Thread by @MarkHertling

Any commander will make an assessment of their force and the enemy’s force.

There are “indicators” as to what will be outcomes when the two meet.

One area I always watch: Overt show of confidence…in people, leaders, equipment, plan. Not cockiness or swagger, confidence. 1/12

https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1665400329494577152

The “hush” video posted by Ukraine is a reflection of this.

No bragging, no bluster, no indicators of what is happening…just a nuanced “we’re ready, and we’re about to go.”

You never underestimate your enemy, but you must be confident in your potential. 2/

Compare that to what’s happening on the Russian side, today:
-more messaging by Prigozhin about dysfunction in RU govt & military
-Russian mutineers killing commander before deserting
-anti-Putin militias continue attack in Shebekino & beyond 3/

nytimes.com/2023/06/03/wor…

These “indicators” show a vast difference between solid UKR confidence & increasing RU chaos.

This interview with @CIA Director Burns on the anniversary of the invasion last Feb has been on my mind.

“Leaders” with hubris & cockiness aren’t leaders. 4/

cnbc.com/amp/2023/02/26…

The upcoming Ukraine operation will be challenging & tough. UAF will be on a large offensive w/ new equipment going against RU defensive positions that have been reinforced for 6 months.

But without trained & well-led soldiers overwatching obstacles, RU defenses are useless.5/

Any attacking force is either “force” or “terrain” oriented.

That is, they are either given a mission to 1. attack an enemy force to destroy/defeat it, or 2. To seize ground (capture areas, interfere w/ enemy movement/resupply, regain desired terrain for future operations) 6/

The upcoming UKR offensive, IMHO, will have elements of both.

What will be interesting is to see how the UAF have “task organized” (that is, places different equipment & types of units) in which areas of the front. 7/

This is a hedge, but there is potential for several approaches:
-multiple efficient & effective combined arms “heavy” units conducting breaches & bypasses of RU defenses in key areas, regaining a lot of ground w/ SOF & territorials striking in the rear areas. 8/

-a more methodical breach operations, massing heavy (armored) forces in fewer areas, with the idea of breaking through the front & breaking supply lines & encircling RU forces, while other “lighter” (infantry in “battlefield taxis”) break through & seize key terrain. 8/

-multiple axis of advance across the front with smaller armor & light forces threatening several areas, with a large reserve ready to exploit success.

Those - and perhaps a few others I could provide but won’t - are all potential courses of action (COA’s) 9/

But now, I’ll repeat what I’ve said so many times before:
-any of these COAs require extensive preparation of routes, synchronization of units, and intelligence/reconnaissance
-MOST IMPORTANTLY, all require extensive resupply & logistics planning and execution. 10/

None of us - NONE - know how this will occur, or when, or with what forces, or which branches & sequels follow, or the results.

At the beginning of this war, in Feb 22, I found it easy to predict UAF would persevere.

I don’t have a clue what will happen next. 11/

But I do believe Ukraine will retake ground and will continue to persevere. 12/12