1/ This very good thread from @TomGiuretis highlights the vital role that the canals fed from the Dnipro play in the agriculture of southern Ukraine and Crimea. But I thought I'd add a historical perspective to how the canals changed life there.
2/ As Tom says, and I can attest as well having been there myself, it's a completely flat landscape of endless fields. It's watered by four major canals and innumerable side canals and irrigation channels. The Dnipro's water has made it a hugely productive farming region.
3/ That, however, is quite a recent development. The canals were only built between the 1950s and the 1980s by the Soviet Union. Before then, the region south of the Dnipro was a hot, arid, dusty plain with frequent droughts, dust storms and crop failures.
4/ This has had significant military consequences in the past. Russian armies under Prince Vasily Golitsyn attempted to invade the region in 1687 and 1689, but found their horses starving for the lack of any grass to eat. They retreated and lost 70,000 men in the process.
5/ Although the soil was fertile and the warm climate allowed for long growing seasons, the problem was that there wasn't enough water. Soviet agronomists found that it took 500 tons of water to grow a single ton of grain in the region.
5/ Leonid Melnikov, who served as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the last years of Stalin's rule, described the situation before the construction of the canals in an article published in October 1950:
7/ "The fertile soils of these regions do not always properly reward the labours of the collective farmers... Dry winds and black dust storms frequently devastate the fields and destroy the fruits of the labour of many thousands of people.
8/ "Suffice it to say that in 60 years, at the junction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were 20 drought-stricken years in the southern districts of the Ukraine.
9/ "In those years, the yields of the principal crop – winter wheat – averaged from 0.09 to 0.3 tons per hectare, and some crops perished altogether.
The yields of grain and industrial crops in the southern Ukraine were often unstable.
10/ "Drought, occurring every three or four years, frequently assumed the proportions of a calamity and weakened the economy in the drought-stricken districts as well as that of the whole republic...
11/ "Owing to inadequate yields and insufficient development of productive livestock farming, the incomes of the collective farms in the southern districts of Kherson, Nikolayev, Zaporozyhe, and other regions were much lower than in the northern districts of the republic."
12/ (USSR Information Bulletin, October 13, 1950, p. 583)
13/ Unfortunately, Russia's reckless destruction of the dam is already leading to water draining out of the canals into the emptying Dnipro river. There's still a lot of water in the canals, but they will dry out in the next few weeks or months.
14/ It's likely to be a long time before the dam is rebuilt – that will certainly not happen while it's on a front line. In the meantime, farmers in southern Ukraine will find the land reverting to the sort of conditions which Melnikov described 73 years ago.
15/ This may happen fairly quickly. When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Ukraine blocked the North Crimean Canal to cut off the water supply. The result was a drastic change in Crimea's vegetation within only two years – the images below show the peninsula in 2016 (l) and 2018 (r).
16/ Conditions may become worse than they were before the dam's construction due to the effects of climate change, which makes prolonged droughts likelier and causes higher temperatures, increasing the stress on plants.
17/ The destruction of the dam is likely to lead to the collapse of the agricultural economies of occupied southern Ukraine and Crimea and a further exodus of people. Considering these are territories Russia claims as its own, it's an incredible act of self-destruction. /end
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1/ Simply travelling to and from the front line in Ukraine is a deadly task, due to the wide-ranging presence of drones. Many soldiers are killed before they even get near a frontline position. An account from a Russian warblogger highlights the work of "killzone runners". ⬇️
2/ 'Voenkor Kotenok' writes:
"On the front lines, they're often called "runners." They're supposedly special forces/semi-combatants on errands. They're supposedly as nimble as sperm, evading even drones."
3/ "The attitude is somewhat dismissive, as if they're not second-class citizens, but rather just helpers. They say there are "tough guys," assault troops, a military elite (and there is one, right?), and then there are the runners, the lackeys. You get the idea.
1/ Telegram will not be restored in Russia, and tighter restrictions will be imposed on mobile phone ownership, says Sergey Boyarsky, head of the State Duma IT Committee. He cites scammers, pro-Ukrainian sabotage, and drone attacks as the reasons behind these moves. ⬇️
2/ In a wide-ranging interview with the St Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka, Boyarsky has explained the thinking behind the government's new restrictions on Telegram. He says that "Telegram doesn't comply with Russian Federation law, and hasn't done so for many years."
3/ "The requirements are simple, basic: localise user data within the Russian Federation, remove prohibited information (extremism, terrorism), and cooperate with law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes (for example, the Crocus [terroist attack] case)."
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.