This photo tweeted by @RALee85 shows Bradley’s and Leo II’s damaged (obvious thrown tracks, apparent mine damage). This is part of combat.
It also speaks to the need for trained maintenance teams to conduct rapid BDAR (battle damage assessment and repair) on high-tech kit 1/
This is the kind of thing I’ve been tweeting about for months. The training of the logisticians, mechanics, repair teams who have established supply chains & available parts
.
There’s even a manual for BDAR (attached). 2/
There WILL be damaged (& some destroyed) western equipment on the offensive battlefield…from direct hits, mine strikes, or even just the “track slap” that comes with heavy track vehicles going over rough terrain.
Things break - a lot - in combat. 3/
The US Army puts a focus on this at all our training centers.
Commanders are forced to look at their daily OR (operational ready) rates (the availability of equipment & what parts/rapid they need). 4/
This one picture drives home a key point:
It’s important to train crews on their tanks…
It’s MORE important to train mechanics, logisticians, supporters, and that takes longer (and is more complex when there are myriad types of equipment.). 5/
Ukraine’s Defense Minister @oleksiireznikov said yesterday Ukraine has - for example - 10 different types of donated artillery pieces.
He and @SecDef have worked to get lots of the equipment of the same type, but that’s not always possible. But it’s important to try. 6/
The UAF is putting these puzzle pieces together, training on their operational capabilities & offensive tactics.
But in case anyone has missed the point, training for repair & support and the availability of parts are often a limiting factor in combat. 7/
With all these new technologies, Ukraine is a formidable force.
Early “hiccups” happen, and offensive ops incur more casualties than the defense.
Ukraine will learn, grow & prevail in this operation. 8/8
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My first contact with @CNN was in 2003, in Baghdad.
I was the assistant division commander of @1stArmoredDiv. One of my duties was "working with the press" (assigned to me by the Division Commander)
During combat, a "stringer" -an Iraqi reporter working for CNN - was killed. 2/
A CNN reporters - @janearraf - asked if I could escort a visiting exec - @EasonJordan - from the Baghdad airport to their bureau. It would speed him and keep him safe along the "highway of death."
I said yes. I met Eason, threw him in my HMMWV, then took him downtown. 3/
Against my better judgement, I thought I would engage @TrentTelenko on his 🧵, to perhaps defend some of those - as he says - are throwing "horses**t against the wall."
Here's a shorter 🧵 suggesting some things that Trent (& others) may not be considering. 1/
First, I'd like to compliment the Telenko family - especially his father - for service during a critical time in our Army. I was a young LT/CPT during that transformational period & saw some of the things Trent mentions when I commanded platoons, companies, & served as an S3. 2/
Most of the run-up Trent gets right.
Cost cap & capabilities guidance for the original M1 is correct. In both cases, cost grew & requirements changed (like they always do).
Also, the M1 grew out of 10+ yrs of the MBT-70 program w/ W. Germany. 3/
The failure or destruction of the #NovaKakhovka dam will cause significant humanitarian issues and it will certainly affect the execution of Ukraine's offense & Russian defensive operations.
UKR has stated they anticipated this potential disaster. 1/5
Generating hydroelectric power & irrigation for most of the Kurdish and northern Iraqi provinces, it was considered the most poorly constructed dam in the world.
Like the NK Dam in Ukraine, it had about 11.1 km3 of water, and it's destruction would have been catastrophic. 3/
The “hush” video posted by Ukraine is a reflection of this.
No bragging, no bluster, no indicators of what is happening…just a nuanced “we’re ready, and we’re about to go.”
You never underestimate your enemy, but you must be confident in your potential. 2/
Compare that to what’s happening on the Russian side, today:
-more messaging by Prigozhin about dysfunction in RU govt & military
-Russian mutineers killing commander before deserting
-anti-Putin militias continue attack in Shebekino & beyond 3/
In opening, I stated I’ve never been opposed to providing any type of equipment to Ukraine, but rather I’ve attempted to outline the availability, logistics, training, immediate use, national security aspect & cost (political & fiscal) challenges of each item. 2/
Each nation has their own way of war, and the methods, approaches, equipment, training & doctrine are trained & refined over decades by the armies of those nations.
When a nation goes to war, the training, systems, equipment, processes & doctrine kicks in. 3/
…happening at once.
-intelligence prep of the battlefield (with shaping operations, raids, deception, etc)
-a great plan with a solid synchronization matrix
-various means to suppress the enemy (artillery, direct fire, electronic jamming & other means)
-obscuring the breach 2/
-a well-rehearsed breach force with plows, mine clearing charges, “cutters,” etc
-marking of the breach lanes for a well-rehearsed follow-on force that will hold the shoulders of the breach
-a plan to the attack or bypass the defending force that is over watching the breach
…3/