For $MMTLP, that is all mis/disinformation to cover up worthless assets
Meta $MMAT is telling everyone they are worthless, the $MMTLP folks just don't want to listen
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I feel sorry for the folks involved but this is what $MMAT - the former parent of Next Bridge thinks of these assets.
Next Bridge owes Meta $23 million and counting between principal and accrued interest
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That $23 million relates to 2 loans, a $15 million secured loan and $5 million + unsecured loan
The secured loan to Torchlight/Next Bridge done in Oct '21 was secured by Greg McCabe's interest in MMAT stock + his 25% interest in the Orogrande
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On the maturity date of the loans - March 31, 2023 - the parties to the loan extended maturity to Oct 1, 2023 and reaffirmed the security interest
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Reaffirmation of this lien was important to Meta as it their recourse, their collateral to foreclose on in the event they do not get repaid
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But we know what Meta thinks of the assets, because they tell us and are forced to evaluate the likelihood of repayment per acct rules
$MMAT is valuing the notes receivable as a "collateral-dependent" asset whereby credit losses are based on the FAIR VALUE of the collateral 6/
Per the text and table provided by Meta $MMAT, they valued the note receivable at $2.2 million at 12/31/22 and $621k on 3/31/23
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So after meeting and conferring with Next Bridge on the 3/31/23 amendment, where any lender would ask for private info - $MMAT determined the fair value of a loan backed by 25% of Orogrande was worth 621k
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Thus, Next Bridge's former parent thinks 100% of Orogrande is worth +/- $2.5 million
Not hedge funds, not shorts, not FINRA - insiders
Next Bridge was unable to convince Meta the asset is worth more
Given secured and unsec debt at NBH, this implied the equity is worth 0
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It is peculiar that Greg McCabe sold off a piece of the 25% interest backing the loan prior to the recent deal with NBH closing
There is NFW any lender would have allowed that
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The loan docs explicitly note that they are secured by 25%, not 22.6%
McCabe / NBH surely breached the loan agreement by selling off the lenders collateral (no amendment suggests he can).
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NBH has a claim/collateral for Wolfbone's 25% interest in Orogrande
NBH bought Wolfbone from McCabe for an equiv % of the stock of company
It would appear McCabe left NBH with an ongoing potential default by selling collateral he wasn't allowed to (per docs available)
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NBH is carrying assets on the books for nearly $90 million, while their lender and former parent has taken a 97% write-down on the same assets, valuing them at $2.5 million
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NBH has to pony up $23 million+ to $MMAT by 10/1/23
More worrisome is that w/o an amendment, they owe Greg McCabe $17 million by 6/21/23 without an amendment
Where did McCabe get the $ to lend to NBH?
He dumped $MMTLP 7 million shares to baggies b4 it stopped trading
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If this sounds incestuous, it is. Never seen a shareholder back a loan to a company with his own assets.
So what is way out?
Few, if any
NBH said they spent 8.4mil in capex in 1Q23
But they only had 50% WI then vs 100% now
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So 17mil spent drilling in 1 quarter on just a few small pokes in the ground. Lets say thats true (Im skeptical).
Suggests they need at least 40mil to drill and 40 mill to repay debt
$80 mil - where does that come from?
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Current share count is ~250 mil shares
Lets say they can raise at $0.40, valuing company at $100mm vs $2.5mil $MMAT thinks its worth
They need to issue 200mm shares
Current holders will be diluted by nearly 50% - or worse - just to get out of the current hole
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So instead of blaming shorts, FINRA, etc, etc, why are $MMTLP holders asking George Palikaras why he spun them an assets he now says is worthless (under penalty of law) and why are they not asking the current mgmt team what the plan is?
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NBH has filed an s-1. It is or was effective. It can start trading as soon as they issue shares and everyone can get liquidity and determine the fair value of this goat pasture
Send George and Clifton an email and get off FINRAs back
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My guess is the only reason holders are not doing this is they know they won't like the answer they hear
Nefarious blue sheet stories are easier to believe than accepting you were the sucker in this saga, its human nature.
The folks in $BTU for dividends are probably (hopefully) in for rude awakening
Think mgmt does mostly stock buybacks
This is why
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The $320 mil convert done in March '22 has conversion ratio adjustments for any kind of equity distribution (cash div, stock div, etc)
This is adjustment to conversion ratio for cash dividends
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The math depends on stock price and dividend amount, but at current stock price every $5 dividend results in the convert converting into an additional 3.8 million shares
My non-consensus take on additional SPR drawdown talk from Biden admin
Original SPR release was political, but in two ways 1) help reduce fuel costs/inflation burden on Americans 2) not allow Russia to benefit from higher oil prices from conflict it created
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As discussed in the past, the scale of the release this year is unprecedented
BUT, the way SPR laws work proceeds from emergency sales must stay with DOE for repurchase, so we know those barrels are coming back
Future mandatory sales are substantial, as laid out in the piece attached, so I think Biden is mostly boxed in..... additional SPR emergency releases are unlikely
But if you are the POTUS and see a KSA-RU axis forming, why would you not jawbone?
Had a number of people say they didn't understand a lot from the thread on $TWTR capital structure
So why not thread to explain the thread
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- More debt, less equity results in better (leveraged) equity returns if things work out in an LBO, thus the debt here despite Elon's deep pockets
- Elon can always take the debt out with more equity but then its a foodfight over valuation and potential cram downs or dilution
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- Revolver ---> corporate credit card; can be borrowed an repaid, typically highest in cap structure, used for working capital, some industries often have amount available tied to inventories and accounts receivable
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Elon had commitments for $13 billion in credit facilities to help finance the Twitter buyout
They are shown here. $12.5 billion was likely funded at close with undrawn $500mil revolver
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The are floating rate loans. Its noteworthy that SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate) was 0.3% when the deal was announced
Just the move in SOFR from announcement in April to close in Oct cost Elon an extra $435 million per year in interest
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Total interest expense appears to be $1.286 billion today, but all of the loans are subject to increases in SOFR which Elon will bear unless he swapped rates (my gut says he didn't)
2 of the tranches also have punitive margin escalation/ratchets
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Myth busting the decline of coal generation in the US
Estimated coal capacity factors shown below 1/
The trailing capacity factor dropped under 70% for good in April 2009. Trailing wind and solar generation were 1.6% of US power stack.
Cf dropped under 60% for good in Feb '12 (33 months to drop 10%); wind + solar were 3.1% of generation
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Cf dropped under 50% for good in Jul '17 (65 months to drop 10%); wind + solar 7.8% of generation
Cf dropped under 40% in Feb '20 (31 months to drop 10%); wind +solar 10% of generation... it then rose back above 40% 14 months later and remains there at 43% as of last reading
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