News🔥 on Germany's double-digit billion€ #CCfD/#KSV program for climate-neutral industry.
The binding call-of-interest starts NOW, deadline in 2 months, a precondition to participate in the 1st tender. bmwk.de/klimaschutzver…
Quick thread with infos & academic background 1/
Carbon contracts-for-difference (#CCfD, in German #Klimaschutzverträge, #KSV) are a policy instrument to guarantee a fixed carbon price to innovative low-carbon industrial projects, for each ton of emission reductions below the conventional benchmark technology. 2/
This is done via a project-specific two-sided contract-for-difference on the EU ETS price and EU BAT benchmarks as baseline (as first proposed in 2017 here: diw.de/documents/publ…, and peer-reviewed in comparison to one-sided CfD/price floor here: sciencedirect.com/science/articl…) 3/
In the German case, next to CO2 price uncertainty, energy-price uncertainties are also hedged by the contract by indexing the contract to price changes so as to limit uncertainties and costs to industry and the public (as proposed here: climatestrategies.org/publication/ca…). 4/
Contracts are awarded in a competitive tender. In principle calls can be open for all industrial activities covered by the EU ETS, such as energy-intensive industries such as steel, cement and bulk chemical production, but also other sectors (e.g. large-scale high-temperature).5/
Only technologies with 60% reductions (compared to the conventional baseline) by end of 3rd year, and 90% reductions by the end of the 15 year contract are eligible. There’s also a minimum size of 10 kt CO2-eq/year. (as measured by the emissions of the conventional baseline) 6/
There's a lot of technical details to write about (how does CO2 & energy-price hedging work in detail; how does the tendering process work;what are the benchmarks, payment ceilings), but for now here the links to the official government information (pending state aid approval) 7/
For now all infos on German #CCfDs can be found here (in German), Funding guideline, Standard contract, Forms to participate in call-of interest, as well as a handbook and Excel-Tool w. examples can be found here: bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/A…
Updates here: bmwk.de/klimaschutzver… 8/
Personally, I’m immensely happy this program to support deep emissions reductions in industry is coming, and that together with many others I could do my part, academically, as well as applied, to help realise it. End/
Further addition, @valenvogl's comparison of ccfd with other policies for early clean steel commercialisation: tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
(I forgot and Valentin was to polite to mention it).
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Viele der Themen in dem lesenswerten Report wurden differenziert beleuchtet; bei Nodalpreisen vs Zonensplit fiel die Diskussion durch @andreasloeschel, @GrimmVeronika, @felixmatthes und Anne Held m.E. leider zu einseitig aus. 1/
Die drei Argumente gegen Nodalpreise im Report greifen m.E. nicht (Referenzen am Ende): 1) Marktmacht: wird in den US bereits effektiv addressiert. 2) Verteilungseffekte: liegen i.d.R. unterhalb der Unterschiede von Netzentgelten, und können (durch FTRs) addressiert werden
2/
3) Ist zu komplex: Nodalpreise funktionieren in mehreren Märkten in den USA. Kopplungslösungen zwischen Nodal-Märkten funktionieren auch - man muss also nicht zwangsläufig alles in einem Algorithmus haben. Insofern bräuchte es da quantitative Analysen was umsetzbar ist!
3/
Kohlekompromiss & Wasserbett-Effekt (@c_endt)
Die Wirkung des Wasserbetts-Effekt sollte man aus zwei Gründen hinterfragen:
- die Marktstabilitätsreserve hat die relativ simple ETS-Cap durch etwas deutlich komplizierteres ersetzt
- Wechselwirkung Politik und EU ETS Cap 1/
Punkt 1: die MSR ist ein Mechanismus welcher "überschüssige" Zertifikate die über einem Gewissen Korridor liegen entfernt. D.h. solange der Korridor nicht erreicht wird, werden also "überschüssige Kohlezertifikate" entfernt. Und das ist aktuell noch der Fall! 2/
Die Wechselwirkungen von Timing der Emissionseinsparungen, ETS, MSR und Erwartungen der Marktteilnehmer sind absolut nicht trivial, und haben eine heiße Debatte ausgelöst, startend hier: nature.com/articles/s4155… (Replik und Matters Arising) 3/
My interpretation of the proposals is slightly different: 1. IMO especially the DG proposal is limited to RES, nuclear and lignite (specified in text as "inframarginal generators"). Excluding hard coal, oil, hydro & flex 2. Potentially a uniform price cap (for some tech). 1/3
Why does it matter, and why would this be potentially better policy:
- hard coal is close to gas, especially considering ramps and unit commitment costs. Plus varying transport costs. Including it risks higher gas usage.
- similar arguments for oil, hydro, flex and others
2/3
Uniform cap (for some technologies):
Maintains relative advantage of low-fuel cost technologies that typically need to earn back more of their investments costs via infra-marginal rents
3/3