Gustav C. Gressel Profile picture
Senior policy fellow @ECFRWiderEurope @ECFR, PhD, specialised on security, defence, military | NATO, EU, Eastern Europe
Paolo Porsia 🇺🇦🇺🇸🇮🇹🇪🇺🇮🇱 #NAFOfella Profile picture Potato Of Reason Profile picture nadezhda - @nadezhda04@mastodon.social Profile picture TITᑌᑕKᕮᖇ Profile picture Ruben Chagaray Profile picture 16 subscribed
Nov 22, 2023 13 tweets 3 min read
1/ I get asked a lot about the possibility of a ceasefire in the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war. Short answer - it's an illusion.
Long answer in the thread. 2/ Roughly two "types" of questions popping up:
1⃣ "Now that the counter-offensive failed, should we put pressure on Zelenskyy to negotiate?"

THis question implies that 🇺🇦 does not want to negotiate and all we need to do is armwrest them into it. That is nonsense.
Jun 25, 2023 16 tweets 3 min read
1/ Some thoughts on the munity turned attempted Putsch yesterday. A lot on it is still in the dark. But a few observations.
A 🪡 2/ First, to pull this, there must have been considerable collaboration from the side of the Russian armed forces. Rostov and Voronezh are not de-militarised spaces. Quite the contrary.
Rostov hosts the SMD command and units of the 8th CAA, Voronezh the 20th CAA.
Jun 6, 2023 22 tweets 5 min read
1/ I am in Stockholm this week and quite busy with meetings. As always, things happen when I am away.
I tried to write an @ecfr comment on the #counteroffensive since May, but now it got overtaken by events. A🪡 from the phone will have to do. Image 2/ Battalion and even brigade size counter attacks are within the range of local 🇺🇦 army-corps. So one needs to be cautious about assaults. Near #Bakhmut & #Soledar they were undertaken predominantly as fixing actions.
Apr 28, 2023 19 tweets 4 min read
1/ So, entering the fighter debate. A lot has been coverd and discussed about it, here a short 🧵about some things I could not fit into this 👇 @ecfr comment.
ecfr.eu/article/the-ca… 2/ 🇺🇦 are at serve disadvantage for both tactical and technical reasons.
The tactical are hard to change. Fighters need to hug the ground to avoid 🇷🇺 GBAD. That means the range of whatever AA missile they fire is reduced. Because the missile has to waste a lot of energy climbing
Apr 4, 2023 9 tweets 2 min read
Ich dachte nicht dass der Tag mal kommen würde, an dem ich jemanden aus der Linkspartei empfehle. Aber hier in der @FAZ_Politik hat @bodoramelow ein lesenswertes Interview gegeben: faz.net/aktuell/politi… Ein paar Schmankerln:
"Leider wird inzwischen nicht nur in meiner Partei die Erinnerung an die sowje­tische Armee, die Auschwitz befreit hat, vermischt mit der heutigen russischen Armee unter Putin, die die Ukraine überfallen hat."
Jan 21, 2023 13 tweets 4 min read
1/ While 🇩🇪 defence minister did not say no yesterday, rather not yet, I think the #Leopard Plan as we conceived it in September 4 @ecfr is dead.

Why? A longer thread.

ecfr.eu/article/the-le… 2/ The #Leopard2 is arguably the most prolific tank in Europe. However surplus and reserve tanks make up only a small part of the force.
They could be used to start training and introduce the tank into 🇺🇦 services, but to achieve a real effect in a long war, more ...
Nov 26, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
Essential reading in the @spectator - 🇺🇸🇨🇳 back channel agreements to limit the war in 🇺🇦.
White house Angst on nuclear release caping military assistance.
spectator.co.uk/article/the-re… This sheds some light into the complete erratic policy on MBT, fighters, and others. And why @JakeSullivan46 stayed so suspiciously silent on all of it.

It would be essential to read whether the White House made "deals" with other larger powers as well.
Nov 24, 2022 14 tweets 3 min read
Da sich die SPD-Hofschreiberlinge (👇) an meinem Tweet ergötzen, ein paar klarstellungen zu Zetenwende und 🇺🇦.
Erstmal, ja "kommt nicht vor" war der falsche Ausdruck, denn in der Einleitung kam sie vor. (Twitterverkürzung).
Aber nun wird versucht Ursache und Wirkung zu verdrehen. Ja, die Ukraine kommt in der Reden vor, als Anstoß. Denn der Angriff auf die Ukraine ist ja der ursächliche Auslöser. Wegen dem Angriff, der die Gefahr Russlands offen legt, gibt es Zeitenwende.
Aber um die EU/NATO vor dem weiteren Ausgreifen der russsischen Bedrohung zu retten.
Nov 23, 2022 9 tweets 2 min read
1/ This is the thing to follow closely.👇
The 🇷🇺 army has the capacity (officers, barracks, etc.) to train roughly 250 000 men at once. If you want to create more forces, you'd have to do this in waves. 2/ Of course Putin/Shoigu pretend that mobilisation is completed, otherwise all those who haven't been drafted yet would go to 🇬🇪🇰🇿🇲🇳 ...
At a later point, they may invent whatever reason that "now suddenly" they need more men.
Nov 16, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
1/ Here you see an 🇺🇦 S-300 intercepting a 🇷🇺 cruise missile. Look how close the point of intercept is!
In theory, S-300 has a range over 100km, but in practice, the radar needs to track and illuminate the target all the way to intercept. 2/ Because cruise missiles fly low, they are hidden behind the horizon, or shielded by ground clutter (hills, mountains, buildings, etc.)
Hence practically interception of cruise missiles takes place at a much, much shorter range.
Oct 10, 2022 39 tweets 7 min read
1/ As 🇷🇺 missiles rain down on civilian targets all over 🇺🇦, I get questions what to do now. Some thoughts as a former air defence officer on this. But beware, information about the attacks is limited, and I would not say it is over yet. Air alarms are still ongoing. 2/ I will 1⃣ look at the missiles/weapons presumably used, 2⃣ 🇺🇦 air defences, and 3⃣ ways if Western assistance. Again, all based on limited information.
Sep 21, 2022 14 tweets 4 min read
1/ Dear journalists, I am travelling 4 @ecfr this week. I can't give individual interviews, so here is a 🧵 on what I think about #mobilisation & #nuclearweapons threats. 2/ Mobilisation was rumored for some time, and it is the bigger news. 🇷🇺 occupation forces had issues finding enough personnel for months. Now a lot of contracts from authumn 2021 expire, in November, a lot of 6 month contracts would have expired.
Sep 2, 2022 13 tweets 4 min read
So, as there is a growing debate on whether the #KhersonOffensive is a success or failure, I try to weight in a bit. In short, it is too early to tell. But expectations have been too high anyway, and likely to be disappointed because of that. @ecfr @ECFRWiderEurope First, some general remarks on where we are in the war.
🇷🇺 has not yet lost its offensive momentum. Attacks on Bachmut and surroundings were still going on. Allthough they produced little results, they still bog down a lot of 🇺🇦 ressources.
Aug 9, 2022 9 tweets 2 min read
So as I get asked whether this is a sign that 🇺🇦 got MGM-140 ATACMS, I'd say not yet. It might also the the Ukrainian Grom(-2) missile as well, however it had to rely un US delivered Anti-Radiation Missiles to poke a hole in 🇷🇺 air defences. People in Western Europe often forget that 🇺🇦 was an integral part of the Soviet space and missile effort, some of the finest scientists and rockets comming from there. That knowledge is not entirely gone...
Aug 7, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
Russia using more and more Soviet (pre1991) equipment is a strong argument for 🇩🇪 to donate remaining #Leopard1 MBT to 🇺🇦. 1️⃣ Yes, the Leopard 1 is outdated compared to more modern 🇷🇺 MBT, but the chance of encountering them is shrinking.
Jun 30, 2022 5 tweets 1 min read
🇫🇷 to send more armoured personnel carriers to 🇺🇦. I hope this increases pressure on 🇩🇪 to do the same. APCs are urgently needed to allow UA to move infantry on the battlefield. In the open, artillery can easily interdict movements, granting 🇷🇺 initiative. ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/351… From the start of the war, 🇺🇦 has conducted a mobile defence. For this, you need armoured reserves.
Wartime attrition has put into question whether UA will sustain its armoured reserves. 🇵🇱 provided MBT critically important.
Jun 9, 2022 16 tweets 6 min read
1/ A short update tweet on where we are on the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war. A lot to do for @ecfr, and our next #twitterspace will be about different things ... so here wer are.
Last week 🇷🇺 repaired the railway connection into #Izyum and you immediately see the results. 2/ Further offensives from Izyum towards #Sloviansk are expected in the comming days. This will make 🇺🇦 positions in #Severodonestk even more vulnerable.
Renewed 🇷🇺 attacks on #Bakhmut were repelled so far, but breakthroughs may happen any day. Any of them will force ...
Jun 1, 2022 9 tweets 3 min read
Finally, there are also positive surprises comming out of Berlin, and this one is huge.
@Bundeskanzler announced 🇺🇦 will get #IrisT-SLM air defence missile.
Why is this so impiortant?
faz.net/aktuell/politi… 🇺🇦 needs an air defence capability above 3000m altitude. Otherwise the Russian Aerospace force will just fly high and avoid MANPADS (Singer, Igla & Grom).
Flying high degrades accuracy, but RuAF give little about collateral damage anyway.
May 20, 2022 19 tweets 6 min read
1/ So after a long time a wrap up tweet on where we are in the 🇷🇺>🇺🇦 war. I wanted to do this a long time ago, esp. as our last @ecfr twitter space was some time in the past. But this 👇 delayed everything a bit. 2/ Russian breakthrough near #Popansa yesterday a shark reminder that the #Donbas offensive is still ongoing. 🇺🇦 hold most lines, but such breakthroughs are always possible as long as the offensive is going on.
Apr 21, 2022 7 tweets 3 min read
So, there finally is some movement in the 🇩🇪 arms delivery debate. A "swap deal" seems to be on the way with 🇸🇮: Germany will give #Marder IFV and #Fuchs APC to Slovenia, in turn Slovenia will give M-84 MBT to 🇺🇦.
faz.net/aktuell/politi… The M-84 is a Yugoslav copy of the T-72, with inferior armour compared to the T-72B and T-64 UA is using right now. 🇸🇮 uses 14 for training and has further 32 in store.
While of course one may wonder why 🇸🇮 wants to trade an MBT with an IFV, the low numbers indicate that these...
Apr 5, 2022 13 tweets 3 min read
1/ Mein heutiger #servicetweet in 🇩🇪 zur #Marder Debatte, da sich hier auch im #Miltwitter gehörige Fehleinschätzungen breit machen!!!
1⃣ Die in Frage stehenden Marder stammen NICHT aus beständen der Bundeswehr. Es handelt sich um ausgeschiedene Fahrzeuge, die wieder ... 2/ ... beim Hersteller stehen.
2⃣ laut Hersteller würde die logischische Vorarbeit und Einschulung des Wartungs- und Bedienpersonals sowie einer "Ukrainisierung" des Fahrzeuges 4 Monate dauern.
3⃣ Allerdings sind diese 100 Marder in keinem guten Zustand, die BW hat nicht umsonst