Thread by @GresselGustav

1/ I am in Stockholm this week and quite busy with meetings. As always, things happen when I am away.
I tried to write an @ecfr comment on the #counteroffensive since May, but now it got overtaken by events. A🪡 from the phone will have to do.

2/ Battalion and even brigade size counter attacks are within the range of local 🇺🇦 army-corps. So one needs to be cautious about assaults. Near #Bakhmut & #Soledar they were undertaken predominantly as fixing actions.

3/ But yesterday the 🇺🇦 37th Marine Infantry brigade appeared in the Novodonetske sector. New formed formation marked as Army level reserve indicates that this operation is at least an attempt at something larger.
If nurtured with reserves, the breakthrough inticates ...

4/ ... offensive operations towards Berdiansk-Mariupol.
As discussed previously, 🇺🇦 general staff has not only one plan, but plans for several options for offensive action. They all have pros and cons and rest on certain assumptions and intelligence on 🇷🇺 positions.

5/ If these prove to be wrong and 🇷🇺 resistance stiffer than expecred, 🇺🇦 may still pull back, re-group and try another.
I'd rougly sumarise northern variant (Northern Luhansk Oblast), central variant (direction Donezk city), southeastern (direction Berdyansk-Mariupol) & ...

6/ ... southwestern (direction Melitopol).
Russians are strong in the northern and central sections, commencing futile offensives until the last moment. Rumor that Putin himself ordered the capture of villages in Luhansk & Donezk oblast. A waste of troops, but well, the Führer...

7/ The south was more exposed than one would think of. Reserves from Wuheldar were moved to Bakhmut, that may explain the 🇺🇦 decision.
Still a demanding variant. 🇺🇦 spearheads will have 2 open flanks they need to cover with troops. This may eat up forces, ...

8/ ... particularly if the speed of advance slows down and 🇷🇺 flanking attacks become more likely.
But we are not there yet. 🇺🇦 working themselves through the first 🇷🇺 line, being delayed predominately by minefields.
Then they'll have to race for the second 🇷🇺 line...

9/ ... which is heavily fortyfied, but thinly manned. If they reach it early, they can clear obstacles with little molestation by 🇷🇺 forces.
If 🇷🇺 reserves are there first, it will be a long positional fight.
The Sea of Azov is 100km away. Don't expect 🇺🇦 to be there too soon.

10/ However, having exhaused much of its forces in the winter offensive, 🇷🇺 options to counter the offensive are not too good too.
Units w mobilised soldiers still show little cohesion and bad morale.
Even if Putin would call another partial mobilisation, ...

11/ ... force generation becomes increasingly difficult for 🇷🇺 as people with military experience are spent already and time demand to train cohesive units from those mobilised or recruited rises.
Whatever Putin does, 🇺🇦s will have the summer to unroll their offensive.

12/ Which brings me to this thing, dominating the news: the destroyed Nowa Kachowa dam.
Militarily it is pointless at this stage. 🇺🇦 has limmited amphibious capabilities. A cross Dnepr assault would only make sense as a diversion, if 🇺🇦 had already reached Cherson Oblast ...

13/ ... from the East and 🇷🇺 forces need to be dislodged from defensive lines west of Melitopol. But we are at least one, if not two months away from that. By then the Dnepr will be down to normal water levels.
This only serves the destruction of 🇺🇦, destruction...

14/ ... of homes, towns, the dam and powerplant itself, etc. Nothing unexpected from fascist Russia: if they can' have 🇺🇦 they destroy it.

15/ Seitenhieb an die 🇩🇪 Pseudointlektuellen: wir müssen wieder über das Verhalten von Sexualstraftätern reden um Putin zu erklären. Denn militärisch war das jetzt wertlos.

16/ Back to the offensive: where will it end, what will it achieve by the end of summer?
According to the books, 🇺🇦 has the forces to liberate 1.5 oblasts against 🇷🇺 resistance. If more, they overperform, if less something went bad.
Ceasing the land bridge will be well within ...

17/ ... the cards. But liberating all of the occupied territories will be hard to achieve.
This is what worries me a bit. There is short term military supply for the 🇺🇦, and there are long term plans to foster defence industrial cooperation to arm 🇺🇦, but there is little ...

18/ ... attention on medium term supply. How to replace 🇺🇦 losses encountered over the summer? How to rearm over the next winter?
There is a lot of expectation in the West (🇺🇸 as much as 🇪🇺) that a humiliating defeat will drive Putin to the negotiation table.

19/ I don't see any indication this may happen. Putin is betting on a long war, that a long war would erode Western support to 🇺🇦 on which Kyiv desperately depends.
A defeat in the summer offensive is embarrassing to 🇷🇺, but a lot of embarrassing things happened to 🇷🇺 ...

20/ ... without Putin rethinking anything.
The US elections in 2024 may be a first indication to him, whether his long war strategy works or not. He will dragg out the war at least until November '24, if not longer.
From a better or worse position makes little difference to him.

21/ For 🇺🇦 it makes a difference. If they manage to shorten the frontline, they significantly reduce the burden of fighting the long war. And of course reliefing civilians from 🇷🇺 occupation.
🇺🇦 would increase its strategic depth, allowing to start reconstruction of ...

22/... critical infrastructure, particularly power plants.
So overall, the offensive makes sense. But many in the West still underestimate the effort it takes and the song term support 🇺🇦 needs.