It looks like Ukraine is "playing the attrition card" in trying to spread out the Russian reserves over a wide area within drone directed artillery range.
Youtube channels are reporting heavy AFU use of 155mm
...delivered scatterable mines to pin RuAF mobile counter-attack forces in place inside Ukraine's artillery fan, to get them worked over by drone directed shelling.
This points out the fact drone directed artillery is now a very lethal tank killer.
2/
@noclador talks to this thought in this excellent thread, particularly how the lack of gun based air defense, to prevent small DJI class artillery observation drones from doing their thing, caused AFU vehicle casualties.⬇️
* The WMD declassifications of the 2nd Clinton Administration made for extremely interesting reading for the right kind of military history nerd.
Ukraine's wide but shallow offensive reflects its unique strategic position compared to Western powers.
The Western militaries
7/
...attack to try and achieve war termination as soon as possible, to avoid an impatient public voting inside a bloody war.
The Ukrainian people know its current war will last as long as Russia exists.😭
This gives Ukraine strategic patience unmatched by Western democracies.
8/
The combination of RuAF tacnukes and that existential conflict based strategic patience is resulting in a different and attrition based AFU offensive that is a mirror image of it's Bakhmut defensive.
Ukraine is only attacking hard enough to draw out Russian mobile reserves
9/
...and artillery in order to kill both in large numbers such that the Russian fortified line will break somewhere.
RuAF committed committed their last credible strategic reserves (i.e. the two VDV Bdes) in Bakhmut, where they are pinned with the AFU advancing on both flanks.
10/
This explains neatly why Russia blew the Kakovka dam. The Dnipro front was the only place RuAF could generate any ground reserves from.
Ground reserves that AFU's shallow/wide Zaporizhzhia/Bakhmut offensives are killing.
Since Kherson has a climate like SoCal.
11/
In about a week and a half, AFU will have a dried out, much shallower, Dnipro river line to cross.
David Axe of Forbes has had a couple of recent articles on the arctic/soft ground/amphibious vehicles the West has transferred to AFU.
AFU is playing a very strategically patient & opportunistic offensive strategy that is about only committing enough Ukrainians to make the Russians come out in the open to be killed at stand off ranges.
Since it outnumbers Russia inside Ukraine. It can push everywhere
13/
...while looking for a break it can put a brigade sized operational maneuver group* (OMG) into the Russian operational rear.
* The acronym _OMG_ had a lot of end of the world, late Cold War nuclear exchange implications that, thankfully,
14/
...most people today have no idea ever existed.
This is why you hear Russians on Telegram channels complaining vociferously that they have no counter-battery & that AFU ground forces with Western vehicles are now attacking at night, where their thermal sites give Ukraine
15/
...an advantage and most Russian Lancet & DJI drones lack the night vision to operate in.
AFUs wide front "Recon in force" offensive is slowly chewing through Russian fortified lines with Western equipment delivered stand-off fire favorable exchange rates until it breaks.
16/
And, IMO, some time in the next 10 days RuAF will break.
Whether it's in the Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Donetsk or the dried out and the now Russian Dnipro river fortification less Kherson fronts doesn't matter.
AFU has the interior lines, tech & the numerical reserve
17/
...advantages to do this.
And the Ukraine supported Russian insurgent Belgorod offensive demonstrated the Putin Regime lacked the military reserves to stop it.
I'm still got my chips on 22 June 2023 for the AFU breakthrough.
18/18 End
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This 🧵is a Telenko family history of the development of the M-1 Abrams tank with my observations of the horses--t being thrown against the wall implying Ukraine cannot operate the Abrams.
The man below is the late Col. George Telenko, West Point Class of 1962. 1/
Dad was the armor officer the US Army chose to turn the Lima Army Modification Center into the Lima Army Tank Plant in the late 1970's.
As I was going to high school at Lima Shawnee, Dad was turning a repurposed steam train manufacturing facility into a state of the art
2/
...tank manufacturing plant. Today it is known as the "Joint Manufacturing Center - Lima."
When this tank rolled out to the media in 1980.
I was there as a reporter for the Lima Shawnee student newspaper. Nepotism has its privileges'...
The explosive detonation for this was bigger than the WW2 Dambusters breaches.
Clearly this is a lot of pre-placed demolition charges being activated.
No missile in Ukrainian service can deliver that much explosive payload, nor in three distinct blasts.
2/5
Issues going forward:
1. ZNPP nuclear cooling once the water abates
2. Crimean canal is fed from this reservoir. The dam destruction means Putin does not plan to keep water flowing to Crimea i.e. he no longer thinks RuAF can hold Crimea.
3/5
Welcome to the era of "NCO Air Forces," drones in the hands of non-commissioned officers supporting light infantry companies and platoons with local airpower sporting precision firepower.
Big centralized western air forces and artillery organizations now have a combat 1/
Drones are a disruptive innovation to big costly platforms as they provide some of the big platforms firepower capabilities very cheaply.
In addition, drones give local 'G-ds eye view' infantry never had before while the big platforms are completely
2/
...irrelevant in stopping the drone threat.
This is a prescription to disinvest in big platforms to provide small infantry formations with organic electronic warfare capabilities to deal with drones.