The Classified Docs🧵:
There have been lots of questions on why these 31 classified (CL) docs were selected and how they will be used. This thread addresses three questions (1) Why the 31 docs? (2) Will the docs be declassified? (3) How will the CL docs impact the trial?
1. Why so many docs? It’s common in cases involving mishandling of CL docs to charge multiple CL docs to capture extent of harm & protect the case if issues arise w/ a doc—e.g., jury thinks doc doesnt contain “national defense” info (NDI) as required under 18 USC 793(e).
One theme identified by others is that some of the CL docs are grouped by theme and date.
That has the benefit of allowing DOJ to have a single witness testify about the topic in those grouped docs and why that info pertains to the “national defense.” It thus can help streamline the case.
Additionally, I suspect we’ll later learn the charged CL docs were found in multiple rooms at Mar-a-Lago. As noted by others, the indictment doesn’t provide such specificity. That distinction between the rooms may become important depending on the evidence presented at trial.
2. The CL docs do not have to be declassified. DOJ can and likely will just show the docs to the jury as classified and not “publish” or show them to the public. This is the most common method to prove a case involving unlawful retention of CL docs.
While there is speculation DOJ may declassify some of the docs, that is very unlikely. First, that is not normally how these cases are proved. Second, the indictment doesnt signal that they are no longer classified.
Third, the docs HOPEFULLY still contain sensitive info—as in the info has not been fully compromised by FTOPUS’ mishandling of them.
And, finally, declassification would undermine the argument that they are NDI. Even though DOJ technically must only prove the docs were NDI at the time of the unlawful retention, declassifying now raises the question that perhaps they really aren’t/weren’t that sensitive.
Additionally, if DOJ was going to declassify them, I would have expected to see more lightly sensitive docs, such as more SECRET docs. But these are highly sensitive docs.
3. How will CL docs impact the trial? They will create significant delay and litigation risk. Using CL docs, which is required in cases involving the retention of NDI under Espionage Act, involves a separate process for discovery and litigation.
Much of the analysis concerns the Classified Information Procedures Act (#CIPA), and there are multiple articles explaining the Act. CIPA is a separate process for using CL info in a prosecution.
First Complication: Security Clearances. At least one defense counsel will need a security clearance (likely an interim clearance). While FBI will expedite the process, some of the docs are very sensitive so process could take longer. We also dont know the entire defense team.
Second Complication: Educating the Court. Most judges are unfamiliar w/ CIPA b/c it's rarely used. So DOJ will file a motion under CIPA Section 2 to have a conference to educate the Court. I anticipate DOJ will file the motion very soon—it’ll be one of their first motions
Third Complication: Litigation. Per standard practice, I expect DOJ already reviewed potentially discoverable CL info before indicting FPOTUS and is already prepared to argue why certain CL docs do not need to be produced under CIPA to defense counsel.
This process takes time and will be unfamiliar to the judge. Critically, defense may seek to push for discovery of unexpected classified info w/ novel arguments or try to use at trial the CL material it did receive in discovery, which could lead to delay and complication.
This CIPA process can also lay the foundation for graymail down the road. Graymail is when a defendant tries to defend themselves by disclosing CL info in a way that could force the government to choose between continuing prosecution or endangering national security.
Defense counsel isn’t likely to create graymail issues w/ the 31 docs, which the Intel Community has already determined can be shown to a jury. The problem is with any other classified material.
As the parties and Court try to assess how long it will take to bring this case to trial—which is a significant issue since the primaries begin in 7 months—the above issues are why the CL docs will cause delay.
Fortunately for DOJ, multiple attorneys on the prosecution team are incredibly experienced with CIPA and these issues—among the most experienced in the country—so risk and delays will be minimized. But they are also unavoidable.
Forgot to include this CIPA explainer from my former colleague:
Four reactions to this list🧵(1) Listed Espionage Act charge only mentions 'retention' and not disseminating the classified docs. Disseminating would have signaled that FPOTUS caused more serious harm to nat'l security. Curious if indictment nevertheless describes dissemination
(2) The 'retention' reference could be one count or multiple counts. It's not uncommon for each classified doc allegation to be a separate count.
(3) Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice. We will soon learn with whom FPOTUS conspired. Conspiracy allegation will also potentially help DOJ admit certain evidence.
The Declass Defense 🧵: FPOTUS’s recent stmts that he declassified “everything” and may have done it secretly (“by thinking about it”) merit a review of how a secret declassification order would impact an Espionage Act charge for retaining nat'l defense info (“retention charge").
As a starting point, the fact that a document has been declassified is typically relevant to a retention charge, even though the law does not specifically refer to classified information. The Espionage Act predates our current classification procedures and nomenclature. /1
And although an appellate court just held the declassification question is a “red herring,” that decision concerned the narrow issue of whether FPOTUS could have a personal interest in docs w/ classification markings and thus deprive the DOJ of the docs—he could not. /2
If ALL docs were actually declassified, which is not supported by the record at this time, it would be RELEVANT to whether DOJ would charge Espionage Act(18 USC 793(e)) even though the law doesn't say classified info. /1
DOJ explained in footnote 2 of affidavit that 793(e) uses the term “national defense information” (NDI) not classified info, and courts have held NDI means the info must be “closely held” and some courts have held disclosure of docs “must be potentially damaging to the US.” /2
If DOJ believed docs had been declassified, it would need to know when, why, and how they were declassified, which would bear on whether they could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the docs were still “closely held” and that disclosure would be potentially damaging. /3
One topic left unaddressed in Judge Cannon’s order is the issue w/ providing appropriate clearance for FPOTUS attys (if DOJ’s appeal is denied). It is more complicated than simply providing “necessary clearance requirements,” as ordered by the court. 🧵 1/
In the typical case where classified docs must be provided to defendant's attys, the attys fill out a questionnaire, undergo an expedited clearance review, and obtain a “limited security approval,” as my former colleague notes @secretsandlaws /2
But such a “limited” clearance is for SECRET and TOP SECRET docs. It is normally not sufficient for more highly classified information known as compartmented information, SCI (Sensitive Compartmented Information), some of which was seized at Mar-a-Lago. /3
Next Monday is a big day for the Foreign Agents Registration Act (#FARA) and foreign influence in the US—on top of what has already been a big year (DOJ has charged a record number of people w/ acting as unregistered agents of foreign govts). /1
First, the Tom Barrack trial begins for acting as an unregistered agent of UAE (in violation of 18 USC 951). It’s only the second trial of a person alleged to be acting as a foreign govt agent to influence people in the US (most other cases involve espionage-like activity). /2
Second, Kaveh Afrasiabi is scheduled to plead guilty to violating FARA for acting as an unregistered agent of Iran. Afrasiabi allegedly lobbied a Congressman, counseled Iranian diplomats, made TV appearances, and authored articles to promote Iran govt policies. /3
There have been some harsh critiques of DOJ’s staffing of the Mar-a-Lago investigation in response to my thread below. So I want to provide additional color. 1/
Jay Bratt, the Chief of CES, spent extensive time in DC as an AUSA and knows that district well. Julie Edelstein is one of the country’s most experienced espionage prosecutors. So DOJ has put its two best national security attorneys at the helm on this one. 2/
We don’t know if there’s also an experienced AUSA working behind the scenes. What we do know based on the events of the past few weeks is that a US Attorney’s Office is not heavily involved, at this time. 3/