukraine as they fight while ensuring they have the capability to use & support the most important stuff..right now.” 6/

Let me emphatically state: I know - from personal experience & training with them - that UA soldiers are brave, smart, & courageous. They’re fighting an existential threat. These soldiers are motivated to operate any type of equipment, usually quickly

That’s not the issue. 7/

The issues are - simply - identifying the stuff, having logistics system to support the stuff, keeping parts & ammo flowing for the stuff, putting together different stuff to synchronize outcomes on the battlefield, & ensuring commanders are comfortable w/ the stuff. 8/

As a commander, I always wanted more “stuff.” Before asking for it, though, commanders must assess how they’ll use that stuff and do they have the ability to support it.

What to some may appear to be slow rolling or saying “no” before getting to “yes,”
perhaps there’s…9/

…a phased approach which requires donating nations to analyze, persuade, assess and evaluate.

It’s important that @SecDef has recommended over 3 dozen “presidential draw down authorities (PDAs)” which involve risk assessments & politics.

Elements of each are staggering. 10/

The PDA on the Patriot transfer is a perfect example.

Those patriot batteries came out of NATO operational units, not war reserve stocks. 3 countries took a huge risk to provide these billion of $ “high demand/low supply” systems. UAF soldiers mastered in 4 months…11/

…those UA soldiers were few in number, veteran air defenders who knew how to fight, & the US (& Germany/Netherlands) adapted their training programs.

While there is deserved pride in how they’re now shooting down RU drones & missiles, each Patriot missile they launch cost…10/

…$4-$5M (depending on the missile) and must be resupplied & the weapon system maintained thru a complicated system.

Abrams tanks, while not the same as Patriots, are costly, & they’re “different” than other kit in that they move a lot, are part of a bigger force, require…11/

…a robust parts, supply & maintenance trail & are in visual, close combat w/ the enemy as part of larger maneuver.

As I’ve said, the US (& other countries with M1s) have trained over time to address & support all this.

IMO, Leo’s & Chieftains are better - right now. 12/

And yea, providing M1s was a political decision to get other nations to “move” at the time. It worked.

It was also a decision linked to longer term commitment to Ukraine, which is also good.

A battalion is training at Grafenwoehr now. 13/

Like I said, the interview with @IAPonomarenko was important to sharing all this information.

What we’ll see soon is a visual of Ukraine’s “way of war,” with a brave group of soldiers & a hodgepodge of western equipment that is now part of a new Ukrainian army. 14/

The upcoming offensive won’t look like Desert Storm - because you can’t just provide types of equipment & expect results - but I continue to believe the upcoming offensive will be successful for UAF.

Sorta like an exhausted Washington against an exhausted Cornwallis.15/15