Death of Silvio #Berlusconi: expected after the recent hospitalization. Discussions on his role in Italian politics and his legacy will be polarized as those on his politics. But his departure opens up a phase of uncertainty in the 🇮🇹 party system. A🧵/1
Berlusconi was no longer the leader of the center-right, and his party, Forza Italia, has not been the hegemonic force right-of-center in the 🇮🇹 political spectrum for several years now. Still, FI's MPs (44 Chamber, 18 Senate) are decisive for the survival of Meloni's govt./2
Berlusconi never anointed a successor, even when it was clear that his leadership had become less effective than in the past: Fini, Casini, Fitto and others have all been internally defeated and outcast. FI lost votes and Berlusconi continued to manage it as a personal party. /3
Recently, also due to his health problems, he delegated to his personal collaborators (most recently to Marta Fascina, his partner) the internal management of the party. This power arrangement will not survive his death. /4 repubblica.it/politica/2023/…
Hence, with Berlusconi's departure, the volatility at the center of the 🇮🇹 political spectrum, already high, increases, and a period of uncertainty is likely to occur. Two opposite scenarios: /5
First, the center space is occupied by another center party that for now stays in coalition with Meloni and Salvini. This could be FI itself if it manages to elect another leader quickly (e.g. foreign minister Tajani), or another political container./6
In this scenario, the 🇮🇹 party system and government coalition remain essentially as they are now, with a centrist party as a junior partner (together with the Lega) of powerful Meloni's Fratelli d' Italia./7
The opposite scenario is that Berlusconi's departure spells death for his party and opens a period in which the centrist member of the government coalition does not manage to reorganize quickly. In this case, Meloni's government has a problem. /8 espresso.repubblica.it/politica/2023/…
Many FI politicians, who remained in Berlusconi's declining party due to their loyalty to (or dependence from) the leader, may defect towards Fratelli d' Italia, the most powerful member of the coalition government./9 espresso.repubblica.it/politica/2023/…
Even though it is very plausible that both Meloni and Salvini's parties, anticipating the predictable demise of Berlusconi, have been engaged in preparing the ground for FI defections to their respective parties, these may however not be enough to stabilize the coalition./10
In the short term, the situation is likely to fall between these two polar opposites: FI (as itself or transformed to something else) may continue to exist, while suffering significant defections. Meloni may have to negotiate with a much less stable center ally or allies. /11
The government may also see its majority shrink, albeit likely not by much. Some moderate FI politicians (likely a minority) may defect from the government coalition altogether. In the recent past, defections from FI have happened in both directions. /12 ilsole24ore.com/art/gelmini-la…
Centrist parties outside the government, however, have been litigious, as well as electorally unsuccessful, and have lost much of their potential attractiveness. /13 rainews.it/articoli/2023/…
Be that as it may, Berlusconi's death likely opens up a phase of additional uncertainty and volatility in 🇮🇹 politics. His personalistic power is probably one of the greatest negative legacies. It won't be easy to remedy that. /End ansa.it/english/news/p…
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A new poll in 🇮🇹 (@Corriere) confirms the trends seen in the elections and since then: in the right-wing coalition, Meloni's FdI continues to grow, Lega goes down; among the oppositions, the Democratic Party continues to slide and the 5-Star Mov. surpasses it.
A short 🧵/1
Meloni continues to cannibalize her allies, Lega in particular. Meloni's party FdI surpasses 30% (31.4% -- it got 26% of the vote last September) and Salvini's Lega continues to slide down (7.3%; -1.5% vis-a-vis the already disappointing electoral result). /2
The approval rating of Meloni is now 58% (up from 54% a month ago). Her government seems to have weathered rather well the first budget law, which was just announced. The approval rating for the govt as a whole is 55% (up from 51% in October). /3
RIGHT:
FdI (Meloni): 25% (largest party)
Lega (Salvini): 11.5%
FI (Berlusconi): 7%
LEFT:
PD: 20%
SI/Greens: 3.5%
+Eur: 2.5%
5MS: 15.5%
Azione/Italia Viva (centrists): 7%
As expected, FdI top party, and bad results for PD, Lega and FI. 5SM unexpectedly much higher than expected: 15.5%.
Conte's split paid off: his 5SM gained about 4% from the time of the split from Di Maio's (foreign minister) faction, and from his defection from Draghi's government
Even though the victory of the Meloni-Salvini-Berlusconi coalition in 🇮🇹 elections is highly likely, today's vote will have consequences on both the stability of the right and the future configuration of the left. A🧵/1
On the right, future stability will depend on how large the result of Meloni's FdI will be vis-a-vis Lega and FI, which are both in crisis..
FdI has grown largely to their detriment, in particular Salvini’s Lega. While Meloni grew from 5% to 25% Salvini fell from 34% to 13% /2
In the latest polls, FdI polled almost twice as high than Lega even in the latter’s strongholds of northeast and Lombardy. /3
No. The rhetoric of the 🇮🇹 center-right, likely winner of the next elections, is in fact aligned with that of other Eurosceptic parties. No nationalist right wing party today advocates exiting the EU/Euro, while still wanting to undermine the EU. 🧵1/12 politico.eu/article/italia…
It has become clear to all right-wing eurosceptic parties that advocating exit is a losing strategy (see Marine Le Pen in 2017)—too expensive especially for countries with a high GDP/debt ratio like Italy or France. 2/12
The new strategy of all anti-EU populists has therefore been to *hollow out* the EU, turning it into a collection of nation-states. This is what their rhetoric of ‘reforming the EU” really means. 3/12
The 🇮🇹 center-right coalition elections has just published its “coalition program”. This includes introducing “presidentialism”What is the reform likely to entail exactly?
TLDR: too extensive presidential powers and a too weak PM may lead to crisis in some circumstances.
A🧵/1
With a couple of exceptions, the CRX’s “A government for Italy” is a list of generalities too vague to be politically meaningful. We’ll have to wait until the component parties present their own programs. One such exception may be presidentialism, given CRX earlier proposals. /2
The “institutional reforms” section of the CRX program opens with “Direct election of the President of the Republic”. Berlusconi immediately said that when the reform is approved, Mattarella should resign, causing a polemic./3
The alliances for the 🇮🇹 elections of Sep 25 are now shaping up, with Calenda’s Azione and Renzi’s Italia Viva joining forces. Last polls give them at 6%.
Except some small fringe parties, such as Italexit (right) and Unions popolare (left) there will be four main actors. 🧵/1
The center-right, formed by Meloni’s FdI, Salvini’s Lega, Berlusconi’s FI, and a common list of small centrist parties, called “Noi Moderati”. Last polls give the center-right at 48%. /2
The center-left, ranging from centrist left-liberal +Europa (ex ally of Calenda before he broke up the alliance with PD) to radical left Europa Verde/SI, with PD and ex-M5S Di Mario’s small new party. Last polls: 31.5% /3