For $MMTLP, that is all mis/disinformation to cover up worthless assets
Meta $MMAT is telling everyone they are worthless, the $MMTLP folks just don't want to listen
1/
I feel sorry for the folks involved but this is what $MMAT - the former parent of Next Bridge thinks of these assets.
Next Bridge owes Meta $23 million and counting between principal and accrued interest
2/
That $23 million relates to 2 loans, a $15 million secured loan and $5 million + unsecured loan
The secured loan to Torchlight/Next Bridge done in Oct '21 was secured by Greg McCabe's interest in MMAT stock + his 25% interest in the Orogrande
3/
On the maturity date of the loans - March 31, 2023 - the parties to the loan extended maturity to Oct 1, 2023 and reaffirmed the security interest
4/
Reaffirmation of this lien was important to Meta as it their recourse, their collateral to foreclose on in the event they do not get repaid
5/
But we know what Meta thinks of the assets, because they tell us and are forced to evaluate the likelihood of repayment per acct rules
$MMAT is valuing the notes receivable as a "collateral-dependent" asset whereby credit losses are based on the FAIR VALUE of the collateral 6/
Per the text and table provided by Meta $MMAT, they valued the note receivable at $2.2 million at 12/31/22 and $621k on 3/31/23
7/
So after meeting and conferring with Next Bridge on the 3/31/23 amendment, where any lender would ask for private info - $MMAT determined the fair value of a loan backed by 25% of Orogrande was worth 621k
8/
Thus, Next Bridge's former parent thinks 100% of Orogrande is worth +/- $2.5 million
Not hedge funds, not shorts, not FINRA - insiders
Next Bridge was unable to convince Meta the asset is worth more
Given secured and unsec debt at NBH, this implied the equity is worth 0
9/
It is peculiar that Greg McCabe sold off a piece of the 25% interest backing the loan prior to the recent deal with NBH closing
There is NFW any lender would have allowed that
10/
The loan docs explicitly note that they are secured by 25%, not 22.6%
McCabe / NBH surely breached the loan agreement by selling off the lenders collateral (no amendment suggests he can).
11/
NBH has a claim/collateral for Wolfbone's 25% interest in Orogrande
NBH bought Wolfbone from McCabe for an equiv % of the stock of company
It would appear McCabe left NBH with an ongoing potential default by selling collateral he wasn't allowed to (per docs available)
12/
NBH is carrying assets on the books for nearly $90 million, while their lender and former parent has taken a 97% write-down on the same assets, valuing them at $2.5 million
13/
NBH has to pony up $23 million+ to $MMAT by 10/1/23
More worrisome is that w/o an amendment, they owe Greg McCabe $17 million by 6/21/23 without an amendment
Where did McCabe get the $ to lend to NBH?
He dumped $MMTLP 7 million shares to baggies b4 it stopped trading
14/
If this sounds incestuous, it is. Never seen a shareholder back a loan to a company with his own assets.
So what is way out?
Few, if any
NBH said they spent 8.4mil in capex in 1Q23
But they only had 50% WI then vs 100% now
15/
So 17mil spent drilling in 1 quarter on just a few small pokes in the ground. Lets say thats true (Im skeptical).
Suggests they need at least 40mil to drill and 40 mill to repay debt
$80 mil - where does that come from?
16/
Current share count is ~250 mil shares
Lets say they can raise at $0.40, valuing company at $100mm vs $2.5mil $MMAT thinks its worth
They need to issue 200mm shares
Current holders will be diluted by nearly 50% - or worse - just to get out of the current hole
17/
So instead of blaming shorts, FINRA, etc, etc, why are $MMTLP holders asking George Palikaras why he spun them an assets he now says is worthless (under penalty of law) and why are they not asking the current mgmt team what the plan is?
18/
NBH has filed an s-1. It is or was effective. It can start trading as soon as they issue shares and everyone can get liquidity and determine the fair value of this goat pasture
Send George and Clifton an email and get off FINRAs back
19/
My guess is the only reason holders are not doing this is they know they won't like the answer they hear
Nefarious blue sheet stories are easier to believe than accepting you were the sucker in this saga, its human nature.
Phoenix Energy One may become a national scandal this year with retirees losing hundreds of millions
Fortess Investments may have a serious public relations disaster when it happens and Trump's efforts to reduce investor protections will get called into question.
Given the CEO of Phoenix is highly litigious this is of course all in my opinion only.
1/
Phoenix is an oil & gas company with primary assets in the Bakken that began operations in 2019. They own operated assets, non-op and minerals
They currently have a S-1 filed with the SEC for $750 million of Senior Subordinated Bonds
Other than a Fortress 1st lien most of the capital they have raised is from Jobs Act Reg A+ and Reg D bonds that get sold to retail investors that they find through Instagram, Youtube and Facebook ads
2/
The capital structure is completely fucking bonkers
The new bonds from the S-1 (if the SEC approves, I'm doubtful given open and active investigation into the company) are Senior Subordinated Bonds
Those bonds will prime/layer the $500 million of Reg D Junior Subordinated Bonds and be junior to
- Fortress 1st lien
- Adamantium Secured 2nd lien
- Adamantium 2nd lien
- Unsecured Reg A and Reg D bons
Oil & Gas Execs absolutely blasted Trumps policies anonymously in the Dallas Fed survey
Unlike political shills who defend every policy industry execs know and tell you his policies are hurting the industry.
Drill Baby Drill is a myth today. Will not happen. Trump is hurting the industry per execs.
A 🧵
Cc: @DavidRamsdenWoo @jendubayevans
The key word to describe 2025 so far is “uncertainty” and as a public company, our investors hate uncertainty. This has led to a marked increase in the implied cost of capital of our business, with public energy stocks down significantly more than oil prices over the last two months. This uncertainty is being caused by the conflicting messages coming from the new administration. There cannot be "U.S. energy dominance" and $50 per barrel oil; those two statements are contradictory. At $50-per-barrel oil, we will see U.S. oil production start to decline immediately and likely significantly (1 million barrels per day plus within a couple quarters). This is not “energy dominance.” The U.S. oil cost curve is in a different place than it was five years ago; $70 per barrel is the new $50 per barrel.
1/
First, trade and tariff uncertainty are making planning difficult. Second, I urge the administration to engage with U.S. steel executives to boost domestic production and introduce new steel specs. This will help lower domestic steel prices, which have risen over 30 percent in one month in anticipation of tariffs.
2/
The administration's chaos is a disaster for the commodity markets. "Drill, baby, drill" is nothing short of a myth and populist rallying cry. Tariff policy is impossible for us to predict and doesn't have a clear goal. We want more stability.
3/
Trump's Energy policies largely revolve around increasing US oil & gas production and deregulation to grease the wheels.
Increasing oil production will be easier said than done, in my opinion
A thread 🧵
1/
The primary elephant in the room is that policies to reduce inflation by reducing Energy costs are limited by rate of return, payback periods and simple old economics.
If you believe the oil industry, $65 +/- oil is needed to profitably drill new wells.
Oil is currently $70, there isn't much juice to squeeze. If prices are materially below $65, the industry will slow drilling regardless who is POTUS.
2/
Law of larges numbers comes into play. We are at all time high oil production. Decline curves never sleep, even if more tails are stacked, large production increases get harder.
Worth noting using EIA weekly data US production rose ~2mm bps under the last Trump admin vs 2.3mm bpd so far under Biden
Despite supportive policies and Drill Baby Drill mantras 2017-2021, the industry was coming out of a downturn and bankruptcy flush from 2014 through 2020 and were forced by stakeholders to focus on returns (see point above).