1/ The destruction of the Kakhovka dam will cause calamitous economic, social and humanitarian impacts across southern Ukraine, including the loss of much of the region's agriculture, industry and the drinking water of hundreds of thousands of people. ⬇️
2/ Ihor Pylypenko, the Dean of Kherson State University's Faculty of Biology, Geography and Ecology, has given an interview setting out the likely impacts of the dam's destruction. He's previously written about the risks in the German journal 'Osteuropa'.
3/ Pylypenko notes that the dam was toppled at the worst possible time – just before midsummer and when the Kakhovka reservoir was at a near-record high. Its destruction now is peculiarly self-defeating given that the flooding affects the Russian-held side particularly badly.
4/ "The left bank suffers more than the right; the right bank is high and relatively steep. Relatively speaking, every 10 centimetre increase in the water level of the Dnipro means 15 metres of flooding on the left bank and only 3 metres on the right bank."
5/ He notes that the volume of water released by the breach has been enormous – between 4.5 to 5 cubic kilometres of water a day (1.3 trillion gallons / 5 trillion litres). This is already causing huge ecological effects downstream and is likely to badly affect the Black Sea.
6/ Pylypenko also provides a detailed analysis of the economic impacts, particularly on agriculture (on which see also the threads linked below). The reservoir supplied water to more than 12,000 kilometers of canals.
7/ The Russian-occupied Azov region depends for its water supply on canals leading from the Dnipro. They will cease to flow when the water falls too low to supply them, which is already happening (see thread below).
8/ The Kakhovka canal, which relied on pumps lifting water from the reservoir to a height of 30m, is no longer functioning. This has cut the water supply to cities such as Melitopol and Berdyansk, as well as all the settlements between them, affecting 400,000 people.
9/ This canal alone supported the irrigation of about 220,000 hectares of land – 190,000 in the Kherson region and 30,000 in the south-west of the Zaporizhia region – and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people in the agricultural sector.
10/ As well as cutting off drinking water supplies, the loss of the reservoir may shut down water-hungry industries such as the metallurgical facilities at Nikopol, which are on the Ukrainian side of the Dnipro.
11/ The North Crimean Canal, which supplies 85 percent of Crimea's water, will not function when the water level falls below about 10 metres – at current outflow rates, this will happen by Sunday. Apart from some aquifers in the Oleshky Sands area, the region is otherwise arid.
12/ Pylypenko notes that annual rainfall in the Azov region is only 350 millimeters while evaporation amounts to 1000-1100 mm. It'll dry out very quickly, within a single season. Crops grown for livestock feed and export such as soybeans and onions will no longer be viable.
13/ This has grave effects for the human population. 150,000 to 200,000 people are forecast to lose their jobs in the Kherson region alone. Many towns and villages will no longer be economically viable. Up to 420,000 agricultural jobs are potentially at risk.
14/ The region's population grew by 340% after the canals were built between the 1950s and 1980s, due to the increased water supply and agricultural opportunities. Pylypenko estimates that a population of only half as much is now sustainable.
15/ The right-bank region around the city of Kherson will be less affected, as it depends primarily on locally supplied but poor-quality water from the Inhulets river, rather than the Dnipro. That said, Dnipro water was used to irrigate a radius of around 40 km from Kherson.
16/ Crimea will be very severely affected, as it was before when Ukraine cut off the water supply in 2014. In February 2021, the Simferopol reservoir was only 7% full. Arable land fell from 130,000 hectares in 2013 — a fraction of Soviet-era levels — to 14,000 in 2017.
17/ Unlike the concrete-lined Kakhovka canal, the North Crimean Canal – which was built in a much simpler (and therefore cheaper) fashion in the Khrushchev era – has a bed of earth. It drains completely by the end of the irrigation season, so it will be empty in a few weeks.
18/ Before 2014, Crimea used over 700 million cubic litres of water during the relatively short irrigation period (spring and summer). When Russia launched the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it unblocked the North Crimean Canal almost immediately to restore the water flow.
19/ Nonetheless, despite a high-profile relaunch of irrigation by Crimea's governor Sergey Aksyonov in April 2022, the water flow was only restored to 80 million cubic litres and the amount of arable land increased only to 25,000 hectares.
20/ During the years of drought, the irrigation infrastructure in Crimea was reportedly "almost completely lost, plundered" and required the expenditure of 14.5 billion ($177 million) rubles to restore.
21/ This year, Crimea planned to increase the area under cultivation to 40,000 hectares and to bring more than 300 million cubic metres through the canal. Now the water has been cut off entirely, plunging Crimean farmers into long-term crisis.
22/ Pylypenko is hopeful that the dam can be restored within three years (the Soviets took five years to build it), due to improved construction technology. The reservoir itself will take a year to refill. But this will depend on peace being restored.
23/ "In case of a negative scenario, of course, nothing can be restored ... Without irrigation there will be no supply of drinking water. There will again be the situation of the 1930s-50s of the last century: a sparse, small population, sparse villages, imported water." /end
1/ Six months ago, the newly built Russian Navy tugboat Kapitan Ushakov capsized at its moorings during its final outfitting, when it was 97% complete. It's still there today, resting on its side, leading to some hard questions for the Northern Fleet. ⬇️
2/ The only thing that seems to have changed after six months is that the boat is now encased in ice at the Baltic Shipyard pier in St. Petersburg. It's an "endless disgrace", 'Military Informant' complains. But how and why has it not been raised?
3/ The shipyard's owner, Yaroslavl Shipyard (YaSZ), says that because the vessel "is being built under a state defence contract ... there is no permission to disclose this information or comment on it."
1/ Russian ultra-nationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin predicts that Western civilization will collapse due to the Epstein files, clearing the way for Russia and China to take over. He calls for all-out opposition to the West, and for Russia to save Iran from Donald Trump. ⬇️
2/ Dugin writes:
"The West, thanks to Epstein's lists, is beginning to crumble before our eyes. Russia and China have a historic opportunity to become the beneficiaries of the total collapse of the entire Western system.
3/ "Now it's no longer a matter of right or left, if they have a "right" like Epstein Island (or a left). It's time to end the West.
1/ Russia is reportedly considering proposing a wide-ranging economic partnership with the Trump administration, including joint cooperation to push fossil fuels as an alternative to Chinese and European clean energy solutions, in opposition to curbing climate change. ⬇️
2/ Bloomberg is reporting that Russia has prepared a seven-point memo that includes a return to the dollar settlement system, reversing Putin's by now well-established policy of creating an alternative system insulated from US economic pressure.
3/ The proposals also include joint US-Russian ventures in manufacturing, nuclear energy, oil and LNG extraction, preferential conditions for US companies in Russia to compensate for past losses, cooperation on raw materials, and jointly working against clean energy.
1/ Why does the Russian government appear to be so clueless about the role Telegram plays in military communications? The answer, one warblogger suggests, is that the military leadership doesn't want to admit its failure to provide its own reliable communications solutions. ⬇️
2/ Recent claims by high-ranking officials that Telegram isn't relevant to military communications have prompted howls of outrage and detailed rebuttals from Russian warbloggers, but have also pointed to a deeper problem about what reliance on Telegram (and Starlink) represents.
3/ In both cases, the Russian military has failed abysmally to provide workable solutions. Telegram and Starlink were both adopted so widely because the 'official' alternatives (military messngers and the Yamal satellite constellation) are slow, unreliable and lack key features.
1/ Telegram is deeply embedded into Russian military units' internal communications, providing functionality that MAX, the Russian government's authorised app, doesn't have. A commentary highlights the vast gap that is being opened up by the government's blocking of Telegram. ⬇️
2/ The Two Majors Charitable Foundation writes that without Telegram, information exchange, skills transfer, and moral mobilisation work within the Russian army will be crippled:
3/ "I'd really like to add that for a long time, we've been gathering specialized groups in closed chats, including those focused on engineering and UAVs, to share experiences and build a knowledge base. Almost everyone there is a frontline engineer.
1/ Russia's Federal Customs Service is seeking to prosecute Russian volunteers who are importing reconnaissance drones from China to give to frontline troops. It's the latest chapter in a saga of bureaucratic obstruction that is blocking vital supplies to the Russian army. ⬇️
2/ Much of the army's equipment, and many of its drones, are purchased with private money by volunteer supporters or the soldiers themselves. High-tech equipment such as drones and communications equipment is purchased in China or Central Asia and imported into Russia.
3/ However, the Federal Customs Service has been a major blocker. Increased customs checks on the borders have meant that cargo trucks have suffered delays of days or even weeks, drastically slowing the provision of essential supplies for the Russian army.