Greek shipping oligarchs and the EU 1. Russia in H1 '23 exports more oil than ever (blue). That is possible only thanks to Greek-owned tankers (red), who - since Russia invaded Ukraine - stepped in to transport Russian oil big time. Greek ships are 50% of total tanker capacity...
2. Greek shipping oligarchs shifted their tankers to help Russia after the invasion. Greek ships were 33% of total tanker capacity out of Russian ports prior to the invasion. Since then, this number is up to 50%. This means Putin's war machine depends critically on Greek ships...
3. Russia exports 83% of its shipborne oil out of Black Sea (lhs) and Baltic (rhs) ports. Greek-owned oil tankers make up 75% of tanker capacity out of Black Sea ports and 60% out of Baltic ports (blue). There is NO Russian war machine - no war in Ukraine - without Greek ships...
4. So the EU is in a unique position to curtail Putin's money machine. But it hasn't done that. Instead, it's allowed itself to be lobbied by Greek shipping oligarchs, who first opposed the G7 price cap and - when it became inevitable - undercut it by lobbying for a high $60 cap.
5. Greek lobbying of the EU rests on two points. The first is: if Greek ships don't transport Russian oil, someone else will. This argument is total nonsense, as no one else has the capacity that Greek shipping oligarchs have. There's no alternative to Greek ships for Russia...
6. The second point Greek lobbyists make: if the G7 cap is lowered from $60, Russia will retaliate with production cuts. This point has also been exposed to be total nonsense. Russia desperately needs cash for its war. Cutting the cap to $50 won't see any Russian retaliation...
7. By shifting so much of their tankers to help Russia, Greek shipping oligarchs have - in a commercial sense - aligned themselves with Putin. There is NO reason for the EU to listen to their lobbying. The EU needs to step up and push for a lowering of the G7 cap to at least $50.
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Take aways from the IMF/WB meetings 1. European denial: Europeans converged on DC this week. The degree of denial on the shift in geopolitics that Russia's invasion of Ukraine signifies is alarming. Short-termism rules. A strategic vision is woefully missing. A huge problem...
2. European strategic autonomy: there's a surprising number of folks who - in the event of a Trump win - advocate a European pivot towards China. Seriously? China allied itself firmly with Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. You may not like Trump, but this would be a disaster...
3. End to war in Ukraine: underlying this is a view in Europe that a rapid end to the war is good for the EU, the epitome of EU short-termism. Europeans crave an end to uncertainty, but that won't come by conceding Ukrainian territory to Putin. Putin will only be emboldened...
The Euro zone is like a bad game. There's high debt and low debt countries. The goal of high debt countries is to shift as much of their debt onto low debt countries, so they never have to pay down debt. Crazy thing is: low debt countries allow this to happen. High debt wins...
The key balance sheet for this debt shift is the ECB, where a complex jargon exists to hide this debt transfer. For example, high debt means yields periodically spike when there's global shocks. In the ECB vernacular, this gets called "fragmentation" and has to be prevented...
Calling yield spikes "fragmentation" sounds like there's financial market dysfunction, when markets are really just pricing a risk premium. Only way to prevent that risk premium is for the ECB - over time - to buy lots of debt from high debt countries. That's the debt transfer...
Western gaslighting on Russia sanctions 1. The German word for gaslighting is "Nebelkerze," which means "fog candle." Many western commodity experts and journalists loudly claim the G7 oil price cap can't work, while endorsing financial sanctions on Russia. They're gaslighting...
2. It's exactly the other way around. Financial sanctions on Russia can't work, while the G7 cap is the only way to squeeze Putin. We sanctioned some of Russia's banks (red), so money just flows via non-sanctioned banks (blue). Putin still gets ALL the hard currency he wants...
3. The driver of Russia's hard currency inflows is the current account surplus. If you sanction some banks, you're just redirecting financial flows. The fix is to sanction ALL banks, which is equivalent to a trade embargo (since Putin can no longer get paid and won't export)...
A. Russia sanctions 1. Financial sanctions on Russia don't work 2. We sanctioned Russia central bank (red) 3. Russia switched to using Gazprombank (blue) 4. Russia still earned the same amount of cash 5. Only way to fix this is to sanction all banks 6. That's like an oil embargo
B. Lesson is that you can't hurt a current account surplus country by sanctioning some of its banks. You have to sanction all banks, but that's like a trade embargo, since Putin won't export oil if he can't get paid. The G7 cap recognizes this. It targets the current account...
C. People who support financial sanctions and criticize the G7 cap ignore 18 months of data. We have 18 months of sanctions and a G7 cap that was undercut from the beginning. The result: Russia is back to earning big "excess" current account surpluses. Only the G7 cap fixes this.
IMF/WB meetings in Marrakesh 1. Deep gloom beneath the surface. At best, the US is seen as divided and distracted. At worst, it's seen as weak. Wars in Ukraine and Israel are symptoms of this. Many think the US will get tested more and more, so geopolitical risk will keep rising.
2. A meta question that hangs over everything: "What if Trump gets re-elected next year?" Such an outcome is seen as being very negative for Ukraine and Europe. Even if it doesn't happen, Putin and others have every incentive to sow confusion and instability ahead of Nov. 2024...
3. Growing recognition that popular resistance is rising towards funding Ukraine and combatting climate change. Mounting resentment in EM at G10 double standards. For example, Germany fires up coal power plants, even as much of EM gets lectured on the need for a green transition.
@steve_hanke Argentina has a population of 46 million. El Salvador has a population of 6 million, Panama has 4 million. Both countries are thus much smaller than Argentina, not to mention the fact that El Salvador has much lower per capita GDP. Not good comparators for Argentina at all...
@steve_hanke Ecuador has a population of 18 million, smaller than Argentina but better than the countries you listed. Ecuador - like Argentina - is a commodity exporter, which is key. Falling commodity prices often coincide with a soaring Dollar, which is a double whammy for dollarizers...
@steve_hanke Now let's go back to my chart. Most of Latin America did NOT dollarize. Instead, central banks were made independent, inflation was brought down, currencies were allowed to float and real GDP went up. There is no law of nature that says this cannot also be done in Argentina...